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The ability to solve complex problems in collaborative settings is considered a critical 
21st century competency.  Yet, national and international reports have revealed 
deficiencies in both students’ and employees’ teamwork and communication skills, 
which are essential when working collaboratively.  These deficits may be underlain by a 
limited understanding of how cognitive and social processes operate synchronistically as 
team members work together to solve complex problems.  The current study aimed to 
investigate how two specific processes—relational reasoning (RR) and socially shared 
regulation of learning (SSRL)—unfold during a collaborative problem-solving (CPS) 
task.  Specifically, the researcher assessed the extent to which different teams exhibited 
differential proportions of reasoning and regulation; how team activity was distributed 
across individuals; and, whether frequent sequences of reasoning and regulation could be 
identified.  
  
To address these aims, four teams of senior undergraduate students (n = 22) were 
recruited from a capstone design course in mechanical engineering.  Over the course of 
the semester, teams conceptualized and prototyped a design to address a current market 
need.  Each team was video-recorded during the conceptualization process—specifically, 
as teams evaluated and eliminated ideas from their corpus of designs.  Team 
conversations were transcribed, segmented into utterances, and coded for the presence of 
RR, SSRL, and task-related and other talk.  
Results from chi-square tests of independence, social network analysis, and 
sequence mining revealed that teams indeed exhibited differential proportions of RR and 
SSRL, with antinomous reasoning and monitoring and control of consensus emerging as 
key CPS processes.  Further, planning and reflection acted as bookends to CPS, while 
RR and monitoring processes co-occurred in the interim.  Finally, CPS alternated 
between periods of activity that were shared more and less equally among team 
members.   
This study contributes to the literature on CPS by exploring the dynamic 
interplay between RR and SSRL and by demonstrating that CPS can be investigated at 
the micro level, meso level, and macro level.  Methodologically, this study demonstrates 
how leveraging data mining techniques and assembling compelling visualizations can 
illustrate the recursive and cyclical character of RR and SSRL.  Finally, limitations are 
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 My committee members, Geetha Ramani, Linda Schmidt, and Tracy Sweet, for 
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Statement of the Problem 
The ability to solve complex problems in collaborative settings is considered a critical 
21st century competency in both the classroom and the workplace (De Dreu, 2007; National 
Research Council, 2011).  This sentiment has been echoed in various national and international 
reports (Fiore et al., 2017; Griffin & Care, 2014; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD], 2017a, 2017b).  These reports also stress that tackling significant social, 
environmental, and economic concerns requires a combination of cognitive and social skills 
(Gauvain, 2018).  Pertaining to the workforce, the labor market has shifted to a “knowledge 
economy,” in which human capital is emphasized over industrial resources, rendering knowledge 
the most valuable form of currency (Binkley et al., 2012; Powell & Snellman, 2004).  In such an 
economy, corporations, governments, and other institutions must leverage the knowledge of 
multiple individuals to solve their most pressing problems.  Accordingly, the percentage of jobs 
demanding high levels of social interaction has grown dramatically over the last several decades 
(Deming, 2017), and employees and managers alike have reported substantial increases in the 
amount of time spent on team-related tasks (Cross, Rebele, & Grant, 2016).   
Importantly, these team-related tasks often demand collaborative problem solving (CPS), 
defined as “the capacity of an individual to effectively engage in a process whereby two or more 
agents attempt to solve a problem by sharing the understanding and effort required to come to a 
solution and pooling their knowledge, skills, and efforts to reach that solution” (Fiore et al., 
2017, p. 2).  In essence, CPS involves multiple individuals working interdependently toward a 
shared goal (Fiore, Rosen, Smith-Jentsch, Salas, Letsky, & Warner, 2010, Fiore, Smith-Jentsch, 
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Salas, Warner, & Letsky, 2010; Wiltshire, Butner, & Fiore, 2018).  Further, throughout the 
problem-solving process, individuals must adapt existing knowledge or generate new knowledge 
in service of solving a novel, complex, and often ill-defined problem (Wiltshire, Rosch, Fiorella, 
& Fiore, 2014).  It is the novelty of the problem that distinguishes CPS from collaborative work, 
which typically involves routine tasks with well-established solutions.  In addition, the 
differentiation of roles and the interdependence required among team members differentiate CPS 
from collaborative decision-making and individual problem solving, respectively.  Whereas there 
is a rich literature in the areas of collaborative learning, judgment, and decision-making, less is 
known about the processes supporting complex problem solving in collaborative contexts 
specifically (Graesser, Fiore, Greiff, Andrews-Todd, Foltz, & Hesse, 2018).   
In theory, working with others to solve complex problems may afford certain advantages 
over individual problem solving, including increases in innovation, efficiency, and effectiveness 
(Gauvain, 2018; Graesser et al., 2018).  Different individuals may have different knowledge 
bases and experiences to draw on and share with one another, potentially sparking novel 
solutions (Paletz, Schunn, & Kim, 2013; van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004).  Further, 
assigning individuals specific responsibilities but then convening as a collective to evaluate 
progress and make plans can enhance the quality of the solution (Lajoie et al., 2015; Panadero & 
Jarvela, 2015).  By the same token, the social nature of CPS can present certain challenges.  The 
group may struggle to communicate effectively or clearly delineate team member roles, 
individuals may manifest social loafing behaviors, and conflict, disagreement, and false 
information may disrupt productive conversation (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Jehn, 1997; 
Paletz, Schunn, & Kim, 2011).   
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Regardless of the products of collaborative work, it is widely acknowledged that CPS is a 
core competency in the home, the workplace, and society at large.  Thus, students entering the 
workforce in any field must be well-versed in CPS if they are to excel in their professions.  
However, a number of reports have revealed deficiencies both in students’ and employees’ 
abilities to work collaboratively (National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, & Medicine, 
2016; OECD, 2017b).  In the workforce, reports have noted shortcomings in teamwork, 
interpersonal skills, and communication across disciplines (American Management Association, 
2012; Hart Research Associates, 2015).  Pertaining to students, results from the Programme for 
International Student Assessment’s (PISA) 2015 CPS assessment revealed that only 8% of the 
more than 500,000 students assessed across 52 countries performed at the highest level of CPS 
proficiency, while 29% performed at the lowest levels (OECD, 2017b).   
It is believed that this global deficit may be due, in part, to a lack of preparation from 
academic institutions.  As a case in point, there are no universally accepted curricula or standards 
for teaching CPS skills (Scouler & Care, 2018).  Concomitantly, there is a dearth of empirical 
work on complex CPS, making it challenging to identify areas for intervention (Rosen, 2010).  
Researchers have also noted the difficulty in crafting theoretically and empirically sound 
measures of CPS (Graesser et al., 2018).  In order to develop evidence-based curricula that 
address society’s most pressing problems, work is needed to determine how particular cognitive 
and social processes come together as individuals work to solve complex problems in social 
settings.  In this regard, empirical studies that examine CPS in naturalistic contexts may prove 
most informational.   
Broadly speaking, CPS is comprised of two components: the cognitive, problem-solving 
aspect; and the collaborative, communicative, and social aspect (Graesser et al., 2018).  Although 
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theoretical frameworks differ in how they propose that the two interact, there is agreement on 
many of the processes underlying successful CPS.  For example, one capacity foundational to 
problem solving, whether individually or collaboratively, is relational reasoning, or the ability to 
discern meaningful patterns within streams of information (Alexander & the Disciplined Reading 
and Learning Research Laboratory [DRLRL], 2012).  Relational reasoning is conceptualized as a 
meta-strategy that entails conscious and effortful processing directed toward identifying 
underlying associations among concepts, objects, and ideas (Jablansky, Alexander, Dumas, & 
Compton, 2019).  Importantly, these associations may take on different forms depending on the 
relation identified by the reasoner (Dumas, 2016).   
The four forms of relational reasoning featured most prominently in the literature include 
analogies, or structural similarities; anomalies, characterized as outliers from a set; antinomies, 
or relations of contradiction or mutual incompatibility; and antitheses, relations of opposition or 
differing degree (Alexander et al., 2012; Dumas, Alexander, & Grossnickle, 2013).  The broader 
construct relational reasoning has long been regarded as a necessary precondition for higher-
order thinking and problem solving (Chase & Simon, 1973; James, 1890; Waltz et al., 1999), as 
it allows individuals to meaningfully integrate disparate elements into a consolidated mental 
representation needed for problem solution.  Although there is limited research on how relational 
reasoning operates in CPS contexts, results have indicated that relational reasoning can aid in 
problem identification (Christensen & Schunn, 2007; Dumas, Alexander, Baker, Jablansky, & 
Dunbar, 2014), knowledge reconstruction (Echevarria, 2003), and divergent thinking (Chan & 
Schunn, 2015; Karhu, Ritala, & Viola, 2016).   
Pertaining to the more social aspects of CPS, relational reasoning has been linked to 
uncertainty reduction and team cohesion and coordination (Ball & Christensen, 2009; Paletz et 
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al., 2013).  In spite of the knowledge gained from these studies, it is still unclear how relational 
reasoning unfolds in real time during a CPS task.  For example, how is relational reasoning 
distributed across team members? Are there discernible cycles of relational reasoning that take 
place during problem solving? More research is needed to answer these critical questions, which 
may ultimately provide direction on how to train CPS or compose effective teams.   
In addition to traditional problem-solving strategies, CPS demands the ability to regulate 
cognition, emotion, and behavior (Zimmerman, 1989).  In collaborative settings, this construct is 
referred to as socially shared regulation of learning (SSRL; Jarvela, Jarvenoja, Malmberg, & 
Hadwin, 2013).  Specifically, SSRL refers to the processes used by group members to regulate 
collective activity, such as co-constructing knowledge, aligning task perceptions, setting goals, 
and monitoring and evaluating progress in service of solving a problem (Panadero & Jarvela, 
2015).  SSRL is considered a quintessential skill in CPS contexts (Hadwin, Jarvela, & Miller, 
2011) in that monitoring and controlling each other’s cognitive and metacognitive processes 
allow groups to jointly construct shared task representations, enhance the socioemotional 
climate, and adapt performance when necessary.   
Compared to constructs such as self-regulated learning (SRL) and co-regulated learning, 
SSRL has a relatively sparse and homogeneous base of literature (Panadero & Jarvela, 2015).  
For instance, of the extant empirical studies, many focus on the domain of math (Vauras, Iiskala, 
Kajamies, Kinnunen, & Lehtinen, 2003; Goos, Galbraith, & Renshaw, 2002), well-structured or 
highly constrained tasks (Iiskala, Vauras, & Lehtinen, 2004; Rogat & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 
2011), and computer-supported collaborative learning (CSCL) environments (Hurme & Jarvela, 
2005; Lee, Lajoie, Poitras, Nkangu, & Doleck, 2017).  Given that models of self-regulation 
emphasize the influences of domain, task, and context (Alexander, Dinsmore, Parkinson, & 
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Winters, 2011; Poitras & Lajoie, 2013), research should focus on the extent to which findings 
can be generalized beyond these conditions.   
Study Rationale 
 With the increasing complexity of sociotechnical systems in both the workplace and 
academic institutions, there is a greater need for individuals to pool their knowledge in order to 
address complex problems.  In spite of this shift, stakeholders have identified a global deficit in 
students’ and employees’ abilities to work collaboratively (National Research Council, 2011).  
Although there is a rich literature on individual problem solving and related group constructs 
such as team learning and decision-making, research on complex collaborative problem solving 
specifically has been more limited (Graesser et al., 2018).  As a consequence, there are no 
universally accepted curricula for teaching CPS in schools (Scoular & Care, 2018), and 
assessments of CPS (PISA’s Collaborative Problem Solving Assessment; OECD, 2017a, 2017b) 
are still relatively new.  Given the heavily social nature of CPS, it stands to reason that a better 
understanding of the dynamic, real-time interactions that shape CPS may aid in designing future 
curricula or trainings.   
 Two capacities central to problem solving in any arena are relational reasoning and self-
regulated learning, both of which demand reflective, evaluative, and strategic processing.  
Relational reasoning (RR) entails the detection of patterns, the integration of information from 
multiple sources, and finally the transformation of knowledge (Alexander & DRLRL, 2012).  
Despite all that is known about this meta-strategy, it has traditionally been studied in individuals 
(Dumas et al., 2013), with formal measures (e.g., Test of Relational Reasoning [TORR]; 
Alexander, Dumas, Grossnickle, List, & Firetto, 2016), and in isolated forms (e.g., analogy 
only).  Recently, there have been forays into how RR, in all of its forms, manifests in the 
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discourse of dyads engaged in problem solving in the domain of technology (Jablansky, 
Alexander, Dumas, & Compton, 2016; 2019), as well as teams of doctors diagnosing patients 
(Dumas et al., 2014).  These studies have begun to unravel how RR unfolds in real-time CPS 
contexts, but more research is needed to understand how different individuals contribute to the 
team’s overall reasoning, and how the various forms of RR operate in concert with one another.  
Further, the extant studies have tended to sample teams with a hierarchy, or groups with a 
designated leader who scaffolds thinking and reasoning (Murphy, Firetto, & Greene, 2017; Sun, 
Alexander, & Zhao, 2018).  Research is needed to determine whether these same findings are 
true of teams with no appointed leader.   
 Self-regulated learning (SRL) is highly regarded as an essential skill in any learning or 
problem-solving context as it refers to the active construction of goals for learning and the 
subsequent attempt to monitor, regulate, and control cognition, motivation, and behavior, guided 
and constrained by contextual features in the environment (Pintrich, 2000).  SRL is 
conceptualized as a recursive process in which regulatory processes unfold dynamically and 
cyclically (Azevedo & Witherspoon, 2009; Winne, 2001; Zimmerman & Schunk, 2001).  This 
implies that SRL processes may fluctuate in frequency over the course of problem solving, based 
on the phase of learning in which learners are engaged, as well as the capacities (e.g., domain 
knowledge, self-efficacy) an individual brings to bear on the task.  Currently, researchers are 
devoted to uncovering how and why SRL processes unfold in particular sequences, and what this 
means about a learner’s knowledge and adaptivity, among other things.   
 At the same time, researchers have also begun to address how SRL manifests in CPS 
contexts in which multiple individuals must collectively regulate their learning and performance.  
This construct, termed socially shared regulation of learning (SSRL), deals with many of the 
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same processes as SRL, but considers how multiple individuals engaged in a problem-solving 
task mutually and reciprocally monitor and control each other’s actions (Jarvela et al., 2013; 
Vauras et al., 2003).  Given the nascence of this construct, with a recent review reporting on only 
13 empirical articles addressing SSRL (Panadero & Jarvela, 2015), researchers interested in 
facilitating SSRL in service of CPS performance must explore new methodologies, domains, and 
contexts in which SSRL occurs.   
Study Goal and Context 
 Thus, the present study sought to examine the respective roles of RR and SSRL as they 
contributed to CPS in the domain of mechanical engineering and, more specifically, a product 
design task.  Engineering design was chosen as the context for this investigation because it 
principally involves solving complex problems within a group setting.  As Dieter and Schmidt 
write, “Design establishes and defines solutions to and pertinent structures for problems not 
solved before, or new solutions to problems which have previously been solved in a different 
way” (Dieter & Schmidt, 2009, p. 1).  In this way, effective design demands the formulation of 
objectives, the application of analysis and synthesis, and the establishment of criteria for 
evaluation (Diaz-Herrara, 2001).  Additionally, because the engineering design process typically 
takes place within a group, designers must be able to communicate with one another and 
negotiate the various perspectives and desires of those involved toward a common goal 
(Bucciarelli, 2002).   
 Relational reasoning is cast as an essential process in engineering design, with 
researchers maintaining that “reasoning is at the heart of design activity” (Cramer-Petersen, 
Christensen, & Ahmed-Kristensen, 2018, p. 39).  Analogical reasoning in particular has had a 
rich history in the domain of design, as it involves accessing and transferring elements from 
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familiar categories and applying it to the construction of a novel idea (Christensen & Schunn, 
2007; Visser, 2009).  In fact, a number of design methodologies (e.g., Synectics, TRIZ, 
SAPPhire) explicitly draw on analogical reasoning as a core component of the innovation 
process (Altshuller & Shulyak, 2002; Gordon, 1961; Sartori, Pal, & Chakrabarti, 2010).   
Analogies and relational representations more broadly can be especially helpful in framing a 
problem, and as such, have been linked to the early stages of the design process (Dixon, 2011).   
More recently, other forms of relational reasoning, such as anomalous, antinomous, and 
antithetical reasoning, have been empirically linked to engineering design.  For instance, Dumas 
and Schmidt (2015) found that the relational reasoning abilities of graduate students in 
mechanical engineering positively and significantly predicted success on an ideation task.  
Interestingly, analogical and antithetical reasoning significantly predicted the fluency (i.e., 
quantity) of ideas, while anomalous and antinomous reasoning significantly predicted the 
originality of ideas (Dumas, Schmidt, & Alexander, 2016).   
 Engineering design is also fundamentally a social process in which designers work with 
stakeholders, customers, and other designers to conceptualize and prototype a new product that 
fills a market need.  As with other complex, ill-structured tasks, it becomes paramount for 
designers to set reasonable goals and adopt intrinsic standards for success in order to solve 
problems strategically (Lawanto, Febrian, Butlet, & Mina, 2019).  However, successful problem 
solving requires more than the ability to monitor and control one’s own cognition, emotion, and 
behavior.  Design is a dynamic and socially-mediated process of communicating and 
coordinating the various knowledge, values, and perspectives of a group of individuals (Atman, 
Cardella, Turns, & Adams, 2005; Lee & Johnson-Laird, 2013).  In this way, the resulting design 
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is best understood not as a summation of participants’ products, but as an intersection of them 
(Dym, Agogino, Eris, Frey, & Leifer, 2015).   
 Thus, the current study sought to examine the roles of relational reasoning and socially 
shared regulation of learning in an engineering design context.  Specifically, four teams of 
mechanical engineering students were observed as they evaluated a corpus of design ideas and 
selected one to prototype for their capstone project.  This study aimed to add to researchers’ 
understanding of the respective and interactive contributions of individual and socially shared 
reasoning and regulatory capacities in complex CPS contexts.  Unlike prior studies (Iiskala, 
Vauras, Lehtinen, & Salonen, 2011; Jablansky et al., 2016, 2019), it strove to examine the 
temporal dynamics of these processes across time.  Additionally, this study endeavored to 
identify commonalities in these patterns across teams, as well as how specific individuals 
contributed to these patterns in the absence of an appointed leader. 
Study Design  
This study examined the ways in which RR and SSRL unfolded as teams of mechanical 
engineering students compared and selected designs for a new product.  The study employed a 
microgenetic methodology to capture real-time changes in the iterations and co-occurrences of 
these constructs, as well as how different individuals contributed to these patterns.  Specifically, 
teams of engineers were video-recorded during one of their meetings devoted to evaluating and 
narrowing down their pool of ideas.  These meetings were then transcribed, segmented, and 
coded for RR and SSRL.  Using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative techniques, this study 
sought to provide a rich glimpse into how and potentially why RR and SSRL iterate as they do in 
CPS tasks.   
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
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 Broadly, the goal of this study was to examine iterations of RR and SSRL in a CPS task.  
Given the need to better understand RR in teams, SSRL in discourse, and real-time interactions 
among teammates in CPS contexts, the study was partially exploratory in nature.  Toward this 
end, the study posed three central research questions:  
Research Question 1: To what extent do teams express differential proportions of 
relational reasoning (RR) and socially shared regulation of learning (SSRL) discourse during a 
collaborative problem-solving task?  
To address the question of whether teams manifest disproportionate proportions of RR 
and SSRL discourse in the current study, it was necessary to inspect frequencies of each type of 
speech and evaluate whether distributions of speech were similar or different across teams.  Prior 
to any analyses, team discourse from each meeting was coded for four types of RR (i.e., analogy, 
anomaly, antinomy, and antithesis) and five types of SSRL (i.e., planning, monitoring/control of 
understanding, monitoring/control of consensus, monitoring/control of progress, reflection).  
Then, chi-square tests of independence were run for RR and SSRL, respectively, to determine 
whether the distributions of each differed significantly across teams.  In the case that one of 
those omnibus tests reached statistical significance, post-hoc testing was carried out to determine 
where the differences were.   
Previous studies have found differences in the proportions of RR and SSRL used by 
teams in collaborative contexts (Dumas, Alexander, Baker, Jablansky, & Dunbar, 2014; Lajoie, 
Lee, et al., 2015).  However, it is unclear what motivates the usage of particular forms and 
quantities of each.  In other words, it is uncertain whether aspects of the domain, the task, the 
person, or some combination therein contributes to teams’ resultant reasoning and regulatory 
speech.  For instance, one investigation in the domain of medicine found that medical residents 
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drew most heavily on anomalous reasoning when diagnosing patients, while the attending doctor 
guiding them tended to use proportionally more analogies and antinomies than other forms of 
reasoning (Dumas et al., 2014).  Alternatively, a quasi-experimental study in mechanical 
engineering found that engineering design students’ abilities to reason analogically and 
antithetically significantly predicted their fluency of idea generation for a classic design problem, 
whereas their anomalous reasoning predicted the originality of their solutions, and their 
antinomous reasoning predicted both originality and fluency.  Together, these studies suggest 
that the focal task, as well as one’s role on the team (e.g., guiding others’ thinking), may 
foreshadow which forms of reasoning are used most.  Further, this research suggests that 
different forms may address different aspects of problem solving (i.e., number of solutions vs.  
creativity of solutions).   
There has been a similar lack of clarity in which factors best predict the types and 
amounts of regulatory activity in CPS contexts.  For instance, a recent study of doctoral students 
in pharmacy found that, across the board, few groups engaged in reflection processes when 
trying to solve a problem about how to reduce medication errors (Lobczowski, Lyons, Greene, & 
McLaughlin, 2020).  Other studies have found that task difficulty is an important determinant of 
monitoring activity, with higher-difficulty tasks requiring a higher level of coordination and 
management of individuals’ content and task understanding (Lobczowski, Allen, Firetto, Greene, 
& Murphy, 2020).  Still other studies suggest that the types and frequencies of planning, 
monitoring, and reflection depend on the quality of the group’s regulation, with high-quality 
regulators demonstrating more equivalent proportions of distinct regulatory activities, and low-
quality regulators manifesting disproportionate amounts of particular forms of regulation (Rogat 
& Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2011; Volet, Summers, & Thurman, 2009).   
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Based on these results, it was hypothesized that there would be disproportionate 
quantities of RR and SSRL in the current study.  In terms of RR, it was predicted that there 
might be more instances of antinomous and antithetical reasoning since the task necessarily 
involved differentiating between ideas and comparing their merits and flaws.  In terms of SSRL, 
it was predicted that there might be a disproportionately high amount of monitoring knowledge 
and understanding, given the difficult nature of the task, and potentially disproportionately low 
quantities of reflection, as other studies have found that activity to be rare even in doctoral 
students.   
Research Question 2: How is collective activity within problem-solving episodes shared 
among team members? Further, to what extent do certain individuals mediate these exchanges?  
Research has demonstrated that successful team problem solving depends not only on the 
ability to regulate one’s own thinking, emotions, and behavior, but also on the capacity to co-
construct knowledge, and mutually and reciprocally monitor and control the actions of the 
collective (Rogat & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2011, Roschelle & Teasley, 1995).  However, the 
degree to which activities are shared may vary widely within and between teams.  For instance, 
prior research has found that some individuals possess more knowledge and experience with the 
domain or task than their teammates, leading them to guide the group’s thinking and activity 
(Lobczowski, Lyons, et al., 2020).  Collective activity may also be shared more equally among 
team members (Rogat & Adams-Wiggins, 2014, 2015).  Thus, it is important to explore the 
degree to which different individuals mediate team talk as they problem solve, as well as to 
examine which team members emerge as “more knowledgeable” or “more regulated” others.  
Additionally, because shared regulatory processes can change over time (Efklides, 2006), it is 
important to consider how individuals’ contributions change with shifts in time and task.   
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To address these concerns, one team meeting was segmented into episodes, or discernible 
periods of time in which teams engaged in reasoning and regulatory activities.  Episodes have 
been used in prior research as meaningful units of analysis (Isohätälä et al., 2018; Järvelä et al., 
2016; Järvenoja et al., 2017) and are marked by a “continued pattern in content and 
collaboration, ending with a clear shift in either content or collaboration” (Lobczowski, Lyons, et 
al., 2020, p.17).  Each episode was then coded for the distribution of activity within it, which 
served as an indicator of the degree of sharedness of team activity.  Distribution could be 
characterized as shared, denoting activity that was distributed relatively equally among 
participants, or guided, denoting activity that temporarily controlled by one or more individuals.  
In cases of guided activity, those individuals controlling team activity were noted.  Given the 
complexity of the task before them, and the need to coordinate multiple perspectives and ideas, it 
was expected that there would be more instances of shared activity than guided activity. 
 Following the segmentation and coding of activity within episodes, social transition plots 
were constructed for each episode to illustrate the dyadic interactions among team members.  
These plots helped visually depict patterns of communication by displaying the types of 
communication that occurred as well as the frequencies of such communication.  For each 
episode plot, nodes represented speakers and a tie between nodes indicated that one speaker 
finished talking and the other person responded.  Ties were also colored by the type of speech 
that occurred to distinguish between reasoning, regulation, task-related, and other speech units.  
After constructing the plots, a series of centrality statistics including weighted degree centrality, 
flow betweenness, and eigenvector centrality, were calculated in order to identify individuals 
who were influential in their team’s problem solving efforts both when activity was highly 
distributed and when it was more controlled by particular team members.  By considering the 
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distribution of activity in each episode, the types and amounts of speech units produced by team 
members, and the computed centralities of each individual, overarching patterns in how activity 
was shared among teammates could be discerned and discussed.     
Research Question 3: What systematic patterns can be uncovered about the ways in 
which relational reasoning and SSRL discourse emerge in real time?  
A significant challenge in the study of reasoning, regulation, and collaborative problem 
solving (CPS) is that they are processes that unfold over time.  However, traditional statistical 
paradigms in social science tend to rely on analyses of correlation or group difference that 
aggregate observations over time, effectively capturing cross-sectional snapshots of phenomena 
rather than moment-to-moment change (Greene & Azevedo, 2010).  If these processes are to be 
understood more deeply, then the measurement of these constructs must match their 
conceptualizations.  As Greene & Azevedo argue, “Such data must take into account not only 
what learners do, but when, how often, in what context, in what sequence, and in response to 
what factors” (p. 208).  In the last decade, researchers have begun leveraging data mining 
techniques to do just that.  For instance, using a fuzzy mining algorithm (Günther and van der 
Aalst 2007; Reimann et al.  2009), Bannert et al.  (2014) found that students who scored higher 
on a transfer task not only exhibited a wider variety of metacognitive activities than students who 
scored lower, they also looped through metacognitive activities (e.g., planning, monitoring, 
evaluating) more often and with deeper processing strategies.  In another investigation, 
Kinnebrew and colleagues (2013) used an approach called the Temporal Interestingness of 
Patterns in Sequences (TIPS) technique to show when in the course of a science task middle 
school students were most likely to engage in activities such as reading, taking notes, monitoring 
understanding, and explaining ideas.  Although there is currently great variability in the 
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techniques researchers use to investigate temporal patterns in processes, this approach holds 
great promise for uncovering key facets of how reasoning, regulation, and collaborative problem 
solving emerge.   
Thus, the present study sought to create an algorithm to examine patterns in how 
reasoning and regulation unfolded during the course of a problem-solving task.  Additional 
charts displaying each team’s speech units over time made it possible to see not only which 
sequences of reasoning and regulation occurred most often, but also when and by whom they 
were voiced.  Previous research has revealed that the forms of relational reasoning tend to 
operate in concert with one another as dyads and teams problem-solve (Dumas et al., 2014; 
Jablansky et al., 2016, 2019), although these patterns tend to differ as a function of domain, task, 
and participant characteristics.  As a result, it was unclear whether the same patterns would 
generalize to an engineering design task.  The same is true of SSRL in team discourse, which has 
shown that planning, monitoring, and executing, for instance, serve as introductory activities that 
then lead in to more reflective phases of monitoring, evaluating, and elaborating (Lajoie, Lee et 
al., 2015).  Thus, it was hypothesized that there would be discernible patterns of utterances of 
both RR and SSRL, but the exact nature of those patterns was uncertain.   
Contributions to the Field  
 The current study offers several contributions to the literatures of each of the three 
constructs under examination: relational reasoning (RR), socially shared regulation of learning 
(SSRL), and collaborative problem solving (CPS).  For example, this study will be the first to 
examine how all four forms of relational reasoning iterate in CPS contexts in which the team has 
no hierarchical structure.  Whereas previous research has concentrated on how specific forms of 
RR are used to scaffold less knowledgeable members’ knowledge or guide others’ thinking, this 
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study will provide insight into the functions of various forms when all members have generally 
the same knowledge base.  Further, this study will be the first to use data mining techniques to 
uncover common sequences of relational reasoning employed during CPS.  These sequences will 
help showcase how the forms of RR operate in concert while acknowledging the dynamic, 
temporal nature of the problem-solving process.   
 With regard to SSRL, this study will contribute to the sparse database of empirical work 
examining how this construct unfolds in CPS contexts.  Further, in response to the majority of 
these studies, which have explored SSRL in well-structured tasks in computer-supported 
collaborative learning environments within the domains of mathematics and medicine, this study 
will assess the extent to which findings can be generalized to ill-defined tasks in naturalistic 
environments within the domain of mechanical engineering.  This study will also demonstrate 
how teams vacillate between periods of co-regulation and more equally shared regulatory phases.  
Finally, sequences of SSRL and RR will help show how the two operate in tandem during 
collaborative problem solving that goes beyond the documentation of co-occurrences of SSRL 
alone.   
 Overall, this study endeavors to document the respective and reciprocal roles of two 
cognitive strategies as they played out in a social and collaborative environment.  Given the need 
to better prepare students to work collaboratively in the workforce, this study has implications 
for educators, policymakers, and institutions hoping to foster the higher-order reasoning and 
regulation skills underlying successful CPS.   
Definition of Terms 




Collaborative Problem Solving is defined as “the capacity of an individual to effectively 
engage in a process whereby two or more agents attempt to solve a problem by sharing the 
understanding and effort required to come to a solution and pooling their knowledge, skills, and 
efforts to reach that solution” (Fiore et al., 2017, p. 2). 
Relational Reasoning is defined as the ability to discern meaningful patterns within 
streams of information (Alexander & the Disciplined Reading and Learning Research Laboratory 
[DRLRL], 2012).   
Socially Shared Regulation of Learning refers to the processes used by group members to 
regulate collective activity, such as co-constructing knowledge, aligning task perceptions, setting 
goals, and monitoring and evaluating progress in service of solving a problem (Panadero & 
Jarvela, 2015). 
Speech units, or utterances, roughly constitute one complete thought and may be 
indicated by a disruption or a pause in speech, often corresponding with independent clauses 
(Trickett & Trafton, 2007).   
Sequence mining is a data mining procedure to identify frequently occurring patterns in a 





REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In this chapter, I present the research to date on the roles of relational reasoning (RR) and 
socially shared regulation of learning (SSRL) in collaborative problem solving (CPS).  It begins 
with an overview of the history of CPS, its theoretical underpinnings, guiding frameworks, and 
key components.  Next, I review the literature on RR, focusing specifically on how RR in its 
various forms iterates in CPS contexts.  I subsequently review the literature on SSRL, exploring 
its theoretical roots and recent emergence in the literature, as well as its relation to CPS.  Finally, 
I discuss the relation between RR and SSRL as it is depicted in the literature.  In each section, 
findings from the extant bodies of research are synthesized, methodologies are examined, gaps in 
the literature are identified, and implications for future research are considered.  Importantly, the 
section on CPS presents a more exhaustive review of the literature, whereas the sections that 
follow are geared more toward understanding how RR and SSRL iterate in CPS contexts.  
Further, because there is not necessarily one framework that unifies these three constructs and 
models how they interact during real time problem solving, I highlight components of extant 
theories that I will draw on in the current study.   
Collaborative Problem Solving (CPS) 
 In this chapter, I will first delve into the major frameworks, models, and theories used to 
understand the nature of CPS.  CPS has roots in a variety of disciplines, including but not limited 
to social psychology, organizational psychology, cognitive science, and education.  Although 
there is overlap between the conceptualizations offered by each field, there are notable 
differences in how they integrate the social and cognitive components of CPS.  These 
discrepancies reflect the unique goals of each field, the phenomena they seek to understand, the 
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epistemologies undergirding their theoretical frameworks, and the methodologies used to explore 
their constructs of interest.  I will consider each in turn before reviewing the unique roles of 
relational reasoning and socially shared regulation of learning on CPS.   
History of Research on Collaborative Problem Solving 
 Research on CPS, including both its social and cognitive elements, has roots in the 
Gestalt psychology movement of the early 1900s.  Associated with the Berlin School of 
Experimental Psychology, the Gestalt psychologists—among them such scholars as Koffka 
(1922), Wertheimer (1923), and Kohler (1929)—endeavored to understand how humans make 
meaning from the incalculable and seemingly haphazard stimuli continuously encountered in the 
world.  What the Gestalt psychologists sought to identify, in effect, were laws of perceptual 
organization that helped to explain how seemingly chaotic displays of stimuli took on structure 
and meaning.  Although the Gestalt approach was primarily concerned with perception and 
meaning-making in individuals, a number of the ideas explored by Gestalt psychologists have 
influenced current understandings of problem solving processes and small group behavior.  Until 
recent decades, however, these strands of research largely developed in parallel.  Before delving 
into contemporary theories of CPS, I will briefly explore major developments in the respective 
research traditions of problem solving and collaboration.   
Gestalt influence on problem solving research.  The Gestalt influence on problem 
solving research was apparent in the work of Karl Duncker, a student of Max Wertheimer’s and 
Wolfgang Kohler’s.  Duncker’s work primarily explored the concept of insight, identified as one 
stage of the preparation-incubation-insight-verification model (Wallas, 1926) of problem 
solving.  Originally, insight was proposed as an alternative to the behaviorist account of 
successful problem solving by trial and error, in that the “solution” or “truth” of a situation was 
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seemingly intuited (Hartmann, 1931; Kohler, 1929; Tolman, 1928).  In effect, insight was said to 
rest on the detection of the essential interrelations within a problem situation that would then 
instigate awareness of a plausible solution (Spearman, 1927; Yerkes & Yerkes, 1929).  Although 
this account was popular for some time, it did not find much support in empirical studies 
(Holyoak, 1990).  However, using think-aloud protocols, Duncker (1926) discovered a number 
of mechanisms by which insight, and problem solving in general, might occur.  These 
mechanisms included, but were not limited to, learning from mistakes, analysis of the end state 
(i.e., goal), and analogical reasoning.   
 In an effort to discern more precisely how subjects solve problems, Herb Simon and 
Allen Newell (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958; Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon & Newell, 1971) 
formulated a theory of information processing (IP).  The IP approach to cognition shared some 
commonalities with that of Duncker, including the proposition of a set of cognitive operations to 
solve problems, and the use of verbal protocols to observe problem solving (Ericsson & Simon, 
1980, 1987).  However, the IP approach was also influenced by the new field of artificial 
intelligence, and accordingly used computational models to generate hypotheses about problem 
solving behavior.  In essence, the human mind was described as a processing mechanism, not 
unlike a computer.  Problem solving was thus conceptualized as an interaction between an 
information-processing system (i.e., a problem solver) and a task environment (i.e., a problem), 
as positioned within a problem space (i.e., a problem-solver’s representation of the problem; 
Simon & Newell, 1971).  Consequently, thinking could be viewed as a progression between 
knowledge states, punctuated by processing activity that determined the succession from one 
state to another.   
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Numerous models of problem solving have emerged since the advent of IP theory—some 
that emphasize internal processes (e.g., Anderson, 1993; Johnson-Laird, 1980; Laird, Newell, & 
Rosenblum, 1987), others that prioritize the constraints and affordances of the external 
environment (e.g., Greeno, 1978; Lave, 1988)— but it is clear that IP theory remains the 
foundation under which these theories are built.   
Gestalt influence on collaboration research.  If Gestalt psychology is believed to have 
influenced problem solving research for individuals, then it was equally impactful for the study 
of group behavior.  It is Gestalt psychologists who are credited with the notion of the whole 
being other from the sum of its parts, a phrase coined by Aristotle and later explored by Kurt 
Koffka in his foundational text, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (1935).  It was with this idea in 
mind that Ludwig von Bertalanffy founded General Systems Theory (GST) in the late 1930s in 
an attempt to link the hard and soft sciences.  GST was posed as a logico-mathematical field that 
derived principles applicable to systems across multiple disciplines, where systems were defined 
as “a set of elements standing in interrelation among themselves and with the environment” (von 
Bertalanffy, 1971, p. 417).  Importantly, GST proffered the notion that social groups might best 
be understood as systems, and the same principles that applied to systems might help explain the 
behavior of organisms (i.e., people) within those systems.  GST eventually lost favor to 
frameworks that provided more testable hypotheses (Roberts, Hulin, & Rousseau, 1978), but a 
number of the principles of systems derived by von Bertalanffy (1950, 1971) and GST co-
founder Kenneth Boulding (1956), such as self-organization, adaptation, production of emergent 
phenomena, and exhibition of nonlinear dynamics, found their way into contemporary theories of 
group functioning.   
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 Around the time that GST was gaining ground, Gestalt psychologist Kurt Lewin (1939) 
founded Field Theory (Lewin, 1939), which characterized behavior as a function of a person in 
his environment, formalized in the equation B = f(P, E).  With this equation, Lewin believed he 
could comprehend the totality and complexity of the “field” in which behavior takes place.  
Similar to von Bertalanffy (1950, 1971), Lewin (1939) understood groups as wholes based on the 
interdependence of its members or organisms, standing in contrast to many of his contemporaries 
who defined groups in terms of the similarity of group members.  Undoubtedly influenced by the 
social and political climate surrounding World War II, Lewin studied leadership styles, worker 
motivation, and attitude change (among other subjects) in order to discern how behavior might 
be altered.  Accordingly, Lewin is credited with coining the term “group dynamics.”  
 Although a pioneer in his field, Lewin’s work represented only one school of thought on 
small group behavior.  Whereas Lewin and his successors at the University of Michigan viewed 
groups as vehicles for influencing its members (Cartwright & Zander, 1953; Festinger, 1954, 
1957; Seashore, 1954; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) and focused on the effects of some input factor 
on some output state, another group coming out of Harvard viewed groups as systems of human 
interaction, and thus prioritized the classification of patterns of exchange among group members 
during the course of problem solving (Bales, 1950a, 1950b; Borgatta, 1963; Hare, 1976).  
Bales’s interaction process analysis (IPA) serves as an exemplar of this paradigm, as the 
technique detailed methods for observing and classifying the behaviors exhibited by group 
members operating in face-to-face settings.   
Yet a third group of researchers from the University of Illinois viewed groups as systems 
for performing tasks and sought to understand the individual-, group-, and environmental-level 
factors (e.g., group member knowledge, task complexity, environmental stress) that influenced 
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task performance (e.g., productivity level, decision quality, number of ideas generated; Dashiell, 
1930; Carter, Haythorn, & Howell, 1950; Hoffman, 1965).  Perhaps the most significant 
contribution of this school was the input-process-output (IPO) model of group functioning, 
formalized by McGrath (1964), Steiner (1972), and Hackman (Hackman & Morris, 1975).  Of 
importance in this model, group processes were mediating mechanisms that converted inputs into 
outputs, and as such, group member interactions acted as the primary determinant of product.  
Although researchers have since taken issue with many of the implicit assumptions made by the 
IPO model (e.g., linear progression from input to process to output; static in nature), the IPO 
model has remained a prevailing influence on groups research.   
Interestingly, the Michigan, Harvard, and Illinois Schools of Thought largely developed 
in isolation until, in the 1960s and 1970s, the social psychological approach to groups research 
suffered a “system crash” (McGrath, 1997), having reached the limits of what could be achieved 
by each approach alone.  In spite of this crash, groups research continued to thrive.  As Levine 
and Moreland (1990) famously observed, “Groups are alive and well, but living elsewhere” (p. 
620).  In fact, a review of the literature by Salas and colleagues (2007) found over 130 
frameworks or models of team performance and effectiveness published within the last 25 years 
in the organizational psychology literature alone.  Of course, other literatures, such as the 
cognitive and educational psychology literatures, have studied group functioning too.  Ironically, 
this proliferation of theoretical frameworks may be foretelling of a similar crash to that of the 
1960s and 1970s, as “team researchers, and, in fact, whole disciplines fail to communicate” 
(Salas, Stagl, Burke, & Goodwin, 2007, p. 226).  Indeed, the diverse goals, values, paradigms, 
and assumptions held by researchers may be said to underlie this translational issue.  A full 
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review of these frameworks is beyond the scope of this study.  However, I will overview a few 
key frameworks relevant to studying CPS in an educational setting, organized by discipline.   
Relevant Frameworks for the Study of Collaborative Problem Solving (CPS) 
 Frameworks for the study and measurement of CPS in teams come primarily from the 
organizational and educational psychology literatures.  The fields differ in terms of the samples, 
methods, and variables in which they are invested, but do, for the most part, share similar views 
of CPS.  For instance, the frameworks provided by the organizational and educational 
psychology literatures tend to agree that CPS involves two or more individuals working 
interdependently toward a common goal, and that successful CPS demands effective 
communication among group members, among other cognitive and social capacities.  However, 
the broader contexts in which these frameworks are situated have resulted in differences as well.  
For example, while organizational research deals more often with experts in hierarchical teams, 
educational research typically focuses on novices in either a scaffolded environment or non-
hierarchical group.   On a more fundamental level, organizational research seeks to optimize 
workplace performance, whereas educational research aims to enhance learning outcomes.  As a 
result, educational frameworks tend to focus on the suite of skills students need for successful 
CPS, whereas organizational frameworks concentrate more on how these skills come together in 
real time.  In spite of their differences, when taken together, these frameworks offer a 
comprehensive picture of CPS.   
 Organizational Frameworks for Collaborative Problem Solving.  Within the 
organizational literature, notable frameworks include Hinsz and colleagues’ (1997) groups-as-
information-processors model, Cooke and colleagues’ (2004) theory of team cognition, Marks 
and colleagues’ (2001) recurring phase model of team processes, and Fiore and colleagues’ 
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(Fiore, Rosen, et al., 2010; Fiore, Smith-Jentsch, et al., 2010) macrocognition in teams model 
(MITM).  I will review each of these in turn, discuss their unique contributions to the study of 
CPS, and explain their significance to the current study. 
Groups-as-information processors approach.  One answer to the “system crash” of 
small group research was the formulation of a groups-as-information-processors approach by 
Hinsz and colleagues (1997).  This perspective of groups reflected a scaling up of prototypical 
information processes (e.g., encoding, storage, and retrieval) from an individual level to a group 
level (see Figure 1 for generic information processing model), where group-level information 
processing was defined as “the degree to which information, ideas, or cognitive processes are 
shared, and are being shared, among the group members and how this sharing of information 
affects both individual- and group- level outcomes” (Hinsz et al., 1997, p. 53).  This 
metatheoretical approach represented a paradigm shift in the study of small groups, as it found a 
way to couple individual processes with social cognition.   
 




Epistemologically, the groups-as-information-processors approach keeps cognition in 
individual minds but allows for group-level cognitive structures as well, such as shared mental 
models (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Kozlowski, Gully, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1996) and 
transactive memory systems (Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 1985; Wegner, 1995).  In this way, 
the approach acknowledges the interdependencies between individual- and group-level 
processing, thus skirting atomistic and ecological fallacies in which higher-level phenomena are 
used to make inferences about lower-level structures and vice versa, respectively (Diez, 2002; 
Klein & Kozlowski, 2000).   
Principally, the information processing approach to groups views the degree of social 
sharedness as key for understanding group processing (Tindale & Kameda, 2000).  In essence, 
sharing—via communication and interaction—is what makes group processing possible and 
distinguishes it from individual-level processing.  Further, the approach predicts that things that 
are shared to a greater degree will have a greater impact on team outcomes than things that are 
shared less.  Things that can be shared include but are not limited to: information about the task, 
characteristics of the group, aspects of group members, patterns of group interaction, and the 
context within which the task, group, and its members exist (Hinsz et al., 1997).   
Although influential for small group research, the groups-as-information-processors 
approach was not formulated specifically for research on CPS, and mostly involved studies of 
ad-hoc teams in laboratory settings (Hinsz et al., 1997).  Further, although the approach 
acknowledged a larger environment, it primarily focused on interactions within the bounds of the 
group (Fiore et al., 2010a).  Still, the metaphor of the group as information processor continues 
to serve as the basis upon which many contemporary theories are built.   
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Team cognition theory.  One line of research that has emerged as an extension of both 
IPO theory and the groups-as-information-processors approach is that of team cognition.  The 
theory of team cognition characterizes teams as information processing systems and focuses on 
“how cognitive activity is distributed across two or more interdependent individuals in the 
context of a complex and dynamic sociotechnical work setting” (Gorman & Cooke, 2011, p. 
304).  This cognitive activity may comprise learning, planning, reasoning, decision making, 
problem solving, remembering, and designing.  Put differently, team cognition provides a way of 
describing how thinking and knowledge building occur within and between individuals.   
Moreover, it is concerned with the organization, representation, and distribution of knowledge 
among teammates (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010).   
This framework views change in team knowledge and performance as arising from team 
processes, or interactions between and among team members, task, and environment.  
Accordingly, team cognition researchers use an IPO framework to explain the antecedents and 
outcomes of team interactions.  In this way, the effects of inputs, such as shared knowledge, on 
outputs, such as team effectiveness, are mediated by processes like communication and 
coordination (Gorman & Cooke, 2011).  Importantly, team cognition is viewed as an emergent 
process occurring during team interaction (Cooke, Gorman, Duran, & Taylor, 2007) in that 
lower-level phenomena, such as an individual’s knowledge, reasoning, and regulatory strategies, 
interact dynamically with those of other individuals, ultimately manifesting as a collective, 
higher-level phenomenon (Kozlowski, Chao, Grand, Braun, & Kuljanin, 2013).   
Recurring phase model of team processes.  Although team cognition regards teams as 
complex and dynamic systems that change and adapt over time, the majority of team 
effectiveness models have taken a rather static approach to the study of team process (Marks, 
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Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001; McGrath & Hollingshead, 1993).  For instance, studies examining 
the functioning of teams over a series of tasks may aggregate process data so as to look at overall 
relations between team process and team outcomes.  In doing so, critical sources of variance over 
time are collapsed into a single indicator that cannot capture the dynamism and emergence of 
team process.   
Marks and colleagues (2001) developed the recurring phase model of team processes to 
address how temporal factors of team processes may affect team functioning.  The model 
theorizes that teams perform in temporal cycles of goal-directed activity called episodes, defined 
as “distinguishable periods of time over which performance accrues and feedback is available” 
(Marks et al., 2001, p. 359).  These episodes consist of identifiable periods of action and 
transition between action.  Whereas action reflects engagement in acts that directly contribute to 
goal accomplishment (e.g., coordination, monitoring processes), transition refers to the 
reflection, evaluation, and planning that typically punctuate taskwork.  Further, cycles of IPO 
episodes are nested in these periods of action and transition, such that outputs from a transition 
period may serve as inputs for the subsequent action period.  These IPO cycles then continue to 
play out within periods of action and transition.  The length and frequency of these periods will 
necessarily differ as a function of team objectives, expertise, norms, leadership, and the larger 
environment in which the team is operating.  The nature and complexity of the task, as well as 
the tools teams have at their disposal, will also have an impact on the duration of these periods.  
Importantly, this framework suggests that it is not only what but when particular processes occur 
that is critical for understanding ultimate team performance.  To illustrate, Marks and colleagues 
(2001) display four potential rhythms with which teams may pursue task accomplishment (see 
Figure 2), demonstrating the importance of using real-time measures (e.g., communication 
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transcripts, video records of behavior) to model dynamic team processes, thus taking a more 
microgenetic approach to the study of team performance.   
 
Figure 2.  Possible rhythms of team task accomplishment illustrated by Marks et al.  (2001) 
within the recurring phase model of team processes.   
 
Macrocognition-in-teams-model (MITM).  The frameworks advanced by team cognition 
and the recurring phase model of team processes undoubtedly contributed to a more nuanced 
understanding of team performance as well as the development of more sensitive measures of 
team process.  However, these frameworks have primarily been used to explain routine 
procedures or performance in relatively stable environments.  But many teams—especially those 
in engineering design—routinely operate in situations that are highly novel and variable (Fiore, 
Rosen, et al., 2010).  Additionally, these frameworks are more general in their focus on 
teamwork, rather than CPS, per se.   
The MITM (see Figures 3 and 4) was developed as an extension of rule-based (i.e., 
routine) team cognition to explain knowledge-based complex, collaborative cognition (Fiore, 
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Rosen, et al., 2010; Fiore, Smith-Jentsch, et al., 2010).  Macrocognition is defined as “the 
process of transforming internalized knowledge into externalized team knowledge through 
individual and team knowledge-building processes” (Fiore, Rosen, et al., 2010, pp. 204-205).  In 
this way, the MITM is not simply concerned with the degree of overlap or interaction among 
team members’ knowledge, but also with the team’s generation of new knowledge during 
periods of adaptation.  In addition to its influence from team cognition and the recurring phase 
model of team process, the MITM is informed by theories of externalized cognition, group 
communication theory, group problem solving, and collaborative learning and adaptation (Fiore, 
Rosen, et al., 2010).  With these theoretical foundations, MITM explains change in team 
functioning and performance as arising from a series of iterative processes focused on team 
knowledge-building within a collaborative, novel problem-solving context (Fiore, Rosen, et al., 




Figure 3.  Macrocognition-in-teams-model forwarded by Fiore and colleagues (2010a, 2010b).   
 
 
Figure 4.  Qualitative representation of macrocognitive processes occurring across individuals 
and the team within a particular stage of problem solving (Fiore et al., 2010b).   
 
Specifically, Fiore and colleagues (Fiore, Rosen, et al., 2010; Fiore, Smith-Jentsch, et al., 
2010) suggest four phases of collaborative problem-solving and an accompanying five 
macrocognitive processes, each of which are said to arise during each phase.  Collaboration 
phases include knowledge construction, problem model development, team consensus, and 
outcome revision and evaluation.  As such, the framework implies the importance of both higher-
order (i.e., relational) reasoning processes and regulatory behaviors in guiding activity during 
these phases.   
During knowledge construction, team members identify relevant domain information, 
form individual and team-level mental models of the problem, develop individual and team-level 
knowledge, and set up the communication environment.  Team members then integrate their 
knowledge and understanding in the problem model development phase into a unified conception 
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of the problem, proposing goals and feasible solutions.  Team consensus then involves reaching 
agreement on the specific goals the team will pursue and the solution the team will seek.  Finally, 
the team analyzes, tests, and validates this solution in reference to the agreed upon goals in 
outcome revision and evaluation.  If the team decides that their solution or goals are not viable, 
then they may return to any of the previous stages.  Like the recurring phase model of team 
processes, MITM stresses the iterative nature of collaborative problem solving, and accordingly 
the importance of examining process over time.   
Within each phase of collaboration there are several macrocognitive processes at work, 
including individual knowledge-building processes, team knowledge-building processes, 
internalized team knowledge, externalized team knowledge, and team problem-solving 
outcomes.  Whereas individual knowledge-building involves the individual gathering relevant 
information about the domain and gaining knowledge from interacting with elements of the 
sociotechnical context, team knowledge-building involves the dissemination and sharing of 
knowledge among teammates.  Internalized team knowledge refers to the distributed knowledge 
of each team member regarding both taskwork and teamwork needs.   
Because the MITM was developed for teams operating in novel situations in which team 
members have distributed knowledge and limited or no experience working with one another, the 
process of internalized team knowledge provides a way of describing how individual knowledge 
about one’s own area of expertise becomes increasingly integrated (i.e., coordinated) with other 
individuals’ expertise and knowledge about the task.  As internalized team knowledge is 
verbalized and communicated, it is transformed into externalized team knowledge.  Unlike the 
other processes described, which predominantly pertain to the level at which knowledge is being 
built or communicated, team problem-solving outcomes refers to the relative effectiveness of 
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problem solutions formulated at each of the phases.  Again, each of these processes is said to 
have some influence during each collaboration phase.   
As an extension, or, special case of, team cognition, the MITM provides researchers 
insights into team functioning during complex, collaborative problem solving.  As such, it lends 
itself well to engineering design, in which individuals must work interdependently, coordinate 
their knowledge and actions, and solve ill-structured problems over the course of weeks or 
months.  Further, engineering design demands both innovation and efficiency (Dumas & 
Schmidt, 2015), which necessitates a constant negotiation of task constraints with problems that 
need solving.  Thus, the ability of a team to adapt its problem model, proposed solutions, and 
criteria for evaluating effectiveness is critical to effective team performance (McComb, Cagan, 
& Kotovsky, 2015).  Taken together with the groups-as-information-processors approach, team 
cognition theory, and the recurring phase model of team processes, it is clear that successful CPS 
demands a complex interaction of social and cognitive capacities at both the individual- and 
team-level.   
Key components of organizational frameworks of collaborative problem solving.  
Although the theoretical frames presented above represent multifarious research traditions, each 
offers key components that I will draw on in the current study.  For instance, the groups-as-
information-processors approach stresses the importance of social sharedness in CPS 
environments.  That is, while cognition exists in individual minds, CPS performance is 
determined, in large part, by whether and how individual cognitions, motivations, emotions, and 
behaviors are shared with others.  Put differently, there may be a relation between individual 
capacities assessed in isolation (e.g., relational reasoning) and those assessed in a collaborative 
setting to the extent that these capacities are invoked in team discourse or interaction.   
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Building on this notion, team cognition theory proposes that individual processes interact 
dynamically with those of others to produce higher-level team structures that are not mere 
aggregations or linear combinations of their individual parts.  This suggests the importance of 
examining how contributions are distributed across individuals as well as how overall patterns of 
the team manifest.  In this vein, the recurring phase model of team processes suggests that here 
are discernible episodes of teamwork and taskwork, and that examining patterns in a 
microgenetic framework may illuminate the natural ebbs and flows of a given team’s CPS.  
Finally, all of the aforementioned ideas are integrated in the MITM, which identifies critical 
cognitive and social processes in CPS—higher-order reasoning and socially shared regulation, 
among them—that can be expected to play out in iterative cycles and in reference to ill-defined 
problems.   
Educational Frameworks for Collaborative Problem Solving.  Whereas 
organizational models describe how CPS iterates in reference to workplace performance, 
educational frameworks reflect concern with CPS as it pertains to learning outcomes.  Thus, 
while there is overlap in many of the social and cognitive components of CPS detailed in the 
organizational and educational psychology literatures, the way in which the respective fields 
bring these elements come together do tend to differ.  As a case in point, educational frameworks 
tend to focus more on assessment of an individual’s collaborative behavior, rather than the 
collaborative behavior of the team as a whole.   
Within the educational realm, key frameworks include Roschelle and Teasley’s (1995) 
Theory of the Construction of Shared Knowledge in Collaborative Problem Solving, the 
teamwork process model adopted by the United States Centre for Research on Evaluation, 
Standards, and Student Testing (CRESST), and the CPS models formulated by the Assessment 
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and Teaching of 21st Century Skills project (ATC21S; Griffin, McGaw, & Care, 2012) and PISA 
(OECD, 2013, 2017a, 2017b).   
Theory of the construction of shared knowledge in collaborative problem solving.  In 
order to address how learning occurs in a computer-supported, collaborative learning 
environment, Roschelle and Teasley (1995) formulated the theory of shared knowledge 
construction in CPS.  Like many of the organizational theories presented, Roschelle and 
Teasley’s conceptualization of CPS is underlain by a groups-as-information-processors 
approach, such that individual-level cognitive abilities are recognized as well as team-level 
social interactions and emergent processes.  More specifically, the authors characterize CPS as a 
process of maintaining a joint problem space (JPS), a shared knowledge structure much like the 
SMMs described by organizational researchers (Roschelle & Teasley 1995).  A JPS is said to 
support CPS by integrating taskwork goals, planning behaviors, knowledge of the problem, and 
awareness of available problem-solving actions.  Importantly, once knowledge is introduced and 
accepted into the JPS, team members must continuously monitor ongoing activity and work to 
rectify any conflicts, disagreements, and misunderstandings that may hamper progress.   
Similar to the recurring phase model of team processes, Roschelle and Teasley (1995) 
advocate a microanalysis of teamwork in order to fully capture how CPS occurs.  Although they 
do not advance their own model of how team process emerges, they note that successful CPS 
involves cycles that alternate between lower and higher intensity periods.   
 CRESST teamwork process model.  Another theory originally intended for CPS in a 
computer-supported learning environment was the teamwork process model detailed by CRESST 
(Chung, O’Neil, & Herl, 1999; O’Neil, Chung, & Brown, 1995; see Figure 5).  In contrast to 
Roschelle and Teasley’s focus on how team processes come together during CPS, the CRESST 
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model addresses in more depth what processes are needed for successful CPS.  Adapted from the 
teamwork model developed by Salas and colleagues (Morgan, Salas, & Glickman, 1993; Salas, 
Dickinson, Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992), the CRESST model divides CPS into respective 
categories for collaboration and problem solving, each of which is associated with its own suite 
of subskills.  For instance, collaboration is a function of six dimensions including adaptability, 
coordination, decision making, interpersonal skill, leadership, and communication.  Adaptability 
demands an awareness of team activities, constraints inherent in the task environment, and an 
ability to monitor the source and nature of problems that arise (O’Neil, Chuang, & Chung, 2003).  
Next, coordination involves the synchronization of team activities and resources in order to 
complete the task in a timely fashion.  Third, decision making requires the integration of 
information, identification of possible alternatives, selection of the best solution, and evaluation 
of the consequences.  Team members also need leadership, which involves being able to direct 
activity and establish a positive atmosphere, and interpersonal skill, in which that positive 
atmosphere is maintained through cooperative behavior and resolution of dissent.  Finally, 
communication is needed for any of the former to be possible, characterized by a clear and 
accurate exchange of information, acknowledge of receipt, and proper use of technology to do 





Figure 5.  Collaborative problem solving components described by the Center for Research on 
Evaluation, Standards, and Student Testing (CRESST) model (Chung, O’Neil, & Herl, 
1999; O’Neil, Chung, & Brown, 1995).   
 
The counterpart of collaboration, problem solving, is then comprised of content 
understanding, problem solving strategies, and self-regulation.  A good problem solver, 
according to the model, must possess a sufficient knowledge of the content with which he or she 
is engaging.  Further, the problem solver needs a collection of domain-general (e.g., relational 
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reasoning) and domain-specific problem-solving strategies.  Finally, the problem solver must 
exhibit self-regulation, consisting of motivation and metacognition, operationalized as effort and 
self-efficacy and self-checking and planning behaviors, respectively.   
With its investment in the observation and measurement of CPS in learning 
environments, the CRESST model has served as the paradigm for two large-scale initiatives for 
assessing and improving CPS in 21st century students, ATC21S (Griffin et al., 2012) and PISA 
(OECD, 2013, 2017a, 2017b). 
ATC21S framework of collaborative problem solving.  The ATC21S framework of CPS 
came to fruition through the efforts of stakeholders and educators interested in defining and 
developing pedagogies and assessing 21st century skills in students entering the workforce (Care, 
Scoular, & Griffin, 2016).  Specifically, the project was undertaken as a step in formulating 
standardized measures of CPS in human-to-human interactions.  Headquartered at the University 
of Melbourne, the ATC21S project was sponsored by Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco, and supported 
by the governments of Australia, Singapore, Finland, United States, Netherlands, and Costa Rica.  
The ATC21S framework casts CPS as a composite skill arising from the links between critical 
thinking, problem solving, decision making, and collaboration (Fiore et al., 2017; Scoular, Care, 
& Hesse, 2017).  It further divides CPS into social and cognitive dimensions, where the social is 
comprised of participation, perspective taking, and social regulation, and the cognitive of task 
regulation and learning and knowledge building.   
Within the social dimension, participation refers to an individual’s engagement both with 
teammates and the task (Hesse, Care, Buder, Sassenberg, & Griffin, 2012).  An individual rated 
high in participation would demonstrate a willingness to engage with the task, to initiate and 
promote interaction with others, and to persevere in the face of difficulty.  In this way, the act of 
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participation is reflective of an underlying social constructivist epistemology wherein an 
individual becomes a member of a community of practice by transitioning from a more 
peripheral role in problem solving to a more central role.   
Perspective taking refers to the quality of interactions with teammates and consists of 
subcomponents of adaptive responsiveness and audience awareness (Care et al., 2016).  
Perspective taking is regarded as a multidimensional construct consisting of affective, socio-
developmental, and linguistic elements.  An individual high in perspective taking would 
therefore be one who is aware of teammates’ knowledge and can tailor responses to them in 
appropriate affective, socio-developmental, and linguistic ways.  Finally, the social regulation 
category stems from the observation that team members bring different knowledge, experience, 
opinions, and strategies to a given task, and success depends partially on the ability of the group 
to harness those differences.  Social regulation, then, hinges on recognizing one’s own strengths 
and weaknesses (i.e., metamemory) as well as those of teammates’ (i.e., transactive memory).  
Additionally, individuals must exhibit initiative to take on and complete the task, and negotiation 
skills for resolving conflict or achieving resolution.   
Within the cognitive strand of CPS, task regulation refers to the competencies involved 
in completing taskwork, such as analyzing the problem, setting goals, managing resources, and 
collecting information (Care et al., 2016).  In doing so, individuals must be systematic in their 
search for a solution and continuously monitor progress, but still remain flexible in approach and 
tolerant of ambiguity.  Knowledge building reflects the ability to integrate and synthesize 
contributions from other team members and further refine these problem representations, plans, 
and monitoring activities.  Learning is then indicated by progress within a hierarchy of problem-
solving phases.  First, problem solvers must identify patterns (i.e., reason relationally) between 
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and among pieces of knowledge.  In the next phase, problem-solving strategies are invoked and 
the consequences of those strategies are considered.  In the final phase, hypotheses are generated 
through a process of reflection and monitoring.  As new knowledge is gained, problem solvers 
reconstruct their understandings of the problem and adapt their strategies for solving the 
problem.  Importantly, whereas task regulation captures the scoping of the problem space and 
collection of information, knowledge building and learning involves the use of that information.   
PISA framework of collaborative problem solving.  Although the ATC21S framework 
represented the first effort to identify critical aspects of CPS and generate a method of assessing 
and teaching CPS, the framework has not been widely adopted in schools.  However, one 
initiative that draws heavily on the ATC21S framework and has been implemented in over fifty 
countries is OECD’s Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), which released its 
first assessment of CPS in 2015.  One primary difference between the frameworks provided by 
ATC212S and PISA is in the way they define CPS (Scoular et al., 2017).  The ATC21S 
framework characterizes CPS as a complex, coordinated activity between two or more 
individuals, whereas PISA defines CPS in terms of agents.  This reflects PISA’s use of 
computer-mediated communication between individuals and computer agents, versus ATC21S’s 
observation of human-to-human interactions.  Beyond the difference in definition, their purposes 
are slightly different.  Namely, ATC21S was created to identify the steps and subskills needed 
for CPS for the benefit of students and educators, while PISA was meant to serve as a summative 
assessment to inform larger systems of education.  For the most part, however, the two 
frameworks are similar in emphasizing the respective cognitive and social components of CPS 
(Scoular et al., 2017).   
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Specifically, PISA’s CPS framework incorporates three collaborative competencies and four 
problem-solving processes (Fiore et al., 2017; Scoular et al., 2017).  The first collaborative 
competency, establishing and maintaining shared understanding, comprises the identification of 
shared knowledge, acknowledgement of perspectives of other agents in the collaboration, 
establishment of a shared representation of the problem, and continuous monitoring and 
renegotiation of shared understanding throughout the process.  Like the perspective taking 
component of the ATC21S framework, this first collaborative competency may involve 
responding to requests for information, verifying what others know, and resolving conflicts or 
misunderstandings.  The next competency, taking appropriate action to solve the problem, 
involves identifying which strategies are needed to tackle the problem and then enacting those 
strategies and evaluating their success.  Finally, establishing and maintaining team organization 
necessitates a consideration of each agent’s talents, resources, and assets, an understanding of 
each agent’s role, and the continual adaptation of strategies and reflection on team progress 
(Fiore et al., 2017; Scoular et al., 2017).   
The four problem-solving processes were adapted from PISA’s 2012 assessment of 
individual problem solving.  The first, exploring and understanding, involves interpreting initial 
information about the problem through exploration and interaction with it.  In the next process, 
representing and formulating, agents connect their prior knowledge to what they know about the 
current problem.  This may be done by communicating with others or through the use of external 
objects such as graphs, tables, or symbols.  Then, during planning and executing, agents 
determine goals, create plans to attain these goals, and finally enact the plans.  Last is monitoring 
and reflecting, in which agents track progress while executing plans, reflect on the quality of 
solutions, and revise plans when necessary.   
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Importantly, the PISA framework crosses the three teamwork (i.e., social) competencies 
with the four taskwork (i.e., cognitive) processes to yield 12 resultant skills on which to base 
CPS assessment; OECD, 2017a, 2017b).  Although not included in the framework itself, PISA’s 
report on CPS does acknowledge differences in CPS performance on the basis of particular task 
characteristics (e.g., well-defined versus ill-defined tasks, static versus dynamic tasks), problem 
scenarios (e.g., consensus versus negotiation tasks), team composition (e.g., hierarchical versus 
non-hierarchical), and team member characteristics (e.g., prior knowledge, motivation, cognitive 
aptitudes; Graesser et al., 2018).   
Key components of educational frameworks of collaborative problem solving.  As with 
the organizational theories, there is not one unifying framework within the educational realm that 
captures exactly how relational reasoning and socially shared regulation of learning might iterate 
in CPS.  However, there are aspects of each of the aforementioned frameworks that have 
relevance for the current study.  For instance, the CRESST model delineates separate 
collaborative and problem-solving components of CPS and implies how relational reasoning and 
socially shared regulation of learning play a role in both.  Within the problem-solving 
component, there are specific designations for problem solving strategies (e.g., relational 
reasoning) and self-regulatory activity.  Although less obvious than its counterpart, the 
collaboration component involves integrating information, identifying alternatives, and 
evaluating consequences, all of which presumably demand the ability to see patterns and 
compare ideas on the basis of similarities and differences.  Even more importantly, collaboration 
can be achieved only if team members are continuously monitoring and evaluating task progress, 
making plans, maintaining a positive socioemotional climate.   
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Building on the subset of skills needed for CPS, the theory of shared construction of 
knowledge helps elucidate how problem solving and collaboration come together, noting the 
possibility of higher and lower intensity periods of taskwork and teamwork, and thus, the 
importance of applying a microanalytic framework to the study of CPS.  The ATC21S and PISA 
frameworks offer additional value by providing guidelines for the identification and 
measurement of both the social and cognitive components of CPS at various stages of the CPS 
process.   
Review of Collaborative Problem-Solving Frameworks  
Despite their varying foundations, purposes, and samples, the frameworks provided by 
the organizational and educational psychology fields similarly support the notion that CPS is a 
dynamic, emergent process that involves two or more individuals working interdependently 
toward a shared goal.  More specifically, the frameworks characterize CPS as a process of 
transforming internalized knowledge into externalized knowledge through linguistic and 
behavioral communication and interaction.  Further, many of the frameworks reviewed advance 
the proposition that CPS is an iterative process that may vacillate between discernible periods of 
higher and lower intensity.   
Pertaining to the key facets of CPS, all of the frameworks emphasize a cognitive, 
problem-solving component and a social, collaborative component.  With regard to the cognitive 
component, teams must demonstrate an ability to analyze a problem, develop a coherent 
representation of the problem, collect information, identify patterns and interrelations between 
pieces of information, and integrate and synthesize that information.  In this way, the ability to 
reason relationally—that is, to discern meaningful patterns between and among seemingly 
disparate elements—becomes critical for CPS.  Further, understanding not only what makes 
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certain objects, concepts, or situations similar, but also what differentiates them, is a key 
component of RR and similarly crucial in CPS.  In reference to the social, collaborative 
component, teams must demonstrate an ability to regulate collective activity, including the 
cognitions, emotions, and behaviors of the group.   As such, socially shared regulation of 
learning (SSRL), in which team members co-construct knowledge, align task perceptions, set 
goals, and monitor and evaluate progress, also serves as a cornerstone of effective CPS.  The 
respective roles of RR and SSRL in CPS, along with the ways in which they have been defined 
and studied, will be explored after reviewing gaps in the CPS literature.   
Gaps in the Collaborative Problem-Solving Literature 
 In spite of the recognition that students across the globe lack critical CPS skills needed to 
be productive in the workforce, there is still no universally accepted curricula for teaching or 
training CPS in schools (Scoular & Care, 2018).  This may be due, in part, to the fact that our 
understanding of CPS has largely been shaped by findings for slightly different constructs, 
including group work, decision-making, memory, and learning (Graesser et al., 2018).  Although 
CPS shares some commonalities with these constructs, it is unclear whether studies of these 
constructs would be generalizable to CPS contexts.   
Extant frameworks of CPS specifically emphasize that successful CPS is marked by a 
combination of cognitive and social capacities enacted during taskwork and teamwork.  Further, 
these theories highlight how CPS may involve cycles of lower and higher intensity activity 
(Marks et al., 2001; Roschelle & Teasley, 1995), suggesting that CPS may look different 
depending on the rhythm with which a particular team engages with a particular task.  Because 
CPS may instantiate differently by team, it is crucial that researchers find more valid and reliable 
methods of capturing and quantifying real-time interactions between team members, as well as 
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identifying critical periods of activity during taskwork that contribute to CPS.  Put differently, 
the measurement of CPS must be commensurate with its hypothesized operationalization.  Thus, 
if CPS is said to unfold dynamically over the course of several hours or days, then researchers 
cannot reliably rely on retrospective questionnaires or static survey instruments that aggregate 
responses over time.   
Relational Reasoning and Collaborative Problem Solving 
In order to address open questions about CPS, this dissertation will focus in part on 
relational reasoning (RR), which acts as a key component of problem solving.  Indeed, the ability 
to detect patterns has long been thought to lie at the heart of learning and problem-solving.  In 
his seminal work The Principles of Psychology, William James (1890) highlighted a unique 
ability for humans to discriminate and draw associations.  When speaking about discerning 
similarities and differences, he asserted that, “It is obvious that the advance of our knowledge 
must consist of both operations” (p. 550).  This idea was echoed by Charles Spearman who, in 
writing The Abilities of Man (1927), defined intelligence in terms of the ability to construct 
relations, or perceive connections between things.  Intelligence tests that followed further 
emphasized the centrality of patterning in solving novel problems (Cattell, 1943; Raven, 1941).   
Traditionally, relational reasoning has been studied as a unitary construct, operationalized 
as analogical reasoning, which entails the discernment of similarities between and among 
objects, ideas, or events.  However, analogies constitute just one type of relational reasoning 
(Alexander et al., 2016).  Alexander and colleagues (Alexander & DRLRL, 2012, p. 272) 
formally define relational reasoning as a family of cognitive procedures “purposefully applied to 
recognizing or deriving meaningful relations or patterns between and among pieces of 
information that would otherwise appear unrelated.” This ability is effortful and requires deep 
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processing of problem elements, facilitating transfer of knowledge from one situation to another.  
In addition to analogies, relational reasoning encompasses anomalies, antinomies, and antitheses 
(Alexander & DRLRL, 2012).  All of these forms involve mapping lower-level relations to 
higher-level relations; the difference is the quality or character of the linkage.  Definitions for 
each form will be provided below, as well as ways in which the form has been studied in relation 
to CPS.   
Forms of Relational Reasoning and Associations with Problem Solving 
Analogical reasoning.  Although scholars have investigated this foundational cognitive 
ability (Hofstadter, 2001; James, 1890; Spearman, 1927), Sternberg (1977, 1979) is credited with 
developing the componential model of analogical reasoning.  In this model, the process of 
solving analogy problems is represented by a series of cognitive processes undertaken in a 
logical sequence: encoding, inferring, mapping, and applying.  Specifically, the reasoner begins 
by encoding, or recognizing and comprehending, relevant features of the problem.  Then, the 
reasoner must infer the relation between the lower-order elements of the problem, map the 
lower-order relations into a higher-order pattern, and finally apply this relation to produce a 
response.    
Studies of analogical reasoning in groups have been carried out with students and 
professionals, in both traditional laboratory settings (i.e., in vitro) and in naturalistic settings (i.e., 
in vivo).  These studies have converged on several findings, both related to the teamwork and 
taskwork inherent in CPS.  For instance, pertaining to cognitive outcomes, the ability to 
comprehend and generate analogies can promote domain learning.  Mason and Sorzio (1996) 
demonstrated that elementary student groups that constructed their own analogies scored higher 
on a graphic task depicting heat and water flow, produced higher-quality written reports, and 
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performed better on a transfer task than those who had been given an analogy by a teacher or 
those with no analogy at all.  Further, those positive benefits persisted even after 20 days had 
elapsed, suggesting that analogical reasoning can be a mechanism by which knowledge is 
organized or restructured.  This finding has been replicated with undergraduates as well, such 
that learning in an array of STEM fields (e.g., chemistry, engineering) was bolstered when 
groups of students reasoned analogically together (e.g., Bellochi & Ritchie, 2011; Emig, 
Mcdonald, Zembal-Saul, & Strauss, 2014; Yerrick, Doster, Nugent, Parke, & Crawley, 2013).   
In groups of professionals, analogical reasoning has been utilized as a tool for cognitive 
re-focusing.  In one case, an attending neurologist interspersed analogies into a discussion of 
patient symptoms when reasoning with his team of medical residents about possible patient 
diagnoses (Dumas & Dunbar, 2014), using the analogies to bring to mind previous cases that 
were relevant to the discussion.  Other in vivo studies have found analogies particularly useful in 
identifying, explaining, and solving problems (e.g., Chan, Paletz, & Schunn, 2012).  For 
example, Christensen and Schunn (2007) found that engineering teams engaged in new product 
development used within-domain analogies—or those in which the source and target of the 
analogy come from the same domain—to identify problems, between-domain analogies—those 
in which the source and target come from disparate domains—to explain concepts, and a mixture 
of within- and between-domain analogies to solve problems.  Similarly, Trickett and Trafton 
(2007) found that scientific experts tended to use analogies during data analysis.  Beyond 
identifying and explaining problems, analogies can contribute to CPS by boosting creativity and 
promoting the generation of novel ideas (Chan & Schunn, 2015; Karhu, Ritala, & Viola, 2016).   
Analogical reasoning also appears to impact the social side of CPS.  To illustrate, 
Casakin and colleagues (2015) found that within-domain analogies promoted cohesion among 
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team members by encouraging active communication.  This communication then facilitated a 
greater shared understanding of the task.  These findings are supported by other research which 
suggests that analogies can help to resolve uncertainty (Ball & Christensen, 2009).  However, 
analogies may not always have a positive impact on the group’s social atmosphere.  Paletz et al.  
(2013) uncovered a pattern of within-domain analogies leading to conflict among team members, 
particularly as it pertained to interpretations of data and coordination of the team.  It was 
reasoned that analogies might bring to light differences in underlying assumptions, thus sparking 
conflict.  Analogies may also be used differently depending on who populates the team.  Saner 
and Schunn (1997) found that within-domain analogies were more prevalent in lab meetings with 
individuals of similar backgrounds, whereas between-domain analogies were more likely to be 
used when talking with an audience of individuals with a wide range of expertise.  In this way, 
the type and function of analogies appears to be shaped, in part, by the composition (e.g., 
background, knowledge) of the group.   
Altogether, analogies seem to serve an important role in the collaborative and cognitive 
aspects of CPS.  This role applies both in school and in the workplace, with children and adults.  
However, research is needed to uncover more about how analogical reasoning changes over the 
course of problem solving, how it is distributed across team members, and more specifically how 
it interacts with other cognitive (e.g., anomalous reasoning) and social capacities (e.g., socially 
shared regulation).   
Anomalous reasoning.  Although research on relational reasoning has typically 
privileged analogical reasoning above the others, the ability to reason anomalously is similarly 
important for higher order thinking and problem-solving skills.  An anomaly represents a relation 
of dissimilarity in the form of a deviation from an expected pattern, or an outlier within a set 
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(Alexander et al., 2015; Chinn & Brewer, 1993).  In this way, detection of an anomaly demands 
first an understanding of the pattern governing the set, and then a realization that the elements of 
a member of that set are atypical in one or more ways.  Because of the cognitive conflict it can 
cause in an individual’s understanding of a phenomenon, anomalous reasoning is highly 
regarded as a means of promoting conceptual change and the restructuring of knowledge (Chinn 
& Brewer, 1998; Kuhn, 1962; Kuhn, Amsel, O’Loughlin, Schauble, Leadbeater, & Yotive, 
1988).  Fittingly, this form of reasoning has been studied predominantly in STEM fields (Darden 
& Cook, 1995; Dumas, Alexander, Baker, Jablansky, & Dunbar, 2014; Dumas, 2017; Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988).   
As with analogical reasoning, empirical research has linked anomalous reasoning to CPS 
performance.  For samples of students (i.e., middle school students, undergraduates), these 
studies suggest a reciprocal relation between anomalous reasoning and domain knowledge, such 
that deeper disciplinary knowledge increases a group’s ability to deal with anomalous patterns, 
and dealing with anomalies provides nuanced knowledge for the group to draw on during 
problem solving (Echevarria, 2003; Trickett, Trafton, & Schunn, 2009).   
Groups of professionals’ responses to anomalies have also been implicated in problem-
solving performance in a variety of domains.  For instance, one study found that groups of 
wildland firefighters were better able to manage fires when they could identify and interpret 
discrepancies they were seeing (Barton, Sutcliffe, Vogus, & DeWitt, 2015).  Specifically, the 
detection of discrepancies helped leaders make better sense of the situation and increased 
communication among team members.  In this way, anomalous reasoning served to enhance both 
the team’s shared understanding of the problem and the coordination with which to enact a 
response (Watts-Perotti & Woods, 2007).   
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In a similar vein, anomalous reasoning has been cited as instrumental in helping to 
diagnose patients in medical settings (Dumas et al., 2014).  In fact, the discernment of 
discrepancies was found to serve as the first part of the diagnostic process, such that identifying 
abnormalities in patient presentation facilitated the generation of viable hypotheses about the 
patient’s condition.  Thus, anomalies may serve a similar function for professional teams as they 
do for student teams (e.g., Echevarria, 2003).   
One caveat to the ability to reason anomalously during CPS pertains to the group 
members’ experience with and knowledge of the focal domain.  For instance, Echevarria’s 
(2003) study of middle school students’ scientific reasoning in genetic biology revealed a 
tendency for students to focus only on the most salient anomalies and to spend more time 
understanding rather than resolving those deviations.  Thus, although anomalies may serve as 
catalysts for knowledge reconstruction, individuals with less disciplinary experience or 
familiarity may have limited attention to devote to actually problem solving.  Thus, when 
analyzing the CPS performance of a given team, researchers must consider the background of 
each group member and the constraints or affordances imposed by such characteristics.  In spite 
of these potential limitations, the relation between anomalous reasoning and the social and 
cognitive aspects of CPS is uncontestable.   
Antinomous reasoning.  A third form of relational reasoning, antinomy, denotes a 
relation of mutual exclusivity or a paradoxical relation.  It demands the understanding that there 
is a true incompatibility between objects, ideas, or situations across sets, and thus often involves 
categorizing what something is by describing what it is not (Alexander & DRLRL, 2012).  
Whereas anomalies deal with members of a set that are aberrant, antinomies refer to objects or 
ideas that cannot be part of a set.  Antinomous reasoning has also been associated with 
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conceptual change (Slotta, Chi, & Joram, 1995), as well as originality in engineering design 
(Dumas & Schmidt, 2015) and medical decision-making (Dumas et al., 2014).   
Unfortunately, there are few, if any studies, that have examined antinomous reasoning in 
groups and its relation to CPS performance.  One study investigated the interrelations among the 
four forms of relational reasoning in medical discourse and diagnosis (Dumas et al., 2014).  
Dumas and colleagues discovered that an attending neurologist used proportionally more 
antinomies than expected in guiding discussion among his residents, suggesting that antinomies 
may be important in classifying and organizing elements of a problem.  Further, the disparity 
between the attending doctor and the residents may indicate that certain individuals—as 
determined, perhaps, by knowledge within a domain or position within a hierarchy—are more 
likely than others to reason by antinomy, and accordingly, to scaffold this reasoning for other 
group members.  More generally, these findings suggest that reasoning not only about 
similarities, but about differences, may be critical for problem solving.  Additionally, this study 
found that the doctors reasoned with all four forms of relations, providing evidence that the 
forms of relational reasoning do not necessarily occur in isolation.  Rather, the forms may 
operate in concert, building on one another and promoting problem-solving success.  As an 
example, an individual might find a relational similarity between two situations but follow up 
this observation with an antinomy to distinguish important dissimilarities between the scenarios.  
This insight represents a promising avenue for future research.   
Antithetical reasoning.  An antithesis is a relation of difference in degree.  Like 
antinomy, antithesis represents conflict between objects, ideas, or events.  However, while there 
may be opposition, the differences do not rise to the level of exclusion.  For example, if the 
descriptors hot versus cold are applied to an object, what is being represented is a difference in 
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temperature, rather than the presence or absence of heat (which would be classified as 
antinomous).  Antithetical reasoning is considered central to persuasion and argumentation to the 
extent that it promotes understanding of both sides of an issue (Chinn & Anderson 1998; Kuhn & 
Udell, 2007).  For instance, it has been suggested that to argue effectively, individuals must 
know how to strengthen their position while weakening the opposing position.  Antithetical 
relations are also regarded as fundamental in the organization of human language and thought 
(Marková, 1987).   
As with antinomous reasoning, few if any studies have devoted attention to how 
antithetical reasoning manifests in CPS contexts.  The study carried out by Dumas and 
colleagues (2014) demonstrated that antitheses were a present but infrequent part of the 
diagnostic process.  When antitheses were voiced, it was usually used by the attending 
neurologist toward the end of a meeting as a way to point out oppositional points of view.  
However, the authors reasoned that the general lack of antithetical reasoning may have been 
reflective of the domain, the task, or the degree of conflict within the group.  In the current study, 
I seek to determine the extent to which Dumas et al.’s findings generalize to engineering design 
teams composed of students.  Given that a critical part of the engineering design process entails 
comparing design ideas and subsequently ranking “better” and “worse” on a predefined set of 
criteria, it is possible that individuals engaged in this process would verbalize more antitheses.   
Measurement of Relational Reasoning Within Groups 
Historically, RR has been assessed through various visuospatial measures designed to tap 
only analogical reasoning, such as Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1941).  More recently, 
Alexander and the DRLRL (2012, 2014, 2015) have developed a series of measures that target 
all four forms of RR in both visuospatial and linguistic manner.  The Test of Relational 
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Reasoning (TORR; Alexander & DRLRL, 2012), for example, contains four scales of eight 
selected response items.  Each item contains novel figural items designed to assess participants’ 
abilities to identify relations of analogy, anomaly, antinomy, and antithesis.  Importantly, the 
TORR aims to tap participants’ fluid rather than crystallized abilities, and accordingly does not 
require any prior knowledge.   
In spite of advances in measuring RR as a multidimensional construct, current 
instruments almost exclusively assess RR in individuals.  Consequently, other methods must be 
developed to assess RR in collaborative settings.  Expanding on the coding scheme used by 
Dumas et al.  (2014), Jablansky and colleagues (2016) developed a comprehensive coding 
scheme for identifying relational and non-relational statements in discourse.  Although this 
coding scheme has been used in studies of dyads and classrooms featuring teachers and students 
(Jablansky et al., 2016, 2019; Sun, Zhao, & Alexander, 2017), no research to date has assessed 
RR in the discourse of teams of individuals engaged in a CPS task.   
Gaps in the Relational Reasoning Literature 
 As mentioned, one gap in the literature is the lack of research on RR in the discourse of 
teams engaged in CPS.  Given that schools and stakeholders alike are invested in promoting CPS 
skills in students entering the workforce, it is important to assess these skills in a context that 
mirrors those that students are likely to face in the workforce.  Therefore, research should 
examine RR as it occurs in the real-time problem-solving efforts of individuals with a common 
goal.  Doing so will address another gap in the literature, which pertains to the focus on 
individuals’ RR, rather than the emergent RR of a team.  Specifically, although much is known 
about the RR capacities of adolescents and adults, less is known about the types and quantities of 
RR these individuals would verbalize during a collaborative task.  In this way, determining the 
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strength of the link between individuals’ propensities for RR and the RR they express in a social 
context will help to advance research.  Finally, little is known about how RR unfolds in real time.  
Although research suggests that the forms of RR may operate in concert with one another 
(Dumas et al., 2014; Jablansky et al., 2016; Sun et al., 2017), it is unknown whether certain 
forms are more likely to co-occur, or whether certain larger patterns of relational reasoning 
might be expected given the nature of the domain, the task, or the group.   
Socially Shared Regulation of Learning and Collaborative Problem Solving  
 Decades of research support the notion that successful learners self-regulate their 
learning (Bandura, 1977, 1986; Boekaerts, Pintrich, & Zeidner, 2000; Flavell, 1979; Zimmerman 
& Schunk, 2001).  That is, learners employ a suite of cognitive, behavioral, motivational, and 
emotional strategies to monitor and control their learning (Zimmerman & Schunk, 2008).  For 
instance, a learner might invoke prior knowledge (i.e., cognition) in order to solve a focal 
problem, or keep track of time (i.e., behavior) to make sure she is making sufficient progress 
toward her goal (Alexander, Dinsmore, Parkinson, & Winters, 2011).  Models of SRL have 
varied conceptual roots, ranging from more individual constructivist perspectives (e.g., 
information processing; Winne & Hadwin, 1998) to more social constructivist perspectives (e.g., 
social cognitive model; Zimmerman & Schunk, 2001).  However, most of these theories agree 
that learning is goal directed, that learners actively construct knowledge in service of goal 
achievement, and that self-regulation of learning is constrained to some degree by contextual and 
environmental factors (e.g., Winne & Hadwin, 1998).   
 Although much SRL research focuses on individual performance, strategies, goals, 
beliefs, and evaluation, there is acknowledgment among research that the social environment is 
implicated in SRL (Hadwin & Oshige, 2011).  As a case in point, Zimmerman and colleagues 
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(Zimmerman & Cleary, 2009; Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1997; Zimmerman & Paulsen, 1995) 
note that opportunities for observation, imitation, and feedback of others can facilitate an 
individual’s ability to self-regulate learning.  Further, the social cognitive account of SRL 
emphasizes the reciprocal nature of influences between person, behavior, and environment 
(Bandura, 1986; Zimmerman, 1989).  However, a consideration of how a group of individuals 
with a shared goal mutually and reciprocally regulate their emotions, cognitions, motivations, 
and behaviors appears to be out of the scope of this model and others.  Given the regularity with 
which students are tasked with working collaboratively, and the concurrent need for 
collaborative skills in the workforce, it would seem prudent to consider how SRL iterates in a 
highly social, interdependent problem-solving context.   
 In service of this goal, researchers have begun investigating a construct termed socially 
shared regulation of learning (SSRL), broadly conceptualized as the process by which a group 
of individuals collectively regulate their learning and problem solving (Jarvela & Hadwin, 2013; 
Jarvela et al., 2015).  More formally, SSRL “involves interdependent or collectively shared 
regulatory processes, beliefs, and knowledge (e.g., strategies, monitoring, evaluation, goal 
setting, motivation, metacognitive decision making) orchestrated in service of a co-constructed 
or shared outcome” (Panadero & Jarvela, 2015, p. 4).  That is, group members work to co-
construct goals and standards and then mutually regulate activity as they problem solve.  Unlike 
SRL, which may focus on an individual’s cognition in the presence of others, SSRL refers to 
collaboration cognition that emerges as individuals work toward a shared goal (Hadwin & 
Oshige, 2011).  Further, this socially shared regulation necessitates an awareness of one’s own 
metacognitive experiences as well as that of one’s teammates (Lajoie & Lu, 2012).   
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Conceptual Frameworks of Socially Shared Regulation of Learning 
Since the advent of the term SSRL, two frameworks have been featured most 
prominently in the literature.  These models include Volet and colleagues’ (Volet, Summers, & 
Thurman, 2009) theoretical framework for socially-regulated learning and Hadwin and 
colleagues’ (Hadwin, Jarvela, & Miller, 2011; Jarvela & Hadwin, 2013) model of socially shared 
regulated learning.   
Volet and colleagues’ theoretical framework for socially-regulated learning. Volet 
and colleagues (2009) take a situative approach to understanding self-regulated learning (SRL) in 
collaborative settings, inspired by Barron (2003), Greeno (2006), and Nolen and Ward (2008).  
This approach emphasizes the notion of “learning in activity,” which refers to cognitions and 
understandings as they are constructed during learning activities.  Fittingly, this approach 
advocates the investigation of socially-regulated learning by examining real-time interactions 
between team members and the way that they engage with a focal task or problem.  Far from 
assuming that collaboration and co-regulation are inherent in any social exchange, Volet et al.’s 
framework presents a matrix that can be used to categorize the nature of any social collaboration 
across two dimensions: level of social regulation and sophistication of content processing (see 




Figure 6.  Volet et al.’s (2009) theoretical framework for socially-regulated learning, which 
consists of a matrix that can be used to categorize the nature of any social collaboration 
along the dimensions of level of social regulation and sophistication of content 
processing.   
 
Along the first dimension, social regulation ranges from individual regulation within a 
group to co-regulation as a group.  Here, regulation is considered a recursive process that may 
vacillate between periods of higher or lower co-regulation (Volet et al., 2009).  In times of lower 
co-regulation, a given individual might be engaged in clarifying knowledge or monitoring their 
own understanding of the problem.  By contrast, higher co-regulation might involve all group 
members participating in constructing and maintaining a shared conception of the problem.   
Along the second dimension, content processing represents the mental or cognitive 
activities (i.e., information processes) used by team members to process content knowledge and 
similarly ranges from low to high.  Whereas high-level content processing may include 
elaborating, speculating, drawing relations, and asking thought-provoking questions, low-level 
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content processing may include sharing information, exchanging ideas, clarifying 
understandings, or providing definitions.  What makes the former exchanges high-level is the 
assumption that these activities lead to co-construction of knowledge, while in the latter, low-
level exchanges, there is no attempt to transform or integrate knowledge with one’s own mental 
representations (Volet et al., 2009).   
Hadwin and colleagues’ model of socially shared regulated learning.  Although 
different in its visual depiction of the construct (see Figure 7), the model of socially shared 
regulated learning forwarded by Hadwin and colleagues (2011) is similarly built on information 
processing and situated learning perspectives.  The model focuses on cognitive activity that 
occurs within and between individuals but emphasizes the importance of situational affordances 
that enable SSRL to emerge (e.g., information and communication technology).  However, 
beyond cognitive activity, the model also includes designations for metacognitive, motivational, 
emotional, and behavioral actions.  Another critical difference between the models pertains to the 
measurement of regulatory activity.  Whereas Volet et al.  (2009) place regulation on a 
continuum, Hadwin and colleagues (2011) describe discrete categories of regulation in a group: 
self-regulated learning (SRL), co-regulated learning (CoRL), and shared regulation of learning 




Figure 7.  Hadwin and colleagues’ (Jarvela & Hadwin, 2013) model of socially shared regulated 
learning.   
 
Hadwin et al.’s (2011) framework for SSRL originated in the COPES model of SRL 
advanced by Winne and Hadwin (1998) two decades earlier.  The COPES model posits that 
learning occurs in four phases, each accompanied by five processes (Winne & Hadwin, 1998).  
The phases include task definition, in which the learner forms a perception of the goal for the 
task; goal setting and planning, in which the goal from the previous stage is updated or reframed 
and a plan for approaching the task is subsequently formed; enacting tactics and strategies, in 
which the learner applies operations to achieve the tasks and monitors the performance of these 
tactics; and adaptations to metacognition, in which the learner evaluates the success of the 
tactics from the previous stage and makes modifications as necessary.   
Each of these phases is impacted by conditions, operations, products, evaluations, and 
standards.  Conditions refer to internal and external affordances and constraints affecting 
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learners.  Internal, cognitive conditions include domain knowledge, motivation, beliefs, and 
awareness of strategies, while external, task conditions include time, resources, and local 
context.  Operations refer to the actual information processes invoked during learning, such as 
searching, monitoring, assembling, rehearsing, and translating, otherwise known as SMART 
processes (Winne, 2001).  These operations results in products, an example of which might be a 
definition of the task, as in the first phase of SRL, or the ability to recall information for a test, as 
in the third phase (Greene & Azevedo, 2007).  Products are then evaluated as they compare to 
standards, criteria the learner believes to be the optimal end state of the phase in which they are 
engaging.  If there is poor fit between products and standards, the learner may exert control and 
revise the operations, re-formulate products or revise standards.  Importantly, Winne and Hadwin 
(1998) stipulate that SRL unfolds in loosely sequential and recursive phases, referring to the 
notion that there is no typical cycle, and that learning and problem solving generally require 
recycling through the phases until a satisficing end point has been reached.   
As mentioned, Hadwin and colleagues’ (2011) model of SSRL draws on the COPES 
model of SRL.  As such, it includes provisions for the four phases and five processes involved in 
SRL and posits a similarly recursive and recycling progression through the phases.  In 
extrapolating to a collaborative environment, however, it includes three distinct modes of 
regulation: self-, co-, and shared regulation, which broadly characterize the extent to which 
group members are mutually and reciprocally monitoring and regulating learning and problem 
solving.   
The first mode, self-regulation, intuitively refers to the regulatory actions taken by an 
individual to adapt to interactions with other group members.  For example, an individual might 
imitate the actions of another group member or may strive to regulate her own emotion and 
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motivation during problem solving.  One step further, co-regulation usually applies to dyadic 
exchanges in which regulatory activity is guided or scaffolded by one individual.  This may 
occur when one individual is more knowledgeable than others in the group or when a particular 
individual takes control of group activity.  Finally, shared regulation describes the joint 
regulation of group activity and implies a greater balance of sharedness than in co-regulation.   
As is true of the COPES model, Hadwin et al.’s (2011) model of SSRL assumes that 
regulation may vacillate between periods of self-, co-, and shared regulation.  In differentiating 
between the latter two modes of regulation, Volet and Mansfield (2006) suggest that different 
goals may lead to co- versus shared regulation.  They note that in their study, co-regulation was 
triggered by individual and control goals, whereas shared regulation was triggered by 
collaborative goals.  Thus, it appears that groups may adapt their regulation strategies in order to 
be compatible with goal pursuit.   
Essential components of socially shared regulation of learning for the current study.  
Because there are many components to group regulation, the current study will focus on a few 
key aspects common to both of the models discussed.  The first pertains to different levels or 
categories of regulation.  Both Volet et al. (2009) and Hadwin et al. (2011) note that in group 
settings, regulation can occur within or between individuals.  Further, this regulation can be 
initiated by a more knowledgeable other or jointly and more equitably by all team members.  The 
second component considered in this study is the proposed cyclical, recursive nature of social 
regulation.  Specifically, this study will aim to identify different phases within the regulatory 
process as well as the extent to which they repeat over time.  The final component relates to the 
content of the regulation being done.  As mentioned, Volet et al. (2009) note that regulation may 
involve asking high-level questions, drawing relations, providing definitions, or sharing 
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information.  Consequently, it seemed that not only identifying cycles of regulation, but 
examining their content, would provide key insights into social regulation.  
Measurement of Socially Shared Regulation of Learning in Groups 
Although Panadero and Jarvela (2015), in their review of the construct, found only 17 
studies addressing SSRL—13 of which presented empirical data—there are several 
commonalities in how it has been studied and linked to problem solving.  For instance, studies of 
the SSRL have tended to examine primary school or higher education students working to solve 
relatively well-defined problems.  Further, most of these studies have investigated SSRL in the 
domain of mathematics (e.g., Hurme, Merenluoto, & Jarvela, 2009), with comparatively fewer 
studies in the social sciences and humanities (e.g., Janssen, Erkens, Kirschner, & Kanselaar, 
2012).   
In order to capture groups’ emergent SSRL, researchers have relied on video recordings 
of verbal and non-verbal interactions among team members.  Thus, analyses of data have been 
predominantly qualitative or mixed-methods in nature, featuring discourse or content analyses 
(e.g., Iiskala et al., 2011; Lobczowski, Allen, et al., 2020; Lobczowski, Lyons, et al., 2020).  
Panadero and Jarvela (2015) note that there have been no experimental or quasi-experimental 
studies of SSRL yet, with researchers instead leveraging SSRL in naturalistic tasks or computer-
supported collaborative learning environments.  They add that most groups have ranged in size 
from two to four members, with only one study examining SSRL in a six-person group.   
Although evidence is limited, several studies (Grau & Whitebread, 2012; Janssen et al., 
2012; Jarvela et al., 2013; Volet et al., 2009) have demonstrated that shared regulation has a 
positive association with learning and problem-solving outcomes.  For instance, Janssen and 
colleagues (2012) found that engagement in regulatory activities (i.e., planning, monitoring task 
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progress) predicted the performance of groups of secondary students working on a historical 
inquiry task.  Further, Jarvela, Malmberg, and Koivuniemi (2016) uncovered positive relations 
between socially shared planning and motivation with learning outcomes in an analysis and 
synthesis task.  It is hypothesized that when regulatory activity is shared to a greater degree, 
group members talk more about relevant knowledge, which in turn promotes problem-solving 
(Grau & Whitebread, 2012).  Further, the greater balance of power during shared regulation may 
enhance the socioemotional climate of the group, prompting individuals to share more, leading to 
more monitoring and feedback from others (Rogat & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2011).   
Gaps in the Socially Shared Regulation of Learning Literature  
 In spite of all that has been learned, Panadero and Jarvela (2015) conclude that SSRL 
research is still in its infancy, and that several gaps must be filled before designing and 
implementing interventions.  For one, the range of groups and tasks included in extant studies 
remains narrow.  As mentioned, most studies of SSRL examined groups composed of two to four 
individuals.  It is unclear whether group size has any relation to SSRL, or how SSRL might 
emerge if activity were distributed across more than five or more individuals.  Concomitantly, it 
is unknown whether findings from these groups would generalize to tasks of varying difficulties 
or objectives.  As noted by Panadero and Jarvela (2015), most researchers did not justify their 
selection of task, nor did they clarify whether the task was sufficiently difficult that it necessarily 
demanded collaboration, which is key for the emergence of SSRL (Iiskala et al., 2011).  
Relatedly, the extant literature has primarily examined SSRL in the domain of mathematics.  
Thus, it is unclear if the same findings might be observed in collaborations in other domains, 
such as the sciences or humanities.   
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 Another key gap in SSRL research is that studies have seldom considered the resources 
individual team members bring into a CPS context (e.g., higher-order reasoning skills) or, more 
generally, how different individuals contribute to or drive regulatory activity during problem 
solving (Winne, Hadwin, & Gress, 2010).  For instance, individuals perceived as leaders might 
contribute to more or different aspects of SSRL than other group members.  Alternatively, if one 
individual is driving regulatory activity, then other team members might not be as motivated to 
contribute.  In this way, understanding how SSRL unfolds during real time is critical.   
Relational Reasoning and Socially Shared Regulation of Learning 
 In addition to examining the respective relations between RR and SSRL with CPS, it is 
important to consider how the former constructs are associated in the literature.  In point of fact, 
RR and SSRL have rarely, if ever, been examined in tandem.  That is, there are no studies 
focusing on how the four forms of RR interact with individuals’ regulatory behaviors during a 
team problem solving task.  There is a robust literature on learners’ regulatory behaviors during 
reasoning tasks; however, the reasoning is typically assumed because of the nature of the task 
and is not systematically measured or assessed.  As a case in point, Zheng, Li, and Lajoie (2019) 
investigated the joint roles of achievement goals and SRL on clinical reasoning performance.  
Although both reasoning and regulation constructs were implicated in the study, clinical 
reasoning referred to the task.  Therefore, what was assessed was task performance (i.e., 
accuracy in diagnosing correct medical condition), rather than the nature of the reasoning 
completed.   
Another issue pertaining to the study of RR and SSRL, as evidenced in Zheng and 
colleagues’ (2019) study, is that the type of reasoning examined is often described as clinical or 
scientific, which is distinct in definition and operationalization from relational reasoning.  For 
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example, Taub and colleagues (2018) endeavored to assess how learners used metacognitive 
processes and scientific reasoning processes in a game-based learning environment.  In this 
study, scientific reasoning was operationalized as hypothesis testing, and these hypothesis tests 
were subsequently coded as being relevant, partially-relevant, or irrelevant.  While the thinking 
that gives rise to a hypothesis may certainly be relational (e.g., analogical), this is generally not 
examined.   
A complement to the issue of performance being used as an operationalization of 
reasoning is the use of reasoning as an operationalization of regulatory activity.  In one study, 
researchers coded metacognitive activity in a problem-based learning environment of medical 
students (Lajoie et al., 2015).  When providing examples for each of their coded categories, they 
considered analogies one manifestation of evaluation, as well as detecting differences (i.e., 
anomalies) and discrepancies (i.e., antinomies) as manifestations of monitoring.  This is 
representative of a pattern in which researchers conflate RR and SSRL, making it difficult to 
understand their respective and potentially complementary roles in CPS.   
In spite of the lack of empirical data on how RR and SSRL iterate with respect to one 
another, it seems conceivable that the two might co-occur in a variety of ways.  For instance, 
noticing conflicting task objectives might lead team members to reformulate their plan from a 
prior phase of SSRL.  By the same token, applying prior knowledge from similar tasks might 
help the team identify important information as they begin completing the focal task.  
Alternatively, it is possible that engaging in SSRL might stimulate RR.  For example, when 
selecting a strategy to enact to solve a problem, teams might explicitly choose to draw inspiration 
from similar problems.  In the same vein, teams may recognize a need to distinguish different 
concepts or ideas and then engage in antinomous or antithetical thinking.  Given the sparse 
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empirical work on which to draw, one aim of the current study is to develop distinctive codes for 
RR and SSRL and discern patterns in how they iterate in a CPS task.   
General Summary 
 From the few studies available, it appears that both the ability to reason about higher-
order relations as well as to monitor, control, and regulate learning as a collective are tied to 
collaborative problem-solving outcomes.  However, future research must tackle key issues 
pertaining to how these capacities unfold during problem solving and whether any patterns of 
occurrence can be determined as they relate to the types and quantities of RR and SSRL 
verbalized, as well as the people who verbalize them.  In this way, the current study aims to 
contribute to the literature on CPS by employing real-time measures of teamwork and taskwork.   
Specifically, this study will focus on two constructs key for CPS performance—RR and 
SSRL.  Guided by the frameworks reviewed above, this study will use a combination of non-
parametric analyses, social network analyses, and data mining to identify patterns in the ways 
that RR and SSRL iterate during problem solving, as well as how teammates interact with one 
another and contribute to the team’s problem-solving efforts.  By exploring CPS 
microgenetically in a number of teams over the course of several problem-solving episodes, this 
study can provide support for what is already known about the construct, as well as clarity about 
the lesser studied mechanisms by which cognitive and social capacities come together during 
problem solving.  Further, this study can demonstrate alternative approaches to the measurement 
and analysis of CPS, a pressing need within the empirical literature.  Consequently, the results 
may inform educators, policymakers, and stakeholders endeavoring to improve the CPS of 







The participants in this study were four teams of senior undergraduate students (n = 22) 
enrolled in the University of Maryland’s mechanical engineering capstone design course, 
Integrated Product and Processes Development (ENME472).  Senior undergraduate students 
majoring in mechanical engineering were chosen as the target population for this study for 
several reasons.  First, the abilities of senior engineering students should be roughly equivalent to 
that of new entrants into a professional designer career.  Second, the university setting afforded a 
semi-structured environment in which teams engaged in solving different problems could be 
more easily compared than college teams operating outside of a class structure or professional 
teams residing in different firms or companies, for whom expectations, operations, and processes 
may differ widely.  The course ENME472 was chosen because it aims to expose students to all 
aspects of the design process such as problematization, idea generation, conceptualization, and 
prototyping.  Students are taught engineering-specific methodologies used to evaluate and select 
designs that they are expected to use in their own projects.  Although projects differ among 
teams, all teams must fulfill similar task requirements (e.g., generate ten unique design ideas per 
person), making it possible to compare teams more easily.   
The first team, Team 1, included six males with a mean age of 21 (SD = 0.63), five of 
whom were native English speakers.  Five of these students identified as White or Caucasian and 
one identified as Asian or Pacific Islander.  Team 2 was composed of three males and two 
females with a mean age of 22 (SD = 0.55), all of whom were native English speakers.  Three of 
the individuals identified as Caucasian or White, one identified as African American or Black, 
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and one identified as Asian or Pacific Islander.  Team 3 included six males with a mean age of 
22 (SD = 2.25), five of whom were native English speakers.  Four of the individuals identified as 
Caucasian or White, and two identified as Asian or Pacific Islander.  Finally, Team 4 was 
composed of four males and one female with a mean age of 22 (SD = 1.64), four of whom were 
native English speakers.  Four of the students identified as Caucasian or White and one student 
identified as Asian or Pacific Islander.   
Design 
The study was naturalistic in nature, as there was no manipulation involved in either the 
composition of teams or the manner in which teams approached the generation and selection of 
ideas.  The study may also be considered microgenetic in design, as it aimed to capture moment-
to-moment changes in the reasoning and regulation used by team members as they solved 
problems collaboratively.   
Procedure  
To recruit teams, an email was sent to ENME472 course instructors explaining the goals 
of the study and asking that any teams interested in participating contact the researcher.  The 
email also noted that for a team to be eligible, all members had to consent to participate.  Each 
individual was offered $50 in Amazon or Visa gift cards for their participation at the end of the 
study.  In accordance with course procedure, students were permitted to choose their teammates.  
Data were collected from three teams in the Fall semester of 2016 and from a fourth team in Fall 
of 2018.  After consenting to participate, teams notified the researcher of when and where they 
would be meeting, and the researcher attended and video-recorded these meetings.  Teams 
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generally met in person once per week to complete assignments related to their project.  The 
duration of the meetings was left to the discretion of the group.   
Course Context 
In ENME472, teams must identify a problem with an existing product and design a new 
product to solve that problem.  During the first month of the semester, teams focus on 
conceptualizing and evaluating design ideas in several discrete tasks.  After deciding on the 
problem they will address, team members must individually generate a set of ten unique ideas for 
a new product design.  Following a presentation of those ideas, each team must select ten to 
evaluate in more depth.  Over their next few meetings, teams narrow down this pool of ideas to 
five, and finally to one.  Of note, all teams use the same methodology (i.e., Quality Function 
Deployment; Akao, 1972, 1990) to evaluate their ideas.  This includes generating a list of 
customer requirements for the product (i.e., priority features the customer expects) and 
translating that list into a set of engineering characteristics (i.e., physical features, variables, or 
performance metrics) needed to fulfill those requirements.  For instance, in the case of designing 
a new laptop, a customer requirement might be that the laptop is portable, while its associated 
engineering characteristics might be weight and overall dimensions.  This methodology also 
demands a weighting of each criterion based on its importance to the design.  Finally, design 
ideas are evaluated on the criteria identified, both against a benchmark design (i.e., the most 
comparable product currently on the market) as well as the designs generated by the team.   
For the purposes of this study, team meetings centered around the comparison and 
selection of design ideas were observed, based on the hypothesis that more reasoning and 
regulation would occur in these initial phases of the project.  Teams notified the researcher when 
they were engaged in this phase of the task so that the researcher could attend and video-record 
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the meeting.  Team meetings were not constrained or guided in any way and could run for as 
long as the team deemed necessary.   
Each of the four teams in the current study focused on a different problem.  Specifically, 
Team 1 (Team Kayak) aimed to lower incidence rates of capsizing accidents in kayaks.  Most of 
their ideas focused on features they could add to the structure of the kayak or ways of increasing 
the buoyancy of its paddles.  Team 2 (Team Baby) by contrast, was interested in creating a more 
efficient method of measuring babies right after birth that would minimize miscalculations 
caused by the baby squirming.  Their ideas ranged from infrared scanning solutions to stretchy 
caps that could be used to measure the baby’s head circumference.  Team 3 (Team Toilet) was 
interested in older and differently-abled populations and conceptualized modifications to toilet 
seats to help individuals rise from them more easily.  Finally, Team 4 (Team Ambulance) strove 
to design a medical robot that could be installed in an ambulance in order to provide more 
immediate and precise treatment for critical conditions such as cardiac arrest or hemorrhage.   
Data Collection, Preparation, and Coding  
 Data collection and preparation.  Team meetings were filmed by the researcher with a 
Canon EOS Rebel T3i DSLR camera.  Several research assistants then created written transcripts 
of each meeting from the video recordings.  Throughout this process, the researcher watched 
random selections of each video and compared it with the written transcripts to make sure audio 
was captured and recorded accurately.   
Transcripts from each meeting were then broken up into speech units that would later be 
assigned a code (see Figure 8 for flowchart of data collection, preparation, and coding process).  
A speech unit roughly constitutes one complete thought and may be indicated by a disruption or 
a pause in speech, often corresponding with independent clauses (Trickett & Trafton, 2007).  In 
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this paradigm, it is possible for one word to count as a unit if that word has a substantive 
meaning.  For instance, if a student answered “Yeah” to a question, the word could count as its 
own unit.  If, however, the “Yeah” acted as a colloquialism or filler word designed to precede a 
statement or connect to a longer substantive statement, it would not be regarded as its own unit.  
A single sentence could contain multiple utterances if more than one thought was communicated.  
In such cases, conjunctions such as “and,” “because,” “but,” and “so” often indicated where to 
segment units.  For instance, the sentence “That’s true, but should we choose this idea?” would 
be segmented as follows: That’s true,/ but should we choose this idea?/.  It is common in group 
discussions for several individuals to be speaking at once or to be speaking over one another.  If 
a thought was interrupted by another person and continued after that person finished speaking, 
the thought was broken up into separate units.   
  
Figure 8.  Flowchart of data collection, preparation, and coding.    
Team meeting filmed 
Written transcript of 
speech created from video 
Transcripts broken up into 
speech units 
Coded as RR Coded as non-RR 
Coded as SSRL Coded as non-SSRL 
Coded as task-
related 
Coded as other 
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 Data coding of utterances.  After utterances were segmented, one code was assigned to 
each utterance.  There were three general categories of codes, including (a) relational reasoning 
(RR); (b) socially shared regulation of learning (SSRL); and (c) task-related or other.  Codes for 
RR, task-related, and other talk were adapted from the coding scheme originally developed by 
Dumas and colleagues (2014) and expanded by Jablansky and colleagues (2016, 2019) 
specifically for teams engaged in problem solving.  Codes for SSRL were adapted from 
Lobczowski, Lyons, and colleagues’ (2020) social regulation of learning (SoRL) coding scheme.  
See Table 1 for definitions of possible speech unit codes and Table 2 for an example of a coded 
excerpt.  
Importantly, the coding scheme was monothetic in nature, meaning that only one code 
could be applied to each utterance.  That is, an utterance could be coded as RR, SSRL, task-
related, or other.  Further, each utterance could only receive one code from within a category.  A 
monothetic scheme can present challenges for coding, as some instances of RR could appear to 
be indicative of regulatory activity.  For example, a student might ask whether a feature of one 
design serves a similar purpose as that in another design.  This could be seen as an attempt to 
draw an analogy between the ideas as well as monitoring one’s understanding of the content.  
Thus, a decision rule was made that in cases of possible overlap, RR codes would be prioritized 
over SSRL.  This was done to separate more clearly the two for the purpose of understanding 





Definitions and Examples of Speech Unit Codes for Relational Reasoning (RR), Socially Shared 
Regulation of Learning (SSRL), Task Related (TR) and Other (O) 
 
UNIT  CODE DEFINITION EXAMPLE 
RR    
 Analogy (AG) Identifying relation of structural similarity 
among two objects, ideas, or situations.  
“That would be almost similar to, has 
some similarities to Ciara’s cap.”  
 Anomaly (AM) Identifying relation of non-conformity or 
aberration from larger pattern. 
“But [this design] can lift all your 
weight whereas all these other ones 
can’t.”  
 Antinomy (AN) Identifying relation of incompatibility or 
mutual exclusivity between two objects, 
ideas, or situations.    
“Yeah so it’s like the hat… you only 
have discrete values, and I think 
measuring band you can have 
continuous values.”   
 Antithesis (AT) Identifying relation of contrast, opposition, 
or difference in degree along continuum.  
“Boat dams would probably weigh your 
boat down more [than doggy paddle].”  
SSRL    
 Planning (PL) Setting goals or creating plans related to 
task understanding, content understanding, 
or task performance.  
“Okay so, um, do we want to skim 




Tracking the understanding of task or 
content, including monitoring one’s own 
understanding or taking control to actively 
seek out information or explanation. 
“Okay, so this… walk me through this. 
How is the shaft attached to the plate?”  
 Monitoring/Control 
of Consensus (MCC) 
Directly soliciting feedback from 
teammates about opinions and evaluations 
for the purpose of establishing consensus 
and making decisions. 
“Ling, Grady, what are you thinking?”  
 Monitoring/Control 
of Progress (MCP) 
Tracking progress by monitoring or 
controlling completion of task, goals, or 
subgoals, or references to time 
“Alright, what else do we want to do in 
an hour tonight?”  
 Reflection (RE) Processes related to the evaluation, 
appraisal, or reviewing of task 
understanding, content understanding, task 
progress, task difficulty, or task 
performance 




   
 Task-related (TR) Statements or questions about the task at 
hand that are not relational or regulatory in 
nature.  
“So we have cost, measurement 
accuracy, force on infant, total 
procedure time… those are our highest 
weighted engineering criteria.”    
 Off-task (OT) Statements or questions outside the scope 
of the task.  
“I had somebody call me at four am…”   
 Unelaborated (UN) Brief statements that express confirmation, 
disconfirmation, or ambiguity.  
“Okay.”  
 Inaudible (IN) Statements that could not be heard and 
transcribed.  
“Like (inaudible) pounds.”  
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Table 2  
Application of Coding Scheme to Discourse of Team Baby 
SPEAKER* TURN 
Sarita So then what was the other one?/   TR 
Springer Like measuring glasses/   TR 
Sarita Okay/   UN 
Springer They're not glasses/   AN 
but it like sits on the infant like glasses so,/   AG 
and holds tape in the same spot./   AG 
That's pretty much the ones that I would share from this./   TR 
Ciara I think my like only one that really did the circumference was just similar to 
the onesie and cap./   AG 
And then something that was like similar— yeah I think it was just the 
“onesie” and “cap” that had anything to do with circumference./   TR 
 
Sarita Okay./   UN 
Was it different enough to write--/   MCU 
Ciara Uh uh/   UN 
Sarita --or do anything?/   MCU 
No?/   TR 
Okay./   UN 
I think this goes along with my with my concepts as well. Umm./   TR 
Ciara Yeah I think mine was like the most (inaudible)/   IN 
Sarita Oh wait,/     TR 
I did the sensors,/     TR 
like kind of what you did Corey, with using sensors for the length/   AG 
but using sensors for circumference./   AN 
I guess we could do that./   TR 
Sensors, and... (talking to herself)/   TR  
(writing on blackboard) Okay./   UN 
 So does anyone want to suggest something to go from here?/   MCC 
Note. *All names are pseudonyms. / indicates a break between speech units. AG = analogy; AN 
= antinomy; IN = inaudible; MCC = monitoring/control of consensus; MCU = 





 Relational reasoning codes.  RR utterances included analogies (AG), anomalies (AM), 
antinomies (AN), and antitheses (AT).  AGs were coded when a speaker identified a higher-order 
relation of similarity among two objects, ideas, or situations.  For example, when comparing two 
design ideas one student said, “I do see the support band and glasses having a lot in common, as 
in the principle behind them.” Here, the student discerned a structural similarity among the 
ideas—namely, that the support band and glasses were formulated with the same purpose in 
mind.   
 AMs were coded if a speaker identified a relation of nonconformity or aberration.  For 
instance, one student noticed that “all of [the ideas] are fairly similar except for the motorized 
one.” In doing so, the student recognized that the idea involving a motor was inconsistent with 
the larger pattern governing the rest of the ideas.   
 ANs were coded if a speaker noted a relation of mutual exclusivity or the delineation of a 
categorical boundary between two conditions.  As with the other RR and SSRL codes, ANs 
could be verbalized not just as statements, but also as questions.  As a case in point, one student 
asked, “What distinguishes [the variable size cap idea] from the measuring band?” Even though 
the student was asking for clarification, the phrasing of this question indicates that the student 
was thinking about the categorical boundaries between these two ideas.  The answer she received 
was also antinomous in nature because it identified the feature where they diverged in a mutually 
exclusive manner: “[With] the hat… you only have discrete values, um, and I think [with] 
measuring band you can have continuous values.”  
 Finally, ATs were coded for statements or questions about relations of opposition or 
difference in degree.  Although they may seem to be similar to ANs, antitheses are relations of 
objects, ideas, or concepts that exist on the same continuum, whereas antinomous things cannot 
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co-exist.  For instance, an antithesis was coded when a student argued that “the dimensions of 
this [design] are better than for the [baseline design],” as the designs were considered divergent 
on the continuum of the feasibility of their dimensions.   
 Socially shared regulation of learning codes.  Socially shared regulation of learning 
(SSRL) utterances could receive one of five codes related to planning, monitoring and control, 
and reflection.  These codes were adapted from Lobczowski and colleagues’ (2020) coding 
scheme for social regulation of learning (SoRL) in teams.  A code of planning (PL) was marked 
by setting goals or creating plans related to task understanding, content understanding, or task 
performance.  PL could include establishing goals or subgoals, deciding on an order of steps, or 
discussing actions the group would take later in the meeting or outside of the meeting.  In one 
instance, PL was coded when a student suggested, “So let’s do this again but with everything 
being compared to [this idea].” Additionally, PL could incorporate talk about hypothetical plans 
(e.g., “We could do X”) or questions about plans (e.g., “Should we do X tomorrow?”).   
 Utterances related to monitoring and control could receive one of three codes.  Of note, 
monitoring and control were kept together as these processes work conjointly and are often 
inseparable within speech units.  Monitoring/Control of content or task understanding (MCU) 
referred to tracking the understanding of task or content, including monitoring one’s own 
understanding or actively seeking out information or explanation from others.  This generally 
involved asking teammates for information when there was a gap in knowledge to be filled, 
whether conceptual (e.g., “Well how else could you power something other than hydraulics?”) or 
task-related in nature (e.g., “I thought we were trying to get [our ideas] down to three.”).  It could 
also involve simply observing one’s own lack of understanding, as one student noted, “Okay, I 
don’t know the complete design.”  
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 Students could also monitor and control the more social process of building agreement of 
task, understanding, or plans, which was called monitoring/control of consensus (MCC).  The 
core of this code involved directly soliciting feedback from teammates for the purpose of 
establishing some degree of consensus.  This was evident in one exchange in which a team 
member asked, “Is this fine with everyone?” MCC could also occur during design comparison, 
such as when one student posed the question, “What do we think about [this design]?” 
Importantly, there could be instances in which feedback was solicited about plans for 
proceeding.  In these cases, the decision rule was to code PL in order to differentiate the 
consensus demanded by establishing plans from that of monitoring and controlling current 
performance.    
 Additionally, students could monitor and control their progress (MCP).  This entailed 
tracking movement toward goal completion by discussing how much was left to do or 
referencing the amount of time left to do it.  For example, after eliminating one design from the 
corpus of design ideas, one student said, “Okay, six to go,” providing information both about 
how much had been accomplished as well as how much there was left to do.  MCP could also 
include questions about progress (e.g., “Oh, are we done?”) or comments about the speed with 
which the team was moving (e.g., “We’re crankin’ through these!”).   
 The last code centered on processes related to the reflection, evaluation, or review of task 
understanding, content understanding, task progress, task difficulty, or task performance, labeled 
RE.  This could involve determining whether consensus was met, content was understood, or a 
goal was achieved.  Importantly, RE could involve statements about what was done (e.g., So we 
have our top three [ideas.]”) as well as judgments about how it was done (“It’s hard when you 
[rank ideas] as a team.”).   
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Task-related code.  Utterances that did not fit into the RR or SSRL categories were 
assigned a code of task-related or other.  Task-related talk, coded TR, referred to any utterances 
made about the task at hand that were not relational or regulatory in nature.   
Other codes.  Any remaining utterances were assigned a code of unelaborated, off-task, 
or inaudible.  Unelaborated statements (UN) denoted statements that were extremely brief and 
stood alone as single utterances.  For this reason, statements such as “Yes,” “No,” “Okay”, 
“Alright,” I don’t know,” or “I guess,” were coded UN.  Off-task talk (OT) demanded the 
mention or discussion of thoughts or ideas peripheral to the task at hand.  This tended to include 
talk about plans outside of class, jokes, or other distractions.  Examples include comments such 
as “There’s a lot more people on campus this year” and “Gonna have some M&Ms.” In the case 
that a word or sentence could not be transcribed, a code of inaudible (IN) was given.  Both OT 
and IN units were subsequently excluded from analyses.   
Episode segmentation and coding.  A subset of the data that were collected (i.e., one 
team meeting) were segmented into episodes to more closely analyze the degree to which 
activity was distributed among team members.  Here, an episode was defined as a collection of 
student talk turns in which students engaged in regulatory processes or higher-order reasoning 
discourse.  An episode would begin with a statement by a group member that would 
subsequently guide the ensuing discussion; when the topic of discussion could no longer be tied 
to that initial statement, that episode ended and a new episode began.  Of note, episodes could be 
of any length, ranging from a few lines of talk to hundreds of lines of talk, provided that the 
conversation could be tied back to that initial statement.  However, episodes that did not involve 
any regulation or reasoning, or contained predominantly off-task talk, were discarded from 
further analysis.   
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After segmenting team conversation into episodes, each episode received a code of 
shared or guided, corresponding to the extent to which activity was distributed among team 
members.  A designation of guided signified that one or more individuals were temporarily 
directing or controlling the activity of the group or acting as a more knowledgeable other.  For 
example, one episode that was coded as guided featured a student telling his teammates what 
needed to be accomplished in their meeting and taking control to formulate plans to achieve it.  
In another, one student used his expertise with the subject matter to guide his teammates’ ratings 
of a particular design idea.  Importantly, for guided distribution of activity episodes, the speaker 
or speakers doing the guiding were documented.  A designation of shared activity was given to 
episodes in which students contributed roughly equally toward shared reasoning and regulatory 
activity, helping to co-construct knowledge and move toward shared understanding.  This was 
evident in one episode in which team members all weighed in on the criteria they would use to 
compare designs, with no one person consistently directing the activity of the group or 
demonstrating more knowledge or understanding of the task than others.  Because of the time-
intensive nature of this coding, only one team meeting was segmented into episodes and coded 
for its degree of sharedness.   
Interrater reliability.  Interrater reliability was established between the author and a 
second coder in several phases including: idea unit (i.e., utterance) segmentation; coding of RR; 
coding of SSRL; coding of task-related and other talk; segmentation of episodes; and coding of 
episodes.  Prior to each phase, the second coder completed several training sessions in order to 
get acquainted with the coding scheme.   
In preparation of the first phase, a random 20% of each team’s transcript was selected for 
analysis.  The decision to code a portion of each transcript, rather than one full transcript (~25% 
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of the data), was made to ensure that the coding scheme was appropriately applied to each team, 
acknowledging that different teams might manifest different patterns of speech and interaction.  
After training and refining the rules for segmentation, each coder segmented units for each team 
independently, then met to resolve any discrepancies.  Here, disagreement was operationalized as 
a difference in the number of overall utterances as well as placement of unit breaks.  Agreement 
for the four transcripts was high, averaging 91.7%.   
In the next phase, the same selection of each team’s transcript was coded for RR.  Coders 
independently evaluated whether the utterances were relational or non-relational in nature, and 
then proceeded to code relational utterances for the specific form of RR represented.  
Disagreements were discussed and resolved following the completion of each transcript.  
Reliability was then evaluated for each transcript in terms of (1) the percentage agreement on 
whether a unit was relational or non-relational and (2) a Cohen’s Kappa to denote agreement on 
the particular relational category (i.e., analogy, anomaly, antinomy, or antithesis).  Agreement on 
relational/non-relational designation averaged 94.5% and Cohen’s Kappas among the transcripts 
averaged κ = 0.85.   
In a similar process, coders independently examined the remaining utterances in each 
transcript for SSRL.  In this phase, agreement averaged 94% on whether units were SSRL or 
non-SSRL and Cohen’s Kappas for the type of SSRL averaged κ = 0.86.  Next, the coders 
evaluated the rest of the transcripts for task-related and other talk (i.e., off-task, unelaborated, 
and inaudible).  Cohen’s Kappas at this stage averaged κ = 0.93.   
 In the final phase, the coders delineated and coded episodes for Team Kayak’s transcript 
only.  Because this segmentation involved determining starting and ending places for particular 
threads or topics that would then dictate the beginning of the next episode, the coders met and 
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collaboratively segmented the transcript into episodes, discussing any disagreements as they 
arose.  Then, the coders independently determined what code the episode should receive (i.e., 
SRL, Guided, SSRL, or no code for non-regulatory/reasoning episodes).  Agreement between the 
raters was 85% and κ = 0.74.  For episodes that were coded Guided, the person or people guiding 
the discussion were noted.   
Data Analytic Plan 
Research Question 1: To what extent do teams express differential proportions of 
relational reasoning (RR) and socially shared regulation of learning (SSRL) discourse during a 
collaborative problem-solving task?  
To address this question, it was necessary to begin by inspecting frequencies of each type 
of speech unit by individual as well as by team overall.  Then, a chi-square analysis was used to 
determine whether the distributions of RR and SSRL units differed across teams.  Specifically, 
chi-square tests of independence compared the observed team frequencies of RR and SSRL 
units, respectively, with a null condition in which all teams voiced equal proportions of each type 
of unit.  If the omnibus chi-square tests proved statistically significant, post-hoc analyses were 
carried out to locate the source of the differences.   
Research Question 2: How is collective activity within problem-solving episodes shared 
among team members? Further, to what extent do certain individuals mediate these exchanges?  
To examine in more depth the degree to which problem solving was shared among team 
members, one team meeting was segmented into episodes.  Each episode was then coded in 
terms of how distributed activity was among participants, which served as an indicator of the 
degree of sharedness of the group problem solving.  The number of episodes, as well as the 
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frequency of each type of episode, was counted.  In cases where a code of guided was given, the 
individuals guiding the conversation were documented.   
For a subset of the episodes, social transition plots were constructed to illustrate the 
dyadic interactions among team members.  In this analysis, nodes represented speakers and ties 
between nodes indicated that one speaker finished talking and the next person responded.  These 
networks explored patterns in how overall talk was distributed among teammates as well as the 
extent to which certain individuals led or mediated discussions.  Because ties between nodes 
represented dyadic interactions, this analysis could not model the continuous sequence of speech 
throughout the meeting.  However, the segmentation and examination of discrete episodes within 
the meeting provided a series of snapshots into how activity was distributed at particular points 
in time.  To provide further insight, the ties between nodes were weighted according to how 
often that tie occurred and colored to indicate the type of speech unit verbalized.   
To aid in understanding how activity was distributed among teammates, a number of 
centrality statistics were computed for each team member, or node, within the social transition 
plots.  Broadly, node centrality refers to how important a given actor is in a network (Freeman, 
1978).  Centrality has, in fact, been studied in the context of group problem solving since the late 
1940s (e.g., Leavitt, 1951) with evidence suggesting that group communication patterns can 
explain variation in team performance, organization, satisfaction, and leadership.  However, 
there exist a multitude of centrality measures in social network analysis and each operationalizes 
centrality slightly differently.  For instance, while some statistics characterize centrality in terms 
of the number of connections nodes possess (e.g., degree), others view centrality in terms of 
being an intermediary between nodes (e.g., betweenness).  Still others measure centrality as a 
combination of the two (e.g., eigenvector centrality; Bonacich, 1987).  In the current study, 
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centrality was evaluated in three ways by considering degree centrality, flow betweenness, and 
eigenvector centrality.  These centrality statistics were considered in tandem with the episode’s 
code to see how individuals’ centrality corresponded with the degree of sharedness documented 
in the episode coding.  One question of interest was whether those individuals identified as the 
leader within episodes of a guided distribution of activity would also manifest higher centrality 
scores, given by their attempts to control or mediate team discussion.  However, this analysis 
also sought to move beyond the identification of central individuals by taking into account the 
types of verbalizations (i.e., reasoning and regulation) made by individuals in each episode.  
General patterns in episodes’ distribution of sharedness, individuals’ centralities, and 
individuals’ substantive contributions are discussed, with exemplar transition plots presented as 
illustrations.    
Research Question 3: What systematic patterns can be uncovered about the ways in 
which relational reasoning and SSRL discourse emerge in real time?  
A sequence mining tool was constructed to discover meaningful and systematic patterns 
of RR and SSRL talk as they occurred in engineers’ problem-solving discussions.  In order to 
prepare the data for sequence mining, speech units for each team meeting were assembled in 
order from the first unit of the meeting to the last.  Then, an algorithm was written in Excel’s 
Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) to search for patterns of relational and regulatory speech 
that were three to six units in length (see Appendix).  The algorithm ignored any units that were 
task-related, unelaborated, off-task, or inaudible.  For example, in a sequence of PLANNING → 
ANALOGY → TASK-RELATED → ANTINOMY, the tool would only acknowledge 
PLANNING → ANALOGY → ANTINOMY.  Theoretically, there could be any number of 
intervening task-related or other units between a given set of relational or regulation units.  Thus, 
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a decision was made to limit the number of “noise” units to a maximum of 50.  In other words, 
the algorithm would return the aforementioned PLANNING → ANALOGY → ANTINOMY 
sequence as long as there were no more than 50 task-related, unelaborated, off-task, or inaudible 
units between any of them.  Prior research using the relational coding scheme (Dumas et al., 
2014; Jablansky et al., 2016, 2019) has shown that 50 speech units can be verbalized in a 
relatively short period of time in CPS contexts and, depending on task length, may only account 
for a small proportion of the overall amount of talk.  However, the cutoff of 50 was also made on 
the basis that relational or regulatory patterns with more than 50 noise units between them might 
be less related to one another and therefore not represent a meaningful pattern.   
One additional constraint on the algorithm was to “compress” the transcript by unit type 
when the speaker stayed the same.  For instance, if one speaker verbalized a sequence of 
ANTINOMY → ANTITHESIS → ANTITHESIS → ANTITHESIS, the algorithm would 
compress the sequence into Antinomy → Antithesis.  This decision was made for several 
reasons.  First, because full sentences are often broken up into several speech units, it is often the 
case that subsequent units of the same type are elaborations of the initial unit.  In the case 
described above, an individual may have been describing several ways in which one design was 
superior to another.  Compressing them into one large antithesis would therefore make the 
overall transcript “cleaner,” enabling the algorithm to focus more on finding meaningful 
interactions between different types of reasoning and regulatory speech.  The decision to 
compress units of the same type at the speaker level was made so that any resulting patterns 
captured the social nature of the discourse.  For example, if the algorithm returned a sequence of 
ANALOGY → ANALOGY → ANALOGY, it would necessarily mean that different speakers 
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contributed to the pattern (or that there were 50 or fewer intervening units by other team 
members before the initial speaker voiced an analogy again).   
With these conditions pre-programmed, the algorithm would proceed to determine the 
number of possible three to six unit sequences within a transcript.  In this step, a given speech 
unit could be considered both with the previous two to five units as well as its succeeding two to 
five units.  For instance, take the given sequence of units: PLANNING → 
MONITORING/CONTROL OF UNDERSTANDING → ANALOGY → ANTINOMY → 
ANTITHESIS.  The analogy unit could be considered both a part of a PLANNING → 
MONITORING/CONTROL OF UNDERSTANDING → ANALOGY pattern as well as an 
ANALOGY → ANTINOMY → ANTITHESIS pattern.  Although this resulted in many more 
sequences than simply counting each unit once, this more liberal constraint made it possible to 
identify a broader range of potentially informative patterns.   
At this stage, the algorithm would return all possible sequences three to six units in length 
ranked in descending order of frequency.  Given the exploratory nature of this analysis, no 
threshold was set for the number of occurrences needed to return a sequence.  The most common 
sequences for each team transcript were then examined.  Additionally, charts of each team’s 
speech units over time were constructed to visually display when in the course of the meeting 




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Descriptive Analysis 
Prior to any analyses, transcripts of the discourse from 4 team meetings were segmented 
into speech units, which roughly equate to a unit of language expressing a complete thought.  
These units were then coded as relational reasoning (RR), socially shared regulation of learning 
(SSRL), task-related, or other (i.e., unelaborated, off-task, inaudible).  The 4 team meetings 
ranged in length from approximately one to two hours.  As shown in Table 3, these teams 
collectively produced 5723 speech units.  Teams verbalized on average 1431 speech units (SD = 
266.93), with Team Baby verbalizing the fewest units (n = 1192) and Team Ambulance 
verbalizing the most (n = 1870).  Overall, relational reasoning (RR) accounted for an average of 
6.71% (SD = 2.11%) of teams’ total speech units, socially shared regulation of learning (SSRL) 
an average of 12.34% (SD = 1.63%), and task-related and other speech an average of 80.95% 
(SD = 3.63%).  These results align with previous studies of group problem solving that applied 
the same RR coding scheme (Dumas et al., 2014; Jablansky et al., 2016, 2019).  In those studies, 
RR utterances comprised approximately 10% of total speech units and the majority of the 
remaining speech units were task-related.   
Within the RR category, teams tended to employ analogies, antinomies, and antitheses, 
and only rarely referred to anomalies.  This may have been because the task was less about 
identifying abnormalities or aberrations within a larger pattern and more about comparing and 
evaluating novel ideas side by side.  This result partially coheres with previous work in 
engineering design that revealed that all four forms of relational reasoning were related to 






Frequency (and Percentages) of RR, SSRL, and Other Speech Units by Team 
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Note. Percentages reflect proportions of overall speech within each team. RR = relational reasoning; SSRL = socially shared 
regulation of learning; AG = analogy; AM = anomaly; AN = antinomy; AT = antithesis; PL = planning; MCU = monitoring/control of 
understanding; MCC = monitoring/control of consensus; MCP = monitoring/control of progress; RE = reflection; TR = task-related; 





from research in the medical domain in which doctors relied heavily on anomalies (Dumas et al., 
2014).  These different findings may point to the domain and task as important drivers of a 
team’s resultant reasoning and regulation in a problem-solving context.  Thus, in the present 
study, it seemed quite reasonable that teams would use more analogical, antinomous, and 
antithetical reasoning in order to meet the demands of the task: namely, to generate new ideas or 
combine pre-existing ideas, to discern the boundaries between designs, and to weigh the merits 
and disadvantages of designs.    
Within the SSRL category, teams appeared to draw more on monitoring and control 
strategies devoted to understanding the task and content (e.g., team members’ design ideas) and 
less on reflective activities.  For example, individuals on Team Toilet, who were working on a 
modification to a toilet seat to help people raise themselves more easily, spent considerable time 
determining how to apply the methodology learned in class for evaluating designs, asking for 
details on each other’s ideas, and reviewing relevant engineering concepts (e.g., normal force).  
In part this was done to bring others up to speed on aspects of the project that had been worked 
on outside of class, as well as to erase any gaps in knowledge before moving forward with the 
task.  Teams devoted similarly high proportions of their SSRL speech to establishing plans and 
monitoring and controlling consensus.  Previous work has demonstrated a relation between task 
difficulty and regulatory activity, such that more difficult tasks, like those in the current study, 
tend to be associated with longer and more frequent metacognitive activity, particularly 
monitoring and control strategies directed toward co-constructing knowledge and understanding 
(Iiskala et al., 2011; Lobczowski, Lyons, et al., 2020).  This knowledge and understanding can 
then be used to set appropriate goals and establish plans.   
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It is unclear why teams did not engage in more reflection.  It is possible that reflection is 
a more advanced regulatory technique that requires both backward and forward thinking 
involving recall of what was done and prospective thought related to what can be done 
differently in the future.  Regardless of the reason, studies have documented that groups of all 
manner of experience and domain rarely engage in spontaneous reflection (Lobczowski, Allen, et 
al., 2020; Lobczowski, Lyons, et al., 2020; Sobocinski, Malmberg, & Jarvela, 2017), and that 
significant increases in team reflection are typically associated with explicit prompts to do so 
(Azevedo, Guthrie, & Seibert, 2004; Bannert, 2006; Sonnenberg & Bannert, 2015).   
Within teams, there was a large degree of variability in the amounts of RR, SSRL, and 
task-related (TR) and other utterances (i.e., unelaborated, off-task, and inaudible) verbalized by 
individuals (see Table 4).  Individuals verbalized on average about 260 speech units (SD = 
172.18), with a mean of approximately 17 RR utterances (SD = 13.65) and 31 SSRL utterances 
(SD = 24.42).  Interestingly, individuals who manifested lower instances of RR also tended to 
have lower instances of SSRL.  For instance, on Team Toilet, Ryder and Sterling verbalized no 
RR units at all, and only 1 or 2 units of SSRL utterances.  The inverse was also true, such that 
individuals who produced more RR units tended to produce more SSRL units, as well.  This was 
apparent for Jeffrey, on Team Kayak, and Springer, on Team Baby, who both verbalized close to 
50 speech units of each.  It is possible that simply speaking more gave individuals more 
opportunities to express reasoning and regulation, as those who verbalized higher quantities of 
RR and SSRL generally verbalize higher quantities of total talk.  However, there were 
individuals, such as Freddy on Team Kayak and Sam on Team Ambulance, who spoke regularly 
but were more focused on task-related and other types of utterances, offering potential support 
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for the idea that some individuals demonstrated a higher capacity for both reasoning and 
regulation irrespective of their contributions to the team’s overall speech.   
There were some individuals whose speech was clearly more regulation-oriented.  While 
Sarita, on Team Baby, verbalized a total of 21 RR speech units, she verbalized 67 SSRL speech 
units, more than anyone else on the team.  Similarly, Brice, on Team Ambulance, verbalized 20 
speech units of RR and 87 speech units of SSRL.  This finding fits with prior research in which 
some individuals take on a regulatory role within the team environment, acting as a “more-
regulated other” (Lobczowski, Lyons, et al., 2020; Rogat & Adams-Wiggins, 2015).   
Proportions of Relational Reasoning and Socially Shared Regulation of Learning 
 Research Question 1 for this study sought to ascertain the extent to which teams 
expressed differential proportions of relational reasoning and socially shared regulation of 
learning discourse during a collaborative problem-solving task.  For this analysis, I first present 
the findings for the relational reasoning discourse and then the data for socially shared regulation 
of learning. 
Types and quantities of relational reasoning.  The first chi-square test of independence 
evaluated the extent to which teams differed in their proportions of speech units devoted to 
analogies, antinomies, and antitheses.  Speech units pertaining to anomalies were excluded from 
this analysis because they did not meet the assumptions of the chi-square test (i.e., the value of 
expected frequencies of each cell should be at least 5 or more in 80% of the cells).  The omnibus 
chi-square indicated that proportions of RR speech units differed significantly across teams, χ2 




Table 4  
Frequency of Speech Units by Team Members 
TEAM MEMBERS 
SPEECH UNITS 
RR SSRL OTHER 
AG AM AN AT PL MCU MCC MCP RE TR OT UN IN Total 
KAYAK BRAD* 1 1 2 2 9 2 4 3 1 90 10 32 1 158 
JEFFREY 6 0 24 20 7 16 23 6 3 261 19 47 4 436 
ARI 0 0 1 5 1 11 7 3 1 40 2 12 3  86 
BERT 3 1 8 13 21 14 5 3 3 235 10 54 4 374 
TOBIAS 0 0 9 8 12 2 5 1 8 116 8 17 3 189 
FREDDY 0 0 2 6 4 7 1 1 0 107 9 29 8 174 
BABY COLBY 6 0 5 9 5 6 6 5 3 147 1 74 7 274 
SARITA 10 0 5 6 18 21 14 8 6 116 1 105 16 326 
ALVIN 3 0 3 0 4 8 4 0 2 62 1 44 7 138 
SPRINGER 10 1 26 8 15 14 11 2 9 211 4 57 4 372 
CIARA 5 0 3 2 0 3 0 0 0 41 0 21 7  82 
TOILET TUNG 0 2 2 11 12 20 20 1 2 163 2 61 7 303 
LUTHER 6 4 11 3 2 35 6 1 6 180 10 52 10 326 
RYDER 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 38 1 24 6  71 
GALEN 5 6 10 9 6 13 9 4 11 226 4 73 4 380 
JUDD 0 0 10 3 0 4 0 0 2 101 6 16 7 149 
STERLING 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9 0 5 0  15 
AMBULANCE NASH 15 4 10 2 21 5 23 10 0 265 99 44 30 528 
BRICE 6 1 10 3 18 9 17 38 5 352 83 104 41 687 
SAM 6 0 6 3 9 5 6 2 4 255 81 47 16 440 
GRADY 4 0 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 61 22 16 2 112 
LING 0 0 0 0 8 1 0 0 0 61 8 18 7 103 
Note. *All names are pseudonyms. RR = relational reasoning; SSRL = socially shared regulation of learning; AG = analogy; AM = 
anomaly; AN = antinomy; AT = antithesis; PL = planning; MCU = monitoring/control of understanding; MCC = monitoring/control 




A series of post-hoc comparisons were run with a Bonferroni-adjusted p-value (α = 
0.05/6 comparisons = .008) to determine the source of those differences.  These tests revealed 
that Team Kayak differed significantly in their proportions of RR from Team Baby [χ2 (2, n = 
211) = 23.58, p < .001] and Team Ambulance [χ2 (2, n = 176) = 39.95, p < .001].  Team Toilet 
also differed significantly from Team Ambulance [χ2 (2, n = 136) = 18.51, p < .001; see Figure 
9].  These differences appeared to be tied to the proportion of RR talk involving analogies and 
antitheses.  Team Kayak did less analogical reasoning and more antithetical reasoning than 
would be expected, whereas by comparison Teams Baby and Ambulance did more analogical 
reasoning and less antithetical reasoning than expected.  Similarly, Team Toilet did less 
analogical and more antithetical reasoning than expected, with the opposite pattern occurring for 
Team Ambulance.    
 
 
Figure 9.  Proportions of team reasoning devoted to analogies, antinomies, and antitheses.  AG =  
analogy; AN = antinomy; AT = antithesis.  
Kayak
  




Although overall counts of relational reasoning units were fairly comparable among 
teams (M = 91.75, SD = 18.63), the results of the chi-squares suggest that the teams used 
different types of relational reasoning as they approached the task of evaluating and selecting 
design ideas.  Specifically, whereas Teams Baby and Ambulance focused proportionally more on 
relations of similarity, Teams Kayak and Toilet relied more heavily on relations pertaining to 
differences.  These variations in pattern could be due to several factors.  One plausible 
explanation is that the teams were at different stages of narrowing down the candidates for their 
project.  Indeed, it was evident from meeting transcripts that Teams Kayak and Toilet had 
already made final decisions as to the pool of design ideas they would be evaluating, whereas 
Teams Baby and Ambulance routinely considered changing aspects of their designs or 
generating new designs altogether.  This process of combining similar ideas and generating new 
ones might have led these teams to use more analogical reasoning.  The other teams, however, 
having solidified their corpus of designs, could focus on evaluating each idea on a specific set of 
criteria, potentially leading to more antithetical reasoning.   
Types and quantities of socially shared regulation units.  The next chi-square test of 
independence examined the extent to which teams differed in their proportions of speech units 
related to planning, monitoring and control of understanding, monitoring and control of 
consensus, monitoring and control of progress, and reflection.  The result revealed a statistically 
significant difference between teams in their proportions of regulatory utterances χ2 (12, N = 




Figure 10. Proportions of team regulation devoted to planning, monitoring and control of 
understanding, monitoring and control of consensus, monitoring and control of progress, 
and reflection. PL = planning; MCU = monitoring/control of understanding; MCC = 
monitoring/control of consensus; MCP = monitoring/control of progress; RE = reflection.  
 
Again, a series of post-hoc comparisons were run with a Bonferroni-adjusted p-value of 
0.008 to determine the source of these differences.  All but one of the six comparisons were 
statistically significant.  Team Toilet differed significantly from Team Kayak [χ2 (4, N = 341) = 
24.99, p < .001] and Team Baby [χ2 (4, N = 321) = 15.71, p < .001], manifesting lower 
proportions of speech devoted to planning but higher proportions of units pertaining to 
monitoring and control of understanding.  Based on their speech units, Team Toilet also spent 
proportionally fewer utterances monitoring progress in comparison to Team Kayak.  Given the 
amount of speech spent on co-constructing knowledge about the task and content, these results 
suggest that Team Toilet may have found the task more challenging than the other two teams, or 
that they were potentially less organized coming into the meeting.  In contrast, as the speech 
patterns suggest, Teams Kayak and Baby were able to set goals and subsequently monitor their 
Kayak
  




progress toward them, Team Toilet needed to do the prerequisite work of explaining ideas to one 
another and determining how to properly apply the methodologies learned in class to the task of 
evaluating designs.   
Team Ambulance differed significantly from Team Kayak [χ2 (4, N = 371) = 30.60, p < 
.001], Team Baby [χ2 (4, N = 351) = 38.44, p < .001], and Team Toilet [χ2 (4, N = 321) = 15.71, 
p < .001].  Consistent across these results, Team Ambulance had proportionally higher counts of 
speech units devoted to monitoring and control of progress and proportionally fewer counts of 
monitoring and control of understanding.  These results may point to a difference in priorities 
between the teams or simply a difference in team norms.  Although the members of Team 
Ambulance devoted time to asking about and explaining their ideas to one another (i.e., 
monitoring/controlling understanding), they appeared to be more focused on how much time had 
elapsed, how much work they had gotten done, and what work remained to be done.  One 
plausible explanation for this is that Team Ambulance was simply composed of more highly 
regulated individuals.  Another possibility is that monitoring progress was a strategy they 
employed out of necessity.  For instance, off-task utterances for Teams Kayak and Baby only 
accounted for 4.09% and 0.59% of overall utterances, respectively, whereas Team Ambulance’s 
off-task utterances accounted for 15.67% of their total talk.  Thus, it is possible that team 
members were aware of their tendency to rove off topic and compensated for this with more 
frequent regulatory check-ins.   
The results also revealed that Team Ambulance demonstrated proportionally fewer 
quantities of reflection in comparison to Teams Baby and Toilet, but proportionally higher 
quantities of planning.  This may reflect the fact that Team Ambulance was still finalizing their 
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pool of ideas and therefore at an earlier stage of the task in which planning was crucial to making 
progress, but not enough progress had been made to warrant much reflection.   
Distribution of Problem-Solving Activity among Team Members  
The second research question pertained to how collective activity within problem-solving 
episodes was shared among team members as well as the extent to which certain individuals 
emerged as central to these exchanges.  Given the time intensive nature of the analysis, only one 
team transcript (i.e., Team Kayak) was segmented into episodes and coded for its distribution of 
activity as being guided by one or more individuals or more equally shared by the team.  A total 
of 40 episodes were distinguished within the team’s 1417 speech units (see Table 5).  Seven of 
the episodes consisted primarily of off-task talk and were excluded from further analysis.   
Distribution of activity.  Of the remaining 33 episodes, 11 were coded as guided, and 22 
were coded as shared.  Consistent with prior research, a larger proportion of episodes was 
characterized by a more equal sharing of team activity (e.g., Lobczowski, Lyons, et al., 2020).  
Episodes were quite varied in length, ranging from 11 to 121 speech units, and contained an 
average of 41 speech units (SD = 25.04).  This pattern held across episodes of both guided and 
shared activity, with guided episodes averaging approximately 38 speech units (SD = 30.09) and 
shared episodes averaging approximately 43 (SD = 22.71).  Of the 11 episodes coded as guided, 
nine were led by only one individual and two were led by two team members.  Four of the six 
team members guided at least one episode, suggesting that individuals took turns leading group 
problem solving efforts.  One individual led seven of the episodes either by himself (Leader 1) or 
with another team member (Leader 2), potentially emerging as the team’s “more-regulated 
other” (Lobczowski, Lyons, et al., 2020).  In terms of when in the course of the meeting these 
episodes occurred, guided episodes both started and ended the meeting, and were fairly evenly  
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Table 5  
List of Team Kayak Episode Codes with Primary Leaders Identified 
EPISODE SPEECH UNITS CODE LEADER 1 LEADER 2 
1 22 Guided Brad 
 
2 29 Shared 
  
3 21 Shared 
  
4 11 Guided Tobias 
 
5 44 Shared 
  
6 49 Shared 
  
7 47 Shared 
  
8 78 Shared 
  
9 16 Shared 
  
10 46 Shared 
  
11 8 Off-task 
  
12 25 Guided Bert 
 
13 14 Shared 
  
14 28 Shared 
  
15 37 Shared 
  
16 24 Shared 
  
17 20 Shared 
  
18 45 Guided Bert 
 
19 18 Off-task 
  
20 13 Shared 
  
21 57 Shared 
  
22 6 Off-task 
  
23 32 Guided Bert 
 
24 24 Off-task 
  
25 44 Shared 
  
26 121 Guided Bert 
 
27 35 Guided Bert 
 
28 21 Shared 
  
29 16 Off-task 
  
30 76 Shared 
  
31 37 Guided Tobias 
 
32 13 Guided Jeffrey 
 
33 82 Shared 
  
34 50 Shared 
  
35 19 Off-task 
  
36 27 Off-task 
  
37 58 Shared 
  
38 25 Guided Bert Brad 
39 84 Shared 
  




spaced throughout.  This may provide support for the notion that teams not only cycle 
through the stages of regulation, but also through periods of more and less equal sharing of 
activity.   
Node centrality.  Next, social transition plots were formed by creating adjacency 
matrices of each dyadic interaction within each episode.  As mentioned, team members were 
represented with nodes, and dyadic exchanges were represented with directed ties.  For example, 
if Jeffrey spoke to Tobias, an arrow was drawn from Jeffrey’s node to Tobias’s node.  Similarly, 
if Tobias spoke to Freddy, an arrow was drawn from Tobias to Freddy.  From these plots, it was 
possible to calculate individuals’ degree centrality, flow betweenness, and eigenvector centrality 
scores.  As can be seen in Table 6, Jeffrey manifested the highest averages in all three categories 
across the 33 episodes.  Specifically, Jeffrey sent and received more ties than anyone else, 
mediated a higher proportion of team discussion than others, and was more closely connected to 
other influential teammates.  However, in episodes coded as guided, Bert manifested the highest 
scores, on average, of degree centrality, flow betweenness, and eigenvector centrality.  This 
result seems reasonable, given that Bert was identified as the individual leading or guiding seven 
of these episodes.  In fact, in the majority of cases, the individual coded as guiding the episode’s 
activity also had the highest centrality scores.  Consequently, these results might indicate that 
leadership is not simply a matter of communicating more often but also of managing the 





Means (SD) of Degree Centrality, Flow Betweenness, and Eigenvector Centrality Scores across 
Episodes for Team Members 
  Team Members 
Distribution  Statistic Brad Jeffrey Ari Bert Tobias Freddy 
M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 













































































































Note. Centrality = degree centrality; Flow = flow betweenness; Eigenvector = eigenvector 
centrality.  
 
General patterns of communication.  When considering the broader patterns involving 
the dimensions of distribution of activity and the content of communication, a few themes 
emerged.  One finding was that regulatory utterances, but not relational utterances, were found in 
episodes that were guided.  A second finding was that the majority of relational reasoning 
utterances occurred in shared episodes.  Finally, relational reasoning almost always co-occurred 
with regulatory utterances, regardless of the sharedness of activity.  Each of these patterns is 
explained in further detail below.   
Presence of regulatory utterances in guided episodes.  Guided episodes of regulatory 
talk appeared to be important for exposing misconceptions about the task or content and 
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recalibrating team plans and expectations.  This is reflected is Episode 12 (see Figure 11 below), 
in which Bert paused team activity to express his belief that team members were doing the 
evaluation task incorrectly (i.e., monitoring/controlling understanding).  Tobias then proposed a 
plan to Bert that members show their work to the instructor the next day to get his feedback, with 
Freddy adding that they could explain why they used the evaluation criteria they did (i.e., 
planning).  Bert, however, rejected the plan by explaining his understanding of what the task was 
and how they needed to proceed.  After discussing it further, the team aligned themselves with 
Bert’s view of the task and moved on (i.e., monitoring/controlling consensus).   
 
Figure 11.  Team Kayak’s Episode 12.  The square shape denotes the individual who guided the 
episode, while circles represent all other speakers.  The width of ties corresponds to the 
frequency of that dyadic exchange.  Gray denotes task-related or other utterances, while 
blue denotes regulatory utterances.   
 
The team was able to continue with its design evaluations until Tobias interrupted 
activity in Episode 18 (see Figure 12) with a monitoring statement about how he thought 
members were missing something important in their ratings and raised a question about whether 
their plan for the next part of the task made sense.  Bert again stepped in as an authority and told 







deliberated about the best way to continue at this point, but ultimately accepted Bert’s suggestion 
and proceeded with his plan.   
 
 
Figure 12.  Team Kayak’s Episode 18.  The square shape denotes the individual who guided the 
episode, while circles represent all other speakers.  The width of ties corresponds to the 
frequency of that dyadic exchange.  Gray denotes task-related or other utterances, while 
blue denotes regulatory utterances.   
 
The pattern discussed above continued throughout the meeting, such that every few 
episodes, prompted by a question or point of confusion, one or two team members stepped in to 
resolve the issue and get the team back on track.  Bert served as this person in the majority of 
cases, which could reflect a greater understanding of the task, or perhaps an inclination to exert 
control over his peers.  Altogether, these episodes pointed to a broader cycle in which 
misconceptions or erroneous understandings of task and content arose at each stage of task 
completion, and that it was important to explore these misunderstandings, re-formulate plans, 
and generate consensus about how to continue.   
Presence of relational reasoning utterances in shared episodes.  Interestingly, relational 







activity from each team member (i.e., shared episodes).  Upon further scrutiny of the 
conversations taking place in these episodes, it was apparent that the team actively reasoned 
together, at times expanding on relational utterances made by teammates and at others refuting 
them.  In Episode 6 (see Figure 13), for example, the team was exploring the idea of creating a 
more buoyant paddle float to aid kayakers in capsizing accidents.  Brad began by posing the 
antinomous question of whether the paddle float, as imagined, could be used as is or whether it 
needed to be prepared for use.  Jeffrey then responded with an antinomy himself, explaining that 
the paddle did need to be inflated, which could be done either manually or automatically, 
depending on how they wanted to design it.  He added, however, that they were assuming 
(analogically) that the paddle would have to be inflated as most inflatable things are, by mouth.  
This pattern continued as the team evaluated other ideas in terms of whether they needed to be 
prepped for use.  As they were discussing an idea for a kayak with outriggers, or built-in 
supports, Jeffrey made the analogy that outriggers operate similarly to paddle floats.  Bert, 
however, footnoted this comparison with the important (i.e., antinomous) distinction that 
outriggers are typically built into the kayak, whereas paddle floats exist separately from the 
kayak.   
Co-occurrences between relational reasoning and regulation utterances.  The final 
pattern of interest was that reasoning and regulation utterances often co-occurred and appeared to 
work in concert.  For instance, in Episode 10 (see Figure 14), the team was discussing an idea for 
something a kayaker could wear to protect themselves in the case of a capsizing accident.  
Jeffrey posed the antinomous question of whether the device would be a class two personal 
flotation device (PFD)—meant for offshore use in rougher waters—or a class three PFD—meant 




Figure 13.  Team Kayak’s Episode 6.  The width of ties corresponds to the frequency of that 
dyadic exchange.  Gray denotes task-related or other utterances, blue denotes regulatory 
utterances, and orange denotes relational utterances.   
 
understandings of what characterizes different types of PFDs and which would best address the 
problem they were trying to solve.  Bert then reasoned antithetically that if their idea was a class 
three PFD, then its weight would be better (i.e., lighter) than the paddle float they envisioned as 
an alternative idea.  In this way, reasoning tended to prompt monitoring and control processes, 
which would in turn invite more reasoning, eventually leading to a decision point in which team 
consensus was assessed or a new plan was generated.   
Patterns of Reasoning and Regulation Utterances  
 The third research question asked whether systematic patterns could be uncovered about 
the ways in which RR and SSRL emerge in real time during a CPS task.  To address this 
question, an algorithm was written to search each team meeting for the most frequently occurring 
sequences three to six utterances in length.  As mentioned, the algorithm was programmed with 








Figure 14.  Team Kayak’s Episode 10.  The width of ties corresponds to the frequency of that 
dyadic exchange.  Gray denotes task-related or other utterances, blue denotes regulatory 
utterances, and orange denotes relational utterances.   
 
limit the number of noise units between any two relational or regulatory utterances to 50; to 
compress repeated utterances of the same type by the same person; and to consider an utterance 
both with its preceding and succeeding two to five utterances in determining the total number of 
sequences in the transcript.  Finally, the algorithm returned all of the sequences found in each 
transcript, ordered by frequency of occurrence.   
The algorithm found an average of nearly 16 patterns (SD = 5.80) that repeated at least 
three times within each meeting.  For Teams Kayak, Baby, and Toilet, the most frequent pattern 
occurred 7-10 times throughout the meeting.  Team Ambulance’s most frequent pattern, 
somewhat anomalously, occurred 28 times.  Table 7 displays the most common sequences in 
each team meeting that occurred three times or more.  Although the most frequently occurring 
sequences differed across teams, there were consistencies in the patterns that appeared.  For 
instance, Teams Baby and Ambulance had highly frequent patterns of exclusively regulatory 







understanding (e.g., MCU→MCU→MCU).  Teams Kayak and Toilet, by contrast, had highly 
frequent patterns featuring both reasoning and regulatory utterances (e.g., MCU→AT→AT).  
From these patterns, a number of broader insights were generated about which patterns were 
central to team problem solving, when these patterns occurred, and by whom they were voiced.  
These findings are explored below. 
Common sequences across teams.  There were a number of patterns regarding the 
composition of sequences that appeared most frequently in team problem solving.  For instance, 
three of the four teams had frequently occurring patterns involving sequences of planning 
utterances and sequences of monitoring and control of understanding.  There were also, at times, 
sequences of one form of relational reasoning.  Team Kayak frequently verbalized sequences of 
antitheses and antinomies, and Team Baby verbalized sequences of analogies.  These results may 
suggest that neither reasoning nor regulation utterances occur in isolation (i.e., with only task-
related or other utterances surrounding it), but rather occur in clusters.  It is possible that these 
clusters appear because multiple individuals are adding to an initial regulatory or relational 
utterance, or perhaps because once a relation or regulatory activity is introduced, it is necessary 
to explicate or explore in more depth.   
In addition to finding sequences of the one type of utterance, the algorithm also revealed 
patterns of varying reasoning utterances, regulation utterances, and reasoning and regulation 
combinations.  Pertaining to RR, the algorithm returned several patterns in which antinomies 
were paired with another form of reasoning.  There were several variations of antinomies and 
antitheses, such as Team Kayak’s AN→AN→AT, AN→AT→AT, and AN→AN→AN→AT.  In 
one instance, Jeffrey posed the antinomous question of whether the team’s idea to install an  
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Table 7  
Frequency of Most Common Sequences of Relational Reasoning and Socially Shared Regulation of Learning Three to Six Units in 
Length by Team 
TEAMS 
KAYAK BABY TOILET AMBULANCE 
PATTERN n PATTERN n PATTERN n PATTERN n 
AT-AT-AT 7 PL-PL-PL 10 MCU-MCU-MCU 7 PL-PL-PL 28 
AT-MCC-AT 6 PL-PL-PL-PL 7 MCU-AT-MCU 4 PL-PL-PL-PL 21 
MCU-AT-AT 5 PL-PL-PL-PL-PL 5 MCU-AT-MCC 3 PL-PL-PL-PL-PL 15 
MCC-AT-MCC 5 MCU-AG-AN 5 MCC-MCU-RE 3 PL-PL-PL-PL-PL-PL 10 
MCC-MCU-MCU 5 MCU-MCU-MCU 4 MCU-MCU-AT 3 PL-PL-MCC 5 
AN-AN-AN 5 MCU-AG-AN-MCC 3 MCU-MCU-MCU-MCU 3 MCP-PL-PL 4 
MCU-AT-AT-AT 4 PL-PL-MCC 3 MCU-RE-MCU 3 PL-PL-PL-MCC 4 
AN-AN-AT 4 PL-PL-PL-PL-PL-PL 3 RE-MCC-MCU 3 MCU-PL-PL 3 
AT-AT-MCC 4 AG-AN-MCC 3 MCU-AG-MCC 3 PL-PL-PL-PL-PL-MCC 3 
AT-MCU-AT 4 MCP-MCU-AG 3   PL-PL-MCP 3 
AT-AT-MCU 4 MCU-MCU-MCU-MCU 3   PL-PL-MCU 3 
AN-AT-AT 3 MCC-MCP-MCU 3   AG-AN-AG 3 
MCU-AG-AN 3 RE-RE-RE 3   PL-PL-PL-PL-MCC 3 
MCU-PL-PL 3 AN-AG-AN 3   RE-PL-PL 3 
AT-MCC-AT-MCC 3 MCP-PL-PL 3     
MCU-MCU-MCC 3 AG-AG-AG 3     
AN-AN-AN-AT 3       
AT-AT-MCC-AT 3       
PL-MCC-MCU 3       
AT-AT-AT-MCC 3       
MCC-AT-MCU 3       
MCC-AT-MCC-AT 3       
PL-MCP-PL 3       
Note. Table displays frequencies of most common sequences that occurred three or more times by team. AG = analogy; AM = 
anomaly; AN = antinomy; AT = antithesis; PL = planning; MCU = monitoring/control of understanding; MCC = 
monitoring/control of consensus; MCP = monitoring/control of progress; RE = reflection; TR = task-related; OT = off-task; UN 
= unelaborated; IN = inaudible.  
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outrigger on a kayak would involve compressed gas or the user blowing it up themselves.  The 
other team members, in response, reasoned antithetically that if it involved the user blowing it up 
themselves, then it would be less deployable but cost less than their idea for a more inflatable 
paddle.  Teams Baby and Ambulance similarly demonstrated patterns of antinomies and 
analogies, including AN→AG→AN and AG→AN→AG.  For example, as Team Baby was 
discussing one idea for a way to measure babies more accurately, Springer mentioned how the 
idea had a similar issue as another design they had talked about, explaining with an antinomy 
that the design would not address circumference, as they needed it to, only latitudinal and 
longitudinal dimensions.  Together, these frequent co-occurrences between antinomies and other 
forms of reasoning may point to the importance of being able to identify categorical boundaries 
during any type of reasoning.   
Pertaining to SSRL, the algorithm revealed several patterns in which monitoring and 
control of consensus was paired with other forms of regulation.  This was apparent in the 
MCC→MCU→MCU pattern of Team Kayak, the MCC→MCP→MCU of Team Baby, the 
RE→MCC→ MCU of Team Toilet, and the PL→PL→MCC pattern of Team Ambulance.  In 
these scenarios, MCC sometimes functioned as a jumping off point for discussion, as when 
Jeffrey on Team Kayak surveyed his fellow team members for their evaluations of a design 
involving ropes and pulleys in terms of its how deployable it would be.  This monitoring of 
group consensus of design ratings led to the need for several team members to clarify their 
understanding of the term deployable.  In other scenarios, MCC sometimes followed regulatory 
activity, as when Team Ambulance was planning how they would approach the task.  Sam and 
Brice agreed that the team needed to narrow down their number of ideas and come up with 
justifications for these decisions, but Sam raised the question of what rules they should use to 
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guide the decision-making process, asking his team members to weigh in with their thoughts.  
When initiating or following regulatory activity, MCC appeared to serve as an important check-
in for team members and an opportunity to ensure that all were on the same page.   
Finally, the algorithm found multiple incidences of sequences in which reasoning and 
regulation were combined.  Common strings among all the teams involved monitoring and 
control of understanding (MCU) or monitoring and control of consensus (MCC) paired with 
antitheses, analogies, and antinomies (e.g., MCU→AT→AT; AG→AN→MCC).  In many cases, 
a question aimed at better understanding a concept (i.e., MCU) would precede a reasoned 
judgment of how two ideas compared along a continuum (i.e., AT).  At one point, Galen, on 
Team Toilet, was trying to ascertain how much force a user would have to exert to rise from a 
toilet seat using one of the proposed designs.  This monitoring of his and his teammates’ 
understanding of the design led to a deeper discussion with Ryder, Tung, and Sterling in which 
they determined that the user would be able to exert less force than with a comparable design.  In 
other co-occurrences of reasoning and regulation, reasoning would sometimes precede an 
assessment of team consensus or solicitation of team feedback (i.e., MCC).  For example, in one 
exchange, Springer noted that two of the team’s ideas for more accurately measuring a baby 
were similar in that both were made to hold a measuring tape in place, which Colby rebutted by 
explaining that one would hold itself in place whereas the other would have to be held by 
someone at all times.  This led Springer to open the question more broadly to the group and ask 
for other members’ assessments of how easily each design could be held in place.   
Altogether, these co-occurrences of reasoning and regulation indicate that the two 
processes may work hand in hand, especially in a collaborative context.  Discrepancies in team 
members’ conceptions of ideas may invite reasoning that invokes analogies to similar ideas or 
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antinomies that help distinguish between ideas, just as reasoning involving evaluations of ideas 
along a continuum may invite team members to ask one another to weigh in so that agreement 
can be established.   
Temporality of common sequences.  Because both regulation and problem solving have 
been theorized as cyclical processes, it was critical to ascertain not only which sequences of 
reasoning and regulation were most common, but also when during problem solving these 
patterns arose.  To address this question, a series of charts were constructed to visually display 
when selected sequences appeared in each team’s discourse.  Overall, these charts demonstrated 
that regulation sequences were occurring throughout the meeting, whereas reasoning sequences 
occurred more often in the middle of meetings.  The composition of regulation sequences, 
however, differed depending on what stage teams were at in their problem-solving process.  For 
instance, patterns involving planning and reflection tended to bookend meetings.  As Figure 15 
shows of Team Ambulance, the pattern PL→PL→MCC occurred in the very beginning of the 
meeting and then again in the final third of the meeting.  This was also apparent for Team Baby 
(Figures 16-17), as planning dominated the beginning of the meeting and reflection ended it.   
Processes involving monitoring and control, however, which operated in tandem with 
reasoning, more often appeared in the middle of problem solving.  This can be seen in Figure 18, 
in which monitoring and control of understanding occurred alongside antithetical reasoning in 
the middle of Team Kayak’s discourse.  It is also apparent from this visualization that the 
reasoning and regulation did not occur in one large mass but was spread out in what might be 
identified as cycles.  This could also be seen in Team Baby’s discourse in Figure 19, where 
sequences of monitoring and controlling understanding, along with analogies and antinomies, 





Figure 15. Team Ambulance’s speech units in sequence. X-axis values correspond to the first and last utterance in the compressed 
version of the team transcript. Blue diamonds represent regulatory utterances, while orange diamonds represent reasoning 
utterances. Diamonds are enlarged if they are a part of the sequence of interest. Here, light blue diamonds correspond to PL 
while darker blue diamonds correspond to MCC. The individual who voiced each utterance can be found alongside the y-axis 
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Figure 16. Team Baby’s speech units in sequence. X-axis values correspond to the first and last utterance in the compressed version of 
the team transcript. Blue diamonds represent regulatory utterances, while orange diamonds represent reasoning utterances. 
Diamonds are enlarged if they are a part of the sequence of interest. Here, light blue diamonds correspond to PL. The 
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Figure 17. Team Baby’s speech units in sequence. X-axis values correspond to the first and last utterance in the compressed version of 
the team transcript. Blue diamonds represent regulatory utterances, while orange diamonds represent reasoning utterances. 
Diamonds are enlarged if they are a part of the sequence of interest. Here, dark blue diamonds correspond to RE. The 
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Figure 18. Team Kayak’s speech units in sequence. X-axis values correspond to the first and last utterance in the compressed version 
of the team transcript. Blue diamonds represent regulatory utterances, while orange diamonds represent reasoning utterances. 
Diamonds are enlarged if they are a part of the sequence of interest. Here, light blue diamonds correspond to MCU, while dark 
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Figure 19. Team Baby’s speech units in sequence. X-axis values correspond to the first and last utterance in the compressed version of 
the team transcript. Blue diamonds represent regulatory utterances, while orange diamonds represent reasoning utterances. 
Diamonds are enlarged if they are a part of the sequence of interest. Here, light blue diamonds correspond to MCU, while light 
orange diamonds correspond to AG and dark orange diamonds to AN. The individual who voiced each utterance can be found 
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Figure 20. Team Kayak’s speech units in sequence. X-axis values correspond to the first and last utterance in the compressed version 
of the team transcript. Blue diamonds represent regulatory utterances, while orange diamonds represent reasoning utterances. 
Diamonds are enlarged if they are a part of the sequence of interest. Here, dark orange diamonds correspond to AT. The 
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The temporality of teams’ most frequent sequences suggests that there may be macro-
level and micro-level patterns playing out during problem solving.  On a macro level, it seems 
that teams begin with a set of plans, then engage in problem solving, and finally reflect on 
performance and plan for the future.  On a microlevel, teams appear to demonstrate smaller, 
dynamic cycles of reasoning and regulation that help to adjust plans, clarify understandings, 
resolve disagreements, and make decisions.   
Distribution of utterances among team members in common sequences.  A final 
question of interest was how individuals contributed to these sequences of reasoning and 
regulation.  For example, were certain patterns most distributed across individuals than others? 
Were certain people more apt to contribute to specific types of patterns? Did the level of 
collaboration change over time? As the results from Research Question 2 suggested, there were 
times (i.e., episodes) when reasoning and regulation were highly distributed, but others when 
only one or two individuals contributed.  Upon examination of the charts of team sequences over 
time, it was clear that most team members contributed to reasoning and regulation sequences at 
some point, but most sequences were distributed over only two to three people at any given time.  
The chart of Team Kayak’s antithetical reasoning sequences, shown in Figure 20, are a case in 
point.   
Over the course of the meeting, all but one of the team members were part of an 
antithetical reasoning sequence.  However, at any one time, only three individuals were actively 
reasoning.  This could also be seen in Team Baby’s planning sequences in Figure 16.  Although 
four of the five team members participated at some point, there were discrete moments featuring 
only Colby and Sarita; Colby, Sarita and Springer; and finally, Sarita, Springer, and Alvin.  
These results held over time, such that, even by the end of the meeting when reflection was 
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occurring (Figure 17), there were generally just two or three team members contributing.  These 
results may indicate that even if overall activity—including task-related and other talk—is being 
shared by everyone, there may be alternating dyads and triads of team members controlling the 





CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
 Broadly, the current study aimed to examine the interplay of relational reasoning (RR) 
and socially shared regulation of learning (SSRL) during a collaborative problem solving (CPS) 
task.  More specifically, nested in the domain of mechanical engineering, this study sought to 
determine: (a) whether the forms of RR and SSRL were employed in relatively equal proportions 
during problem solving or whether certain forms were privileged over others; (b) how collective 
activity was distributed across team members and whether specific team members emerged as 
more central to exchanges than others; and (c) whether patterns of co-occurrences between RR 
and SSRL could be uncovered and linked with particular individuals and points in time.  In this 
chapter, I will overview key findings and acknowledge certain limitations to this investigation.  
Then, I will discuss what I regard as the important substantive and methodological contributions 
of this work, and forward recommendations for future studies of CPS.   
Key Findings 
Teams Exhibit Differential Patterns of Relational Reasoning and Socially Shared 
Regulation of Learning  
 The results from this study demonstrated that all four engineering design teams engaged 
in unprompted relational reasoning (RR) and socially shared regulation of learning (SSRL), but 
in differing proportions.  Although there were some commonalities, including comparable usage 
of antinomous and monitoring and control of consensus (MCC) utterances, teams exhibited 
unique profiles of reasoning and regulation.  Pertaining to RR, Teams Baby and Ambulance 
voiced proportionally more analogies, while Teams Kayak and Toilet made proportionally more 
antithetical utterances.  With regard to SSRL, there were teams that voiced proportionally more 
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planning utterances, and others that voiced proportionally more monitoring and control of 
understanding or progress utterances.  Research suggests that the task—both its focal domain and 
its level of difficulty—shape the landscape of reasoning and regulation to some extent (Dumas et 
al., 2014; Jablansky et al., 2016, 2019; Lobczowski, Lyons, et al., 2020).  Indeed, this was 
reflected in the relatively comparable proportions of antinomy and monitoring and controlling 
utterances that seemed to be keys in understanding the differences between ideas, soliciting 
feedback, and making decisions.  However, there were several other factors that may have 
influenced teams’ reasoning and regulation.   
One possible explanation for the differential patterns of reasoning and regulation is that 
the teams were at different stages of the task when they were observed.  In other words, although 
all four teams were working toward the same ultimate goal, some may have progressed farther 
than others.  For instance, it was clear from the transcripts that Teams Baby and Ambulance were 
at the earlier stages of narrowing down their pool of ideas and were still open to the idea of 
generating new designs or reimagining existing designs.  This may have led them to use 
proportionally more analogical utterances, as they thought of other ideas after which they could 
model their designs.  Teams Kayak and Toilet, by contrast, appeared to be engaged in the 
process of eliminating project ideas, which may have necessitated more antithetical utterances to 
examine the differences between their designs on several criteria.   
Similarly, the teams may have been differentially prepared prior to their meetings, which 
had downstream effects on their regulation.  As a case in point, Team Toilet’s transcript revealed 
that one team member had developed the list of criteria with which to rank proposed designs and 
had preliminarily completed all of the comparisons and rankings on his own.  He subsequently 
spent precious meeting time explaining to his teammates the criteria he chose and how the 
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rankings were done, and then obtaining and incorporating their feedback into their evaluations.  
This approach to the task may have resulted in larger proportions of monitoring and control of 
understanding (MCU) as team members came to better understand the task and formed mental 
representations of their team members’ designs.   
Individual differences were another possibility for the differing proportions of RR and 
SSRL documented in this study.  Research suggests that prior knowledge and experience with a 
task may account for differences in the types and depth of regulation used by teams (King, 1992; 
Volet et al., 2009).  For example, students with more domain knowledge may be able to pose 
higher-level questions, which have been found to stimulate the activation and use of prior 
knowledge, analysis of relations, and explanation of concepts (King, 1990, 1992).  Additionally, 
both open questions, in which information is requested, and critical questions, in which claims 
are challenged, have been linked to the co-construction of knowledge and group consensus-
making activity (Visschers-Pleijers, Dolmans, de Leng, Wolfhagen, & Van der Vleuten, 2006).  
On the other hand, having less domain knowledge could also encourage more reasoning and 
regulation.  For instance, Ball and Christensen (2009) found that teams of engineering designers 
at a medical plastics company used analogies to help resolve uncertainty by identifying 
problems, generating solutions, and explaining concepts.  Accordingly, it is possible that in the 
present study students had different levels of knowledge and experience that either afforded or 
constrained specific types of reasoning and regulation.   
Finally, there may have been group-level factors that influenced proportions of reasoning 
and regulation.  Socioemotional interactions have been identified as a key contributor to team 
functioning and performance in CPS contexts (Jarvenoja & Jarvela, 2009; Rogat & Adams-
Wiggins, 2015).  Collaboration can lead to moments of positive interactions, marked by active 
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listening, respectful exchanges, and group cohesion, as well as negative interactions such as 
disparaging comments, disrespect of others, and social comparison.  Whereas positive 
socioemotional interactions may facilitate socially shared regulation by promoting 
communication and monitoring, supporting joint and inclusive planning, and encouraging group 
feedback, negative interactions may discourage participation, undermine monitoring and content 
understanding, and promote off-task behavior (Rogat & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2011).  Although 
the present study did not examine the character of students’ socioemotional exchanges, there 
were some notable differences in how team members interacted.  For instance, Nash (Team 
Ambulance) made consistent, concerted efforts to involve and obtain feedback from Grady and 
Ling, who rarely spoke.  This may have promoted a more positive socioemotional climate in 
which everyone felt comfortable offering evaluations of ideas or monitoring their understanding.  
By contrast, the individuals on Team Toilet made no attempt to include Sterling, who made only 
15 utterances throughout the entire meeting, and routinely discussed his ideas without involving 
him.  These more negative interactions may have hindered group cohesion and prevented team 
members from effectively co-constructing knowledge.   
Antinomous Reasoning and Monitoring and Control of Consensus are Key Processes 
involved in Collaborative Problem Solving  
 One finding of interest was that antinomous reasoning and monitoring and control of 
consensus (MCC) were present in relatively equal proportions in all of the teams’ problem-
solving discourse.  This may suggest that the cognitive capacity to reason about the 
incompatibilities among ideas, and the social ability to promote awareness and facilitate 
cohesion are important for CPS.  Indeed, theories of group learning and problem solving have 
emphasized that CPS requires maintaining a joint problem space (Roschelle & Teasley, 1995).  
123 
 
This necessarily involves setting goals, establishing shared understanding, and resolving 
conflicts (Scoular et al., 2017), none of which can be accomplished without monitoring team 
consensus (i.e., soliciting feedback, building agreement, aligning task representations).  Theories 
of CPS also highlight the importance of analyzing problems and developing coherent task 
representations to begin with.  Although this can be done with many forms of reasoning, 
antinomous reasoning may be especially important during CPS because it demands the ability to 
classify and organize elements of a problem (Slotta et al., 1995).  In effect, antinomous reasoning 
entails the categorization of what something is by explaining what it is not (Alexander & 
DRLRL, 2012).  In the present study, teams often paired antinomies with analogies and 
antitheses, using them to note where the similarities between ideas diverged, or explain why 
certain ideas ranked higher than others on certain criteria.  It is unclear whether the ubiquity of 
antinomous reasoning and monitoring and control of consensus in team discourse would 
generalize to other domains or tasks, but it seems plausible that these processes would prove 
important in ill-defined tasks involving the comparison of ideas and the coordination of multiple 
perspectives.   
Collaborative Problem Solving Alternates between Shared and Guided Activity  
 Another finding of interest was that team problem solving alternated between periods of 
shared and guided activity.  Shared activity was characterized by relatively equal contributions 
from participating team members, while guided activity was led or controlled by one or two 
group members.  Although research has found evidence of both shared and guided episodes 
(Lobczowski, Lyons, et al., 2020; Rogat & Adams-Wiggins, 2015), the current study was unique 
in being able to show when these episodes occurred during a problem-solving session.  This 
cycling between periods of more tightly controlled and more collaborative activity coheres with 
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conceptualizations of CPS rooted both in educational psychology and organizational psychology.  
For instance, Marks and colleagues’ (2001) recurring phase model of team processes theorizes 
that team activity occurs in discernible and recursive cycles of action phases, which consist of 
the monitoring and coordination processes that contribute to goal accomplishment, and transition 
phases, which involve the planning, reflection, and evaluation that punctuates engagement with 
task.  The action phases described by Marks et al.  (2001) align fairly well with the shared 
episodes identified in the current study, in which team members often monitored their 
understanding of task and content and reasoned relationally about designs.  The transition phases 
aligned well with the guided episodes, which almost exclusively featured regulatory activity such 
as planning and reflection.   
Similarly, Roschelle and Teasley’s (1995) theory of shared knowledge construction 
describes periods of group activity marked by a withdrawal from some participants followed by 
periods of intense interaction which incorporate individual insights generated in the previous 
period into the joint problem space (i.e., shared knowledge structure).  The theories of both 
Marks et al.  (2001) and Roschelle and Teasley, in combination with the findings of the current 
study, suggest that collaborative problem solving has an identifiable rhythm to it, although these 
rhythms may differ by group, task, and environment.   
Planning and Reflection Act as Bookends to Collaborative Problem Solving, While 
Relational Reasoning and Monitoring Co-occur in the Interim 
 The analysis of teams’ most frequent patterns of reasoning and regulation revealed that 
sequences of planning and reflection utterances were present at the beginning and the end of 
problem-solving sessions.  In contrast, relational reasoning and monitoring co-occurred in the 
interim.  More specifically, teams spent time at the beginning of the meeting discussing work 
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that had been done in previous sessions and then setting goals for the current session; in the 
middle, they worked on the task, reasoning about the similarities and differences among designs 
and monitoring their progress and understanding as they pushed forward; at the end of the 
meeting, teams would often sum up what they had done, evaluate whether they were happy with 
the end product, and decide what their objectives would be for the next time.   
This pattern is consistent with the framework for SSRL offered by Hadwin and 
colleagues, which posits that regulatory activity unfolds in loosely sequenced phases (Hadwin et 
al., 2011; Jarvela & Hadwin, 2013; Winne & Hadwin, 1998).  These phases include task 
definition, goal setting and planning, enacting tactics and strategies, and adaptations to 
metacognition.  In the context of the current study, the planning observed at the outset 
corresponded with the beginning phases of SSRL in which team members built a representation 
of the task, established goals, and devised steps to attain those goals.  The relational reasoning 
that co-occurred in the interim could be linked to the third phase of the SSRL framework of 
enacting tactics and strategies.  Finally, the reflection that occurred at the end (or preceded 
activity in the beginning), could be mapped onto the fourth phase, in which team members 
evaluated the success of their strategies and made modifications as necessary.   
As Winne and Hadwin (1998) noted, however, these phases do not always unfold in a 
fixed sequence or in equal proportions.  For instance, Team Baby spent a lot of time planning at 
the outset of the meeting, whereas Team Toilet jumped right into the task and cycled through to 
planning toward the middle of the meeting.  Similarly, Team Ambulance engaged in planning 
and reflection processes in the middle of the meeting as they completed one task and set goals 
for the next.  In this way, the results provide evidence for recursive cycles of reasoning and 
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regulation and help to elucidate why current models stress the loosely sequential nature of these 
constructs.   
Collaborative Problem Solving Can be Viewed at a Micro Level, Meso Level, and Macro 
Level  
 Finally, this study was able to examine team meetings at three levels of granularity, 
which afforded a unique set of insights into how problem solving iterates in collaborative 
contexts.  At the most granular level, or micro level, the sequence mining algorithm identified 
patterns of reasoning and regulation three to six utterances in length.  The sequences made it 
possible to see not only how reasoning and regulation intersected in real time, but also how 
different individuals contributed to them moment-to-moment.  At the next level, or meso level, 
episodes illustrated the extent to which activity was shared among team members or controlled 
by one or two individuals as they were addressing different aspects of the task.  Further, 
examining the temporality of shared versus guided activity shed a light on the unique rhythms of 
team problem-solving.  Patterns of dyadic exchanges also helped illustrate which individuals 
emerged as more central members of their team.  At the highest level, or macrolevel, it was 
possible to see which forms of reasoning and regulation were most prominent at the beginning, 
middle, and end of each meeting.  Even though the most frequently occurring sequences of 
reasoning and regulation differed among teams, this higher-level analysis showed that there were 
some commonalities in when certain forms were likely to occur.  With these three levels of 
analysis, the current study was able to provide a singular degree of nuance to the understanding 




 Although this study offered valuable insight into the interplay of reasoning and regulation 
in CPS contexts, it was constrained in several ways.  First, I was not able to collect outcome data 
on the quality of teams’ designs after the semester-long project had concluded.  Consequently, I 
could not conclude that certain teams manifested more optimal patterns of interaction than 
others.  In actuality, teams received feedback on their projects throughout the semester and were 
able to make changes to their designs at many stages.  As a result, an analysis of their final 
product (i.e., a prototype of one design) might not have been related to their problem solving in 
the meeting that was observed in this study.  Compounding this issue, team effectiveness has 
been characterized as a particularly difficult construct to measure, and psychological researchers 
are still struggling to define what team effectiveness is (Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, & Mount, 
1998; Gorman, Grimm, & Dunbar, 2018; Hackman, 1987).   
 A second limitation is related to the generalizability of this study.  It is unclear whether 
the results observed in the current study would extend to other teams, tasks, or domains.  For 
one, because teams self-selected into the study, it is possible that there were systematic 
differences between the groups observed and those who chose not to participate.  The groups 
who volunteered for the study may have been more motivated to work on their design projects or 
may have felt more confident in their ability to work together as a team.  Indeed, course 
procedure allowed students to choose their teammates, meaning some individuals may have 
known each other, been friends, or worked together on other projects.   Research has shown that 
working with friends on academic tasks can facilitate performance outcomes (Wentzel, 
Jablansky, & Scalise, 2018); thus, differences between teams observed in the present study may 
have been due, in part, to existing friendships between teammates or a lack thereof.  A greater 
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degree of familiarity with teammates may have also allowed for a better socioemotional climate, 
which may have, in turn, promoted certain types of reasoning and regulation.  Interestingly, 
Bakhtiar and colleagues (2018) found that socioemotional interactions among group members 
may be impacted by a number of factors, including (a) the incoming conditions (i.e., prior 
knowledge, preparation, emotions) upon which individuals base their evaluations, judgments, 
and decisions; (b) the regulation of emotions during the planning phase; (c) the presence of 
negative emotions during challenging episodes; and (d) the use of encouragement and 
motivational statements to create a positive climate.  Thus, it is possible that the teams in the 
present study displayed differential patterns of reasoning and regulation due to the ways in which 
they regulated their emotions.  Future research could explore this further by employing coding 
schemes that deal with emotion regulation (e.g., Lobczowski, Lyons, et al., 2020), or by using 
random assignment to teams from the start.  
 Research has found that team effectiveness is also influenced somewhat by the attributes 
of team members (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996) and certain facets of team composition, which may 
have been at play in the current study.  For example, individual differences such as 
agreeableness, cooperation, and trust tend to facilitate amicable interactions, prompt information 
sharing, and facilitate team coordination (Fisher, Bell, Dierdorff, & Belohlav, 2012).  Team-level 
constructs such as collective efficacy, racial, and gender diversity have also been linked to team 
outcomes.  Higher collective efficacy, for instance, is associated with better team performance in 
tasks requiring high levels of interdependence (Katz-Navon & Erez, 2005).  Findings have been 
somewhat mixed with regard to the racial and gender balance of teams, with some work 
reporting that such diversity hinders performance by creating a distinction between in-groups and 
out-groups, which may prevent social integration and harm group functioning (O’Reilly, 
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Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989).  However, other work suggests that diversity promotes better team 
performance by giving teams access to a broader range of past experiences and perspectives to 
draw on (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). 
As a case in point, Woolley and colleagues (2010) found that group collaboration is 
greatly improved by the presence of women in the group. Given that women are generally 
underrepresented in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields, these 
findings have important implications for engineering design in particular.  In the current study, 
two teams were entirely male-dominated, while the other two teams included one or two women 
apiece.  It is possible that, consistent with research suggesting women can improve team 
performance by enhancing collaborative group processes and establishing cooperative norms 
(Fenwick, Graham, & Neal, 2001), the females in the current study contributed to Team Baby’s 
openness to new design ideas or Team Ambulance’s emphasis on monitoring and control of 
consensus.  Future research that systematically assembles teams of varying levels of so-called 
surface-level diversity could provide further clarity on this important topic.  
 Beyond generalizing to other teams out of the study, it was unclear whether the patterns 
of reasoning and regulation observed might generalize to other tasks or domains.  Although the 
three forms of reasoning that were most prominent in the current study (i.e., analogy, antinomy, 
and antithesis) have been observed in other engineering design tasks (Christensen & Schunn, 
2007; Dumas & Schmidt, 2015), it is impossible to determine with certainty whether such 
reasoning is necessary for all engineering design tasks or whether the relation was spurious.  For 
instance, it may have been that the engineers sampled in this study were specifically taught to 
employ those types of reasoning.  Similarly, while high proportions of monitoring and control 
processes have been documented in ill-defined CPS tasks in several scientific domains (e.g., 
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veterinary medicine, pharmacy; Khosa & Volet, 2014; Lobczowski, Lyons, et al., 2020), it is 
difficult to say definitely that the profile of regulation observed in this study would hold in tasks 
of a different difficulty.  Future research must therefore strive to sample teams in a wide variety 
of domains completing tasks of differing levels of complexity.   
 An additional concern pertains to the generalizability of the coding scheme employed in 
this study.  Indeed, a common issue in qualitative research is the reliability of codes and the 
extent to which results can be replicated by other researchers.  In fact, I was able to successfully 
adapt both the RR and SSRL coding schemes of other lab groups without any noticeable 
problems with the reliability of any singular code.  However, one phenomenon which remains 
somewhat underexamined in the literature is the extent to which individuals’ speech patterns, or 
idiolect, impacts coding.  For instance, the monitoring and control of consensus (MCC) code 
involved soliciting feedback and determining levels of understanding and agreement among team 
members.  As such, a student asking his teammates “Do you know what I mean?” might 
reasonably be coded MCC.  However, in coding Team Toilet’s transcript, I found that one 
student ended almost every turn by saying, “Do you know what I mean?”  In many cases, it was 
clear that this verbalization was more of a speech habit than a genuine attempt to ask his 
teammates for their level of understanding, and therefore was generally coded as task-related 
(TR).  Thus, it seems important to advise that when performing qualitative coding, researchers 
must be sensitive to idiosyncratic verbal patterns and adapt coding as necessary.  
 A third limitation was that, in the case of SSRL, the depth of regulation was not 
measured.  Whereas relational reasoning, by definition, implies a higher-order process, 
regulation has been conceptualized as having dimensions of more and less depth.  Volet and 
colleagues (2009) describe low-level regulatory activity as an attempt to clarify basic facts, 
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versus high-level regulatory activity as engagement in the co-construction of knowledge.  Thus, 
it is possible that teams demonstrated different proportions of high- and low-level regulatory 
activity within any given form of regulation.  For instance, Team Toilet’s high proportion of 
monitoring and controlling of understanding (MCU) might have reflected their need to gather 
information rather than a propensity to make inferences, link ideas, or ask high-level questions.  
Future research that codes for the quality of regulation could therefore provide invaluable 
information not only about the composition of high- and low-level regulation within individuals 
or within a group, but also across teams.  This could, in turn, help researchers clarify the link 
between process and product in CPS contexts.   
 A final limitation related to the potential conceptual overlap between RR and SSRL.  As 
mentioned, some frameworks of SSRL consider the forms of RR as manifestations of regulation.  
For example, Lajoie et al.  (2015) regarded analogies as an instantiation of evaluation processes, 
and anomalies as instantiations of monitoring.  Indeed, there were utterances observed in the 
current study that appeared to have components of both RR and SSRL, such as when Bert, on 
Team Kayak, asked, “How is [the doggy paddle design] more impact resistant than a paddle 
float?” Bert appeared to be monitoring his understanding of the designs but also noting an 
antithetical relation between them.  Although it was important to make clear distinctions between 
RR and SSRL in the current study so that the interrelations between them could be made more 
visible, it may be that the two are not entirely distinguishable in practice.  Future research might 
attempt to clarify this link by allowing utterances to be double-coded, or by expanding current 




 Even with the acknowledgment of its limitations, this study has extended prior research 
in both substantive and methodological ways.  For example, to my knowledge, this is the first 
study to empirically explore the interplay between relational reasoning (RR) and socially shared 
regulation of learning (SSRL) in collaborative problem solving (CPS).  Although there is 
research on how RR iterates in collaborative contexts (Dumas et al., 2014; Jablansky et al., 
2016), it has not been meaningfully tied to regulatory activity through an analysis of team 
problem-solving discourse.  Additionally, while those prior studies summarized patterns of RR 
co-occurrences in a narrative format, the current study was able to empirically and quantitatively 
uncover frequently occurring sequences of RR within the analysis.  Similarly, there has been 
research on SSRL that has analyzed team discourse in collaborative learning activities, but it has 
often examined reasoning as an aspect of regulation, rather than as a distinct but co-occurring 
process.  Further, this study contributes to the literature on SSRL by examining its iterations in 
larger groups, as opposed to two to four individuals, and within a naturalistic environment, as 
opposed to a computer-supported collaborative learning environment.  This study was also novel 
in examining manifestations of RR and SSRL in the domain of mechanical engineering, and, 
more specifically, an engineering design task in which success is predicated on effective 
teamwork.   
 On the methodological front, through this investigation, I was able to align the 
conceptualizations of constructs with their measurement; that is, to use dynamic methods to 
capture dynamic constructs.  CPS and SSRL have been theorized as dynamic in nature, but they 
have traditionally been studied in more static ways.  However, by using a small grain size (i.e., 
utterances) to observe RR and SSRL, leveraging data mining techniques, and assembling 
133 
 
compelling visualizations, the present study was able to show the dynamic and cyclical character 
of these critical CPS processes.  Consequently, this study was able to uncover systematic co-
occurrences of reasoning and regulation at three different levels.  At the micro level, there were 
recurring sequences of reasoning and regulation occurring moment-to-moment; at the meso 
level, there were discernible episodes of more and less shared activity among team members; and 
at the macro level, there were identifiable patterns of when certain forms of reasoning and 
regulation co-occurred.   
Implications  
 The present study offers implications for research and practice in the areas of RR, SSRL, 
and CPS in general.  Regarding RR, the study provides further evidence for the proposition that 
there are systematic co-occurrences between different forms of RR as individuals and groups 
engage in problem solving (Dumas et al., 2014; Jablansky et al., 2016, 2019).  However, the 
study may also advance theory by shedding light on the potentially critical role of antinomous 
reasoning when reasoning about similarities and differences.  In previous studies, researchers 
have seemed to implicitly assume a division between relations of similarity and difference; the 
current study shows that it may be necessary to use a combination when drawing any higher-
order relation between two things.  This may have implications for practitioners who wish to 
train students or professionals how to reason relationally.  Rather than teaching the forms of 
reasoning as separate types of relations (Kendeou, Butterfuss, Van Boekel, & O’Brien, 2017; 
Richland, Begolli, Simms, Frausel, & Lyons, 2017), educators may want to demonstrate how 
multiple forms of relational reasoning can be used in concert.   
 Pertaining to SSRL, the current study supports previous work demonstrating the cyclical 
and recursive nature of regulatory processes during CPS (Jarvela & Hadwin, 2013; Winne & 
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Hadwin, 1998).  Although regulation did not always flow linearly, most teams began by setting 
plans, then monitoring their engagement with the task, and finally reflecting on their work and 
setting plans for the future.  This study also builds on theoretical work by showing key sequences 
of regulatory activity that occurred within those broader phases of regulation.  A case in point 
was monitoring and control of consensus, which accompanied planning, monitoring and control 
of understanding and progress, and reflection at various points during problem solving.  Future 
research on CPS in naturalistic environments should see whether these findings generalize to 
other teams, tasks, and domains.   
Importantly, this study was also able to integrate work on regulatory processes with work 
on the social sharedness of activity.  With social transition plots illustrating the dyadic exchanges 
among team members across an entire problem-solving session, it was possible to identify not 
only how distributed activity was, but what manner of reasoning and regulation occurred, when it 
occurred, and who was responsible for these verbalizations.  Researchers might consider adding 
a contextual dimension to current SSRL theories to address the variable nature of sharedness and 
the temporality of different sequences of regulatory processes.   
Finally, this study offers support to theories that emphasize the cyclical nature of CPS 
(Marks et al., 2001; Roschelle & Teasley, 1995), underscoring the idea that different teams, 
tasks, and environments may demand different rhythms of problem solving.  As reviewed in 
Chapter 2, theories of CPS range from focusing on the moment-to-moment, to the episodic, to 
the holistic when describing problem solving.  The current study suggests that a comprehensive 
theory of CPS should incorporate aspects of all three, as there are nuances to be considered at 
each level.  Accordingly, those wishing to study CPS should ensure that they adopt measures that 
can capture variance at different time scales.  With more information about how problem solving 
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changes over time, it may be possible to identify areas for intervention.  Further, incorporating 
measures of individual differences with observations of CPS processes may eventually provide 
insight into how best to assemble a team.   
In addition to potential advancements in theory, this study has several implications for 
educators and employers hoping to foster CPS in teams.  For one, the differential portraits of 
each team’s reasoning and regulation suggest that there may not be one optimal way to problem 
solve.  It may be the case that there are several paths to a solution, dependent on the attitudes, 
behaviors, and cognitions exhibited by individuals as well as the emergent group dynamics of the 
team.  In some ways, this finding may seem disadvantageous because it does not provide a 
prescriptive approach that practitioners can use to teach CPS.  However, the broader patterns 
uncovered in this study may be more actionable.  For instance, the analysis of Team Kayak 
revealed that the team alternated between periods of activity that were shared more and less 
equally among team members.  Those periods in which one or two individuals dominated 
appeared to be key in promoting team regulation, which in turn spurred more reasoning and 
problem solving.  For teams of college students or working professionals, it may be wise to 
designate someone as the team regulator—someone who will check in with everyone 
periodically and ensure that team members are on the same page and have completed sufficient 
planning and reflection to move forward.  For younger students in primary or secondary school, 
it may be advisable for a teacher to explicitly prompt students to engage in regulation at regular 
intervals to facilitate problem-solving performance.  Educators could also communicate to 
students that problem solving need not occur in a linear fashion, and that they will likely need to 
revise their plans a number of times before reaching a solution.  
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Likewise, it is impossible to prescribe one best way to reason relationally in a team 
setting.  Further, unlike the forms of regulation—all of which appear to be present in any manner 
of problem solving—not all forms of reasoning may be necessary for every task.  However, 
teachers could teach students about the forms of relational reasoning and craft exercises to have 
them practice it collaboratively.  Additionally, educators could construct curricula that describe 
how to use different types of reasoning together, much like the engineers demonstrated in this 
study on a moment-to-moment basis.  Although many students are taught how to compare and 
contrast with analogies and antitheses for the purposes of essays and written assignments, there 
may be added value in developing these skills in a verbal format within team problem-solving 
scenarios.    
Coda 
 Now more than ever, individuals must be well-versed in collaborative problem solving 
(CPS) if they are to address the world’s most pressing social, economic, and environmental 
concerns.  However, a series of national and international reports continue to document 
shortcomings in this area.  With no universal curricula to teach students or employees, and 
research distributed across different fields of study, the path forward is uncertain.  Current 
research suggests that successful CPS involves both cognitive and social processes, including the 
abilities to reason relationally and regulate collective activity.  The present study helps shed a 
light on how these processes unfold during a CPS task, including how often they occur or co-
occur, which forms they take, and how different individuals contribute to them.  With a better 
understanding of moment-to-moment changes and the global patterns displayed by these 
processes, researchers and practitioners alike may gain new and actionable insights into the 




The following is a description of the data structures and algorithm used to represent and analyze 
a meeting transcript. It is intended to convey the main features of the actual code used. The 
meetings were first transcribed in Microsoft Word, then coded for speech utterances and 
episodes in Microsoft Excel. The programming code to analyze the meetings was written in 
Excel’s Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). Therefore, the data structures are presented as 
Visual Basic code fragments. They form a complete description of the algorithm’s internal 
representation of a meeting. These data structures can easily be translated to other programming 
language implementations, although small details might need to be altered to accommodate 
meetings that were not coded in Excel.  
 
The description of the algorithm is written in English pseudo code with Visual Basic style 
references to data structures. The pseudo code is intended to convey the overall approach to 





‘SpeechUnit describes a single coded utterance 
Type SpeechUnit 
    speaker As Integer ‘Index of name of speaker in meeting 
teammembers array 
    prevSpeaker As Integer ‘Index of name of previous speaker in meeting 
teammembers array 
    text As String  ‘Text of the utterance 
    SeqNum As Integer                    ‘Sequence number of the utterance in the 
meeting 
    code As Integer                   ‘Number of the specific Code classification of 
the utterance 
    LineNum As Integer                ‘Line number of transcript 
    PhraseNum As Integer              ‘Number of the specific phrase on this line 




‘TransciptLine is a row in the transcript with a valid speaker 
Type TranscriptLine 
    speaker As Integer ‘Index of name of speaker in meeting 
teammembers array 
    text As String ‘Text of this line 
    NumUtterances As Long ‘Number of coded utterances on this line 
    rowNum As Integer ‘Starting row number in spreadsheet of this line 
    EndrowNum As Integer ‘Ending row number in spreadsheet of this line 
    Utterances() As SpeechUnit ‘Description of each utterance 
End Type 
 




    Category As Integer ‘Exception type: 1=invalid speaker, 2=invalid 
code, 3=all units on line ignored 
    SpeakerName As String ‘Speaker name if this is a speaker exception 
    rowNum As Integer ‘Line of transcript in which anomaly occurs 
    PhraseNum As Integer ‘Number of the specific phrase on this line 




‘Distribution of Speech Units by TeamMembers Over Time Units (SeqNum) 
Type UnitDistr 
    IntervalLength As Integer ‘Length of speech unit sequence over which 
bucketing occurs 
    numIntervals As Integer ‘Number of intervals in meeting 




‘PatternDescr provides the necessary information to analyze a particular sequence of codes 
Type PatternDescr 
    SeqLen As Integer ‘Length of this sequence 
    SeqNum() As Integer ‘Beginning sequence number of pattern in this 
transcript 
    sequenceText As String ‘The full text of the sequence codes 




‘UtterancePointer is a map from an utterance sequence number to the line and phrase where the 
utterance occurs 
Type UtterancePointer 
    LineNum As Integer ‘The line number where this utterance occurs 




‘Episode describes a discrete episode within a meeting 
Type Episode 
    StartRow As Integer ‘Starting row of this episode in transcript 
    EndRow As Integer ‘Ending row of this episode in transcript 
    StartLine As Integer ‘Starting line of this episode in transcript 
    EndLine As Integer ‘Ending line of this episode in transcript 
    StartUnit As Integer ‘Starting unit of this episode on starting row 
    EndUnit As Integer ‘Ending unit of this episode on ending row 
    EpisodeCode As String ‘String designating type of episode (Guided or 
Shared) 
    Person1 As String ‘Name of person who guided meeting 
    Person2 As String ‘Name of second person who guided meeting 
End Type 
 




    Name As String ‘The name of this transcript object 
    NumUtterances As Integer ‘Number of coded utterances in the meeting 
    RowOfFirstLIne As Integer ‘Row number of the first line of the transcript 
    TotalLines As Integer ‘Total number of lines in transcript 
    Lines() As TranscriptLine ‘The collection of parsed lines 
    MapToLine() As UtterancePointer ‘Map from an utterance sequence number to the 
line and phrase where the utterance occurs 
    NumAnomalies As Integer ‘Number of anomalies detected 
    Anomalies() As Exception ‘Description of each anomalous line detected 
    MaxCodesOnOneLine As Integer ‘The maximum number of speech units we found 
on any line of the transcript 
    FrequencyMatrix() As Integer ‘Count of each utterance by person 
    AdjacencyMatrix() As Integer ‘Count of times speaker x speaks after speaker y 
    MemberByUnitByTime As UnitDistr ‘Distribution of Member by Unit by Time 
(Sequence Number) 
    NumSequences As Integer ‘Number of sequences in SeqList 
    NumUniqueSequences As Integer ‘Number of unique sequences in SeqList 
    SeqList() As PatternDescr ‘List of all code sequences in the transcription 
    UniqueSeqList() As PatternDescr ‘List of unique code sequences in the 
transcription 
    MaxFrequency As Integer ‘Maximum frequency of any unique sequence 
    EpisodeList() As Episode ‘Ordered list of episodes in this meeting 
    NumberEpisodes As Integer ‘Number of episodes in this meeting 
End Type 
 
‘SeqParam is a set of attributes that applies to a speech unit 
Type SeqParam 
    code As String ‘The unique two-letter code for this type of unit 
    Ignore As Boolean ‘TRUE iff code should be ignored in compressed 
transcript 
    MapTo As String ‘Alternate code this code should be replaced 
with in compressed transcript 
    Compress As Boolean ‘TRUE iff consecutive occurrences of this code 
should be ignored for the same speaker 
    colorR As Integer ‘RGB red value for charts 
    colorG As Integer ‘RGB green value for charts 
    colorB As Integer ‘RGB blue value for charts 
    codeType As Integer ‘RR=1, SSRL=2, OTHER=3 
End Type 
 
‘MemberData is a collection of attributes for each team member 
Type MemberData 
    ActualName As String ‘Team members’ actual first name 








    ProjectName As String ‘Name of team’s project (“Kayak”, “Toilet”, 
etc.) 
    TeamMembers() As MemberData ‘Name of each team member 
    Transcript As Transcription ‘Raw transcript of the Meeting 
    CompressedTranscript As Transcription ‘Compressed and mapped transcript 
    Spreadsheet As String ‘Name of spreadhseet with meeting data 
    Tab As String ‘Name of tab in spreadsheet with meeting data 
    NumberMembers As Integer ‘Number of members on team 
    SpeechCodes() As SeqParam ‘Array of unique speech codes coded for the 
meeting 
    NumberOfCodes As Integer ‘Number of unique speech codes coded for the 
meeting 
    MinSeqLen As Integer ‘Minimum sequence length for pattern mining 
    MaxSeqLen As Integer ‘Maximum sequence length for pattern mining 
    MaxSkippedLines As Integer ‘Maximum number of skipped lines when 
compressing transcript 





Algorithm to Analyze Meeting 
        
Initialize Parameters 
 
Allocate a Meeting structure called “thisMeeting” 
 
Read Input Parameters 
Name of spreadsheet with coded transcript 
Populate thisMeeting.SpeechCodes 
Read list of RR, SSRL, and other utterance codes (“AG”, “AM”, “AN”, “AT”, “PL”, 
“MCU”, “MCC”, “MCP”, “OT”, “IN”, “RE”, “TR”, “UN”) 
For each code 
Should code be ignored in processing the meeting? 
Should code be mapped to a different code 
Should consecutive occurrences of code for same speaker be compressed 
to one instance? 
Read minimum and maximum sequence lengths for data mining 
 
Parse Transcript and Build Representation of Meeting 
 
Open spreadsheet with coded transcript 
 
Parse spreadsheet and find the names of each team member who speaks 
Assign a pseudonym for each team member 
 
Populate the data structure thisMeeting.Transcript 
Populate the data structure thisMeeting.Transcript.Lines 
For each line 𝑘 in written transcript… 
Store the speaker, text of line, number of coded utterances 
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Populate thisMeeting.Transcript.Lines.Utterances with details of each coded 
utterance 
 
Create a compressed transcript starting with thisMeeting.Transcript and using the input 
parameters as a guide 
For each line 𝑘 in thisMeeting.Transcript.Lines… 
For each coded unit 𝑢 in 𝑘… 
  If 𝑢 is unequal to previous unit, then add 𝑢 to thisMeeting.CompressedTranscript 
 
Populate thisMeeting.CompressedTranscript.EpisodeList by building a map of when (what line and 
unit within the line in thisMeeting.CompressedTranscript) episodes occur 
 
Graph each utterance in thisMeeting.CompressedTranscript 
Arrange team members along the vertical axis with values: 
Team member 1 = 1, team member 2 = 2, etc. 
For 𝑢 = 1 to thisMeeting.CompressedTranscript.NumUtterances 
Plot a data point such that 
The x-axis value equals 𝑢 
The y-axis value equals thisMeeting.CompressedTranscript.Lines.Utterances(u).speaker 













Calculate a frequency matrix describing how many times each team member utters each type of 
coded speech in each episode 
 
Calculate an adjacency matrix specifying how many times each team member speaks directly after 
each other member in each episode 
 
Chart dyadic relationships 
For each episode… 
Arrange data points along a circle 
Each data point represents a team member 
Use a square to represent the members, if any, who guided the episode 
Use a circle to represent the members who did not guide the episode 
 
For each team member, 𝑚𝑖… 
For each team member,𝑚𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,… 
Draw an arrow from 𝑚𝑖 to 𝑚𝑗 with the following attributes: 




The color of the arrow represents the type of utterance (RR, 
SSRL, or task-related or other) 
 
Perform Data Mining 
For s = minimum sequence length to maximum sequence length… 
For i = first code in transcript to (last code in transcript – minimum sequence length + 1) 
Add sequence {code i -> code i+1 -> … -> code i+s-1} to list of all sequences 
 
Sort list of all sequences by sequence codes 
 
Count frequency of occurrence of each unique sequence, remove duplicates, and keep a list of where 
in the meeting each sequence occurs 
 
Sort remaining unique sequences by frequency in descending order and print list of sequences 
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